Executive Affairs Authority Chairman's Preface

As we conclude the activities of the International Advisory Board of the UAE Peaceful Nuclear Energy Program (UAE Program), and as the members of the IAB publish their final report, I wished to seize upon the opportunity to express on behalf of the entire UAE Program our deep appreciation for the IAB Chairman, Dr. Hans Blix, and all the members of his board, who have given so liberally of their time and their expertise to aid the UAE in launching this historic program.

The IAB published its first report in 2010, following detailed briefings and evaluations of the performance of both promotional and regulatory entities within the UAE nuclear energy program. From that point until the present, the IAB has conducted similar reviews and published their findings roughly every six months. Each of these reports, drawing upon the extensive knowledge and background of the board members, made a valuable contribution to the UAE Program in helping us to gain an objective perspective on our successes and our failings. The 16 reports published by the IAB have been very helpful to the UAE Program, particularly as the latter has passed through the seldom-trod phase of beginning a wholly new program.

Today, the project at the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP), the largest-ever nuclear construction project in the world, is progressing steadily. The overall completion of the project (including all four units) is more than 85%. Once operational, these units will provide safe, clean and reliable electricity to power the UAE economy, all while mitigating more than 21 million tons of carbon dioxide emissions each year.

Internationally, the UAE continues to work closely with the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure the highest levels of nuclear safety and quality. International collaboration has been an important part of the UAE Program, as has been demonstrated by more than 3,700 UAE participants in various IAEA initiatives and activities, including hosting the recent International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Power in the 21st Century.

In another illustration of our commitment to international cooperation, it should be noted that the UAE’s Peaceful Nuclear Energy Program is likely the most diverse and most multicultural in the world, with more than 20% of program staff being made up of women and over 40 nationalities being involved.

Once again, the UAE Peaceful Nuclear Energy Program has been fortunate to have such a distinguished group of nuclear leaders to assist it through this complex launch phase and to help carry it to the current pre-operational stage, where established oversight bodies and mechanisms such as the IAEA and WANO can harness their resources to further assist us in meeting our long-standing aspirations of achieving the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and transparency. We are all grateful to the role of the IAB, and highly recommend it as a potential best practice for other nations considering the adoption of peaceful nuclear energy for the first time.

Chairman's Preface

It is with a sense of fulfilment that I transmit to you the last report of the International Advisory Board on the development of the United Arab Emirates Nuclear Power Program. As always, the report covers the implementation of the five main principles on which the UAE Nuclear Power Program is based on: safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency and sustainability. The Board is confident that all those who are responsible for the success of the program will continue to adhere to these principles.

The UAE nuclear program is nearing the operational phase. Construction of all the four units of the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant (BNPP) is nearly complete. As of August 31, 2017, Units 1 and 2 were 94% complete and Units 3 and 4 were 68% complete.

This last and sixteenth report of the IAB, discusses a host of items: the updated status of the Barakah NPP, the status of the Operating License, the solution of certain technical issues that were pending from the last meeting, cyber-security, international collaborations, waste management, Sufficient Qualified Experienced Personnel (SQEP), Nawah’s educational program and much more.

Looking back, the Board is convinced of the wisdom of the UAE’s decision to select a fully developed reactor type, which came with a fully engaged seller, and a competitive reactor purchase contract. The Board also concurs in the practice of resolving technical issues as soon as they come up, the practice of recruiting professional female staff and the practice of public outreach.

I would like to thank all the entities for their contributions to our meetings since 2010 and for responding to the Board‘s recommendations. My thanks are also due to my fellow Board members for their continuous attention throughout the past years and for collectively taking responsibility for all the sixteen reports. I am grateful for the privilege to have been a part of this great program and I wish the UAE the best of success as it soon reaches the operational phase.

Introduction

The original mandate of the IAB envisioned that the Board would help lead the UAE program in an advisory capacity, through the technical and political complexities of the concept and construction phases. Construction of Units 1 and 2 is virtually complete and the construction of Units 3 and 4 is far along.

Operations are actively focusing on the process of preparing the infrastructure required to achieve sustained nuclear operations in adherence to the highest standards of nuclear safety, quality and security. The IAB was impressed with the degree of commitment of management to this process.
Operations are scheduled to begin at Unit 1 in the fall of next year, 2018 and at Unit 2 in early 2019. It is estimated that the four reactors will be operating by the scheduled date of 2021.
Thus, the IAB has successfully completed its mandate. The Board is proud of its association with the UAE Program, which is an essential part of the energy future of the UAE and the world community.

David Scott also indicated that the Board would be invited back for one more meeting - a celebration at the time of the commencement of operations - which is hopefully in the near future. That, indeed, will be a great day for everyone - for the energy future of the international community and for the worldwide struggle against climate change.

The Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR) conducted the first entity briefing, as per usual, after David Scott’s opening remarks on October 1st 2017. The Director General of FANR began the briefing with an opening statement in which he said that the UAE has created an excellent international regulatory program. He said that, from the beginning, it had been necessary to establish the UAE Program with a considerable emphasis on the quality of production as well as construction. He believed that the outstanding issues were security, safety, and their interaction. There was a need to attract outstanding professionals to the UAE Program, so a sustainable program is built. Chairman Blix thanked him for his introduction and years of support. Several senior FANR officers continued the briefing, including the Deputy Director General.

The briefing by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) was carried out, as in the past, by Ambassador Hamad Al Kaabi. In his briefing, he underscored the superb relationships that the UAE Program had developed with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In the view of the Board, this is in no small part the result of the Ambassador’s outstanding work in Vienna.

The following day, prior to the briefing of the Board by the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), there was a meeting with His Excellency Khaldoon Al Mubarak, the Chairman of the ENEC Board of Directors and the Chairman of the Executive Affairs Authority (EAA). He commended the Board for their contributions, “We couldn’t have done it without your wise counsel.”

The second part of the meeting took place the following day on October 2nd 2017. The meeting featured a comprehensive briefing by ENEC’s Board and led by the CEO Eng. Mohamed Al Hammadi, the Chief Program Officer (CPO), the Project Engineering Director, as well as several other senior officers of ENEC and its operating subsidiary Nawah, which will operate and maintain the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant. This briefing was followed by the Board holding its own private discussion, as has been the regular practice.

The UAE Peaceful Nuclear Energy Program is based on upholding the highest standards based on the five principles of safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency and sustainability. The IAB has been responsible for reviewing the UAE Program bi-annually and reporting on how well it has adhered to these principles. The Board is happy to conclude its eight years of service with the statement that the UAE has strictly, completely and enthusiastically adhered to these principles throughout the eight years of the Board’s tenure. The UAE is to be greatly applauded for its outstanding performance in this regard.

Safety

Safety assessment and recommendations

The UAE Peaceful Nuclear Energy Program is a great success story. Construction of the four units of the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant is nearing completion. As of August 31 2017, Units 1 and 2 were 94% complete, and Units 3 and 4, were 68%complete. The construction workforce is decreasing down to 15,000 from a high of 21,000. Operations are gradually taking control, through a systematic commissioning and turnover program, from construction to systems acceptance. The testing phase is progressing steadily. The conditions that will grant Nawah to proceed with the first fuel load of Unit 1 depends on the receipt of the Operations License (OL) by FANR, and on the work that ensures that the operating subsidiary has the right People, Plant, Programs, Procedures and Processes to safely manage operations at Unit 1.

ENEC is scheduling the complete systems turnover of Unit 1 for operations by the end of 2017, handing over the Unit to Nawah for operational readiness.

In the past IAB meetings, the Board was informed that despite the imminent completion of construction of Unit 1 and the soon-to-occur completion of construction for Unit 2, operations had been, to a certain degree, delayed pending the resolution of two issues. The first was the hiring of sufficient numbers of expert personnel to ensure fully manageable reactor operations and the second was resolution of certain technical issues, for which clear action plans for resolution are being followed.

Operational readiness is moving forward led by Nawah:

• All 46 Program Description documents are complete and self-assessments have been conducted. Twenty-six out of 46 (57%) programs have been inspected by FANR
• All 47 Process Description documents are complete and self-assessments have been conducted. Twenty-six out of 47 (55%) processes are fully complete and ready for inspection
• About 1,200 out of 1,800 (67%) procedures required for Operational Readiness are fully complete and ready for inspection

Since September 2017, Nawah has been taking more control in preparation for the first fuel load by acting as though actually running Unit 1 and having practice meetings, etc. This will enable Nawah to master the Plant infrastructure while awaiting FANR approval of the Operating License. Once the license is approved, Nawah will commence the load of the fuel assemblies into Unit 1 and start the Power Ascension Testing procedure, in adherence to the highest standards of safety and quality.

FANR reported that in order for the OL preparation for Unit 1 to be complete, a few issues need to be resolved and two additional reports need to be released. Since 2010, approximately 115 construction and commission inspections have been completed and five inspections remain to be carried out. With respect to organizational readiness inspections, all Control Room inspections have been carried out except for follow up inspections; four of six Technical Training inspections have been conducted; Procedure and Process Implementation―inspections to determine whether all implementing procedures are in place―three of six “waves” (each “wave” covers approximately ten program process areas) have been completed; the Final Integrated inspections (two or three) which focus on staffing levels and qualifications are not yet scheduled.

Only 40 of 1,746 Requests for Information remain unresolved; 16 of 230 Safety Evaluation Reports (SER) are not yet completed and all but 61 of 346 inspection findings have been closed. The FANR Safety Assessment focused on system designs and operating arrangements is taking into account the unique environmental conditions and hazards on Barakah site (air and cooling water temperature, humidity, sand storms, dust storms). Another area of detailed review and assessment was the containment performance in severe accident conditions: containment integrity and leak tightness is necessary to eliminate the risk of significant radioactive release. The draft OL calls for an interim periodic safety review with the first review to focus on experience of systems function in harsh environmental conditions―scheduled to be conducted in five years. Finally, the IAEA pre-OSART team rendered an overall positive judgment in its report in early October.

Turning to the technical engineering issues, there were four issues since the last IAB meeting that needed to be solved: the issues detected on the Pilot Operated Safety and Relief Valves (POSRV), which are the most safety critical; the requirement for higher performance margins of the Safety Injection Pumps; the Essential Service Water System pipe through wall corrosion, which has been fixed and is only pending regulatory closure; and the requirement for higher performance of the Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger, which has also been fixed and is only pending regulatory closure. The third and fourth issues were quickly resolved: in the first case by replacing the pipes damaged by corrosion, in the second case by re-manufacturing the relevant heat-exchange plates to make them compliant with their original design specifications. Performance of the Safety Injection pumps was improved by small modification of their hydraulic parts and all pumps passed on retest.

The POSRV issue has been more complicated; the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) reviewed the same problem in Korea at Shin Kori 3 (the reference plant for Barakah) and concluded that the principal problem was the startup sequence, which did not provide even heating of the valve parts. The operator altered the startup sequence and improved the insulation.

In demonstrating their adherence to the highest standards of safety and quality, ENEC/Nawah undertook their own research for the root cause, engaging some of the world’s most reputed experts to address the root cause and draw action plans. An updated report on the issue was provided by ENEC/Nawah to FANR. The startup sequence was modified and improved insulation was added. It was an outcome similar to the one reached at Shin Kori 3. A retest is scheduled for November 2017 and there is considerable confidence that the problem has been solved. It is believed by ENEC/Nawah that they now have a safe leak-free valve, pending the results of the testing; any leakage could be detected by a temperature increase in the pipe between POSRV and the steam relief tank. Replacement of POSRV with devices of a different design is being considered as a long-term solution.

Security

Security assessment and recommendations

The Physical Protection Plan for Barakah is now largely implemented in practical plant arrangements. The principal security issue being focused on now is cyber security. In line with nuclear plants internationally, managing the risk of a cyber-security attack is a priority at Barakah.

• In 2010, Stuxnet destroyed 1,000 centrifuges in the uranium enrichment facility in Nantanz, Iran
• In 2012, Shamoon wiped out 35,000 computers at Saudi Aramco led by a group of hackers calling themselves the Syrian Electronic Army
• In 2017, Ransomware operating in the U.S. caused thousands of critical systems in hospitals, manufacturing facilities, and government systems to be held hostage by malware encrypting their data

The objective of cyber security is the protection of equipment systems and networks against cyber-attacks that would impair safety, security or emergency preparedness. The necessary FANR regulation system is in place. The FANR regulations take into account the approaches proposed in the IAEA security guidelines and in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Guides. The list of Cyber Security Milestones is extensive:

• Establishment of Cyber Security Assessment Team (CSAT)
• Identify Critical Systems (CSs) and Critical Digital Assets (CDAs)
• Installation of a protective device between the lower and the higher level devices in the security defensive architecture
• Protections against hazards caused by portable media and mobile devices
• Cyber tampering―insider mitigation rounds
• Apply cyber security controls to a select group of CDAs
• Ongoing monitoring and assessment of applied cyber security controls
• Full implementation of the Cyber Security Plan for all SSEP functions

FANR’s recent steps for implementation of cyber security included: an inspection at Westinghouse Office (USA) in December 2016, a supplier for IT and I&C Systems was conducted to verify the implementation of the cyber security protection strategy for Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant; there was a review of the ENEC Cyber Security Program Manual Revision 4; and the implementation schedule of milestones was established in December 2016. This led to an agreement to undertake an inspection at the Barakah Plant from October 29th to November 2nd, 2017, of the implementation of the protection strategy for the CDAs at Unit 1.

Non-proliferation

Non - proliferation assessment and recommendations

In his briefing, Ambassador Al Kaabi stressed the continuing importance of the UAE’s relationship with the IAEA. He emphasized the importance of formulating IAEA support for the transition to the operational phase of the program, as well as research and development and sustainability for the long term. The Ambassador underlined the importance of sharing the UAE experience as a model for other countries. This is something that the UAE has had in mind from the beginning. There is an IAEA Collaborating Center at Khalifa University in the UAE. The UAE, in part through its work in international agreements and conventions in the nuclear field, is becoming a major player in international nuclear cooperation.

In Abu Dhabi, the IAEA International Ministerial Conference for Nuclear Power in the 21st Century was organized for October 2017 by the IAEA and hosted by the UAE Ministry of Energy in collaboration with FANR. This will be the 4th International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Power in the 21st Century as well as the fifth high-level conference to be hosted in the UAE. It will enable:

A dialogue at high ministerial and international expert level on the role of nuclear power in meeting future energy demand, contributing to sustainable development and addressing climate change; discussions on the main issues related to the development of nuclear power in the form of presentations, and local and international panel discussions.

In addition, there have been three International Convention meetings of importance in 2017:

• The Third Extraordinary Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management in May in Vienna, Austria
• The Seventh Review-Meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) March in Vienna, Austria; and
• The conclusion of the Subsidiary Arrangement to the IAEA-UAE Safeguards Agreement

Since 2010, the UAE has carried out significant capacity building at the IAEA. This includes more than 3,700 participants from the UAE and since 2010, more than 780 women.

Since 2011, there have been more than 300 activities by the UAE with the IAEA, focusing on safety and security, and more than 50 UAE experts were involved in 40 IAEA activities.

Since January 2011, the UAE has received nine major IAEA peer-review missions and has always received a positive report. These missions include the Emergency Preparedness Review Service (EPREV) in March 2015; International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) in October 2016; and pre-Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) in September 2017. The pre-OSART mission was still in country during the October 1-2, 2017 IAB meeting.

The UAE has completed Phase 3 of the IAEA Milestones approach, fulfilling all 19 milestones to develop the required nuclear infrastructure: national position; nuclear safety; management structure; legislative framework; regulatory framework; financing; human resources development; safeguards; security and physical protection; emergency planning; radiation protection; nuclear fuel cycle; nuclear waste; environmental protection; site and supporting facilities; industrial involvement; procurement; electric grid; and stakeholder involvement.

Policy of the UAE regarding the Long-Term Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Radioactive Waste

FANR has prepared a digest of the Cabinet Policy contemplated in Article 41 of Federal Law by Decree No. 6 of 2009 (the “Nuclear Law”). It remains under consideration by senior officials.

Radioactive Waste from other sources will be managed by the UAE along with waste from nuclear energy plants.

With respect to used fuel assemblies, options will include:

Direct disposal in the UAE with alternatives of reprocessing outside of the UAE, fuel leasing or international geological repository.

Low-level operational waste will be disposed in an engineered near-surface low-level waste repository. Higher-level waste will be shifted to deep geological disposal.

Decommissioning waste will be disposed in suitable repositories in the same way as operational waste.

The design of the Barakah Plant spent fuel storage pool provides sufficient capacity for 20 years operation for each unit. ENEC and its affiliates plan to establish an independent spent fuel storage waste allocation before the spent fuel storage pool reaches capacity.

The Low and Medium Level Radioactive waste storage building at the Barakah Plant provides sufficient storage capacity for 10 years for low-level waste and intermediate-level waste produced from the operations of the four units that comprise the Barakah Plant.

The Nuclear Law requires the UAE Cabinet to establish a decommissioning trust fund pursuant to the recommendation of the FANR Board. A draft Cabinet Resolution to establish the Fund has been submitted to the FANR Board for consideration. It proposes that: The Fund is established as a Federal entity that will operate in accordance with FANR regulations, which will be managed by a Board of Management appointed by the Cabinet.

Transparency

Transparency assessment and recommendations

The UAE since its inception of its Peaceful Nuclear Energy Program has been committed to full transparency and remains so to this day. There have been many public presentations and workshops connected with the Program over the years. These continue in all the principal cities and towns of the UAE and the UAE public has never wavered in its strong support of the Program.

The existence of the IAB, an international board to monitor the Program’s commitment to excellence and the five principles of safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency and sustainability is an unprecedented commitment to transparency. The Board has published a bi-annual report on the performance of the UAE in developing its program pursuant to these principles for eight years now. This report is publically available so that the world community remains fully aware of all that the UAE is doing in regards to peaceful nuclear energy.

In addition, the UAE in the evolution of its Peaceful Nuclear Energy Program has developed close relations with many relevant international organizations and parties; particularly the IAEA. The IAEA has sent nine major review delegations to the UAE. The UAE will shortly host an IAEA International Ministerial conference and, under the leadership of Ambassador Hamad Al Kaabi, the UAE has become one of the most influential members of the Agency.

Sustainability

Sustainability assessment and recommendations

FANR has built over the years an independent, highly effective regulatory body. It is a credit to the UAE. FANR is a great success story - its expertise is respected everywhere. As one of its first tasks, FANR has developed a comprehensive set of national nuclear safety regulations that give a sound basis for importing and constructing nuclear energy plants. These will serve as guidance also for the future needs and the status of its human resources as reported effective September 27th 2017 is impressive. The total workforce was 215 and of these 38% were women, which at nearly 40% is probably the highest in the world for a national nuclear regulatory body. Of the 215, 138 were UAE Nationals which is a solid 64%. The remainder were very experienced expatriates from a large number of countries that have advanced regulatory frameworks. These expatriates, jointly with the UAE Nationals, have developed an “Emirates Model” for licensing and regulation.

ENEC as an organization, under the leadership of CEO Eng. Mohamed Al Hammadi, has also done an outstanding job in leading the UAE Peaceful Nuclear Energy Program from its very earliest stages to the edge of the commencement of operations. It has long been planned to turn the operation of the reactors over to ENEC’s majority-owned subsidiary, Nawah, which is a multi-national, multi-cultural Emirati-led company. The current head count of Nawah: by gender: 84% male and 16% female - an excellent result with many women slated to be part of the reactor operation teams; by nationality: 51% UAE Nationals; 16% North American; 16 percent South Korean; 19% others; and according to Emiratization, 51% are UAE Nationals and 49% expatriates. At present, 134 places in the Nawah work force plan are reserved for South Korea under a KEPCO secondment agreement for the Operations Support Services (OSSA) Program.

As reported in recent IAB reports, one of the two principal issues delaying progress to operations for Unit 1 was the need to augment the quantity of Sufficient Qualified Experienced Personnel (SQEP) throughout nuclear operations, to provide the work force strength to operate the reactors with complete confidence. ENEC believes it is proactively addressing this, and that the Corporation is focusing on ensuring that Unit 1 is fully resourced with the right Plant infrastructure, People, Programs, Processes and Procedures. Once that is achieved, the operating personnel will commence a series of familiarization processes to master the Plant, as well as Stress Tests, to ensure plant personnel are fully competent, trained and certified to assure long-term reliable operations.

For Power Block Unit 1: Positions-1004; Filled-790; Reserved for OSSA-86; Vacant-128.

For tasks outside Power Block: Positions-806; Filled-441; Reserved for OSSA-48; Vacant-317.

Therefore, the total vacant positions were 445. This includes full resources for Unit 2 and partial for Units 3 and 4. In 2017, Nawah recruited 373 employees and the completion of the KEPCO secondment agreement in October meant that the 134 places agreed to OSSA personnel would be recruited from Korea. ENEC believes that it can continue this successful recruiting permitting the commencement of operations at Unit 1; and Unit 2 will not be far behind. South Africa has a national nuclear program that has faced a significant slowdown, thus South Africa has been a good location for recruitment for Abu Dhabi, as many talented professionals in South Africa no longer have the job opportunities there that they once had.

Nawah continues its educational program both pre-employment and in-house. The brief list below conveys the extent of the program:

1. The mainstream scholarship program: Students enrolled in bachelors or masters programs that are pursuing nuclear engineering as their major and some who are taking a minor in this subject. Included is the expectation of working at Nawah/ FANR/ENEC upon graduation. There are 284 students who have graduated from this program and 146 who are still in school.
2. The dual education/training program. This mixes on-the-job training with university courses. 51% of the training and education is at Nawah and 49% involves academic courses. The result is a Higher Diploma in Nuclear Technology; 143 students have completed their course of study and 90 are students in the program.

There is an induction program delivered to all incoming personnel with an emphasis on the Culture of Safety, Nuclear Safety and Security, and Cross-Cultural Communications. In 2016, 750 employees received this training; in 2017 to date, 1,011 employees have received the same training.

Nawah corporate education provides 40 soft-skills courses to enhance Nawah core competencies. In 2016, 532 took these courses and in 2017, there were 294 in the courses with 250 more registered but have not begun.

Nawah nuclear leadership training continues in-house, based on nuclear industry standards. There have been 139 who have completed this program and 141 enrolled in the course. Lastly, 41 employees have completed the Westinghouse Management Senior Reactor Operation Equivalence course over the years. Thus, it can be concluded that ENEC/Nawah remain committed to continuing education and this bodes well for the future.

Conclusion

The Board found the final round of updates quite encouraging. FANR is doing well and has developed into an outstanding independent regulatory organization. MOFA, representing the UAE, continues to play the role of one of the truly important countries at the IAEA and its mission as symbolized by the IAEA International Ministerial Conference to be held in Abu Dhabi at the end of October 2017.

The five principles of the UAE Program have served it well: safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency and sustainability. It is important that the UAE continues to adhere to these principles for the indefinite future and the Board is confident that the UAE will continue to do so. In the future, the UAE should also pay close attention to potential cyber-attacks. The Board believes that, to a large degree, cyber war represents the face of future conflicts. However, the UAE should always remember that the UAE Program represents a path that many other countries should follow if the threat of climate change is to be overcome.

Looking back over the past eight years, the Board believes that there is much that it and the UAE should regard with satisfaction. In its very first report, the Board took note of and agreed with the intention of the UAE Government that some of its very first steps in developing the Program should emphasize the commitment of the UAE Government to total transparency in all aspects of the Program. Indeed, the establishment of the IAB itself with a bi-annual public report on the adherence of the Program to the five principles was an important act of transparency in and of itself. In addition, the IAB strongly supported from the start FANR’s intention to be a fully independent regulator, something that is reassuring to both the nuclear industry and the public.

Shortly after the third IAB meeting in March 2011, the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident took place following one of the largest earthquakes ever recorded along the east coast of Japan and the ensuing tsunami that struck the east coast of Japan. The UAE responded immediately, FANR established a Fukushima task force and tasked ENEC to prepare a comprehensive report on lessons learned from the accident. An interim report was made available to the IAB in its fourth meeting in the fall of 2011. The Board wanted to know the degree of vulnerability of the APR 1400 to earthquakes at the Barakah site, high water levels in the Gulf, and the extent that the planned elevation of the reactor and other safety critical features should be reevaluated. The initial ENEC response was that the nearest that an earthquake of the severity of the one that struck the east coast of Japan in March could occur was off the western coast of the Indian subcontinent. The resultant tsunami would have considerable distance to travel to the Gulf area and then would have to pass through the narrow straits of Hormuz.

These facts ensured that any tsunami threat in the Gulf would be much reduced and would be well within the safety elevation of the Barakah site. Likewise, a cyclone at a time of high tide was estimated to be well within the safety margin. Earthquakes are virtually unknown in the Arabian Peninsula and there is little historic susceptibility to earthquakes in the Gulf itself. There is a history of earthquakes in Iran but far away from the UAE.

At the fourth Board meeting, speaking for the government, Ambassador Hamad Al Kaabi delivered the official response as to how the Fukushima accident might affect the UAE Peaceful Nuclear Energy Program. He noted that after in-depth consideration, the Government had “… decided on no change to its policy on nuclear power for the Emirates and that the results of a recent public survey indicated that 85% of the public supported nuclear energy for the UAE. The government will, however, incorporate any lessons learned from Fukushima”. ENEC was asked to conduct a review of the reactor design in light of the accident. The government followed closely related international action, particularly at the IAEA, and specifically with respect to additional regulations for operation and industry.

At the same IAB meeting, FANR presented its plan to monitor international reactions at the IAEA and among regulators in other countries. ENEC presented in its interim report on reactor design, delivered at this IAB meeting, proposals for possible adjustments to the Barakah reactor installation, mentioning watertight doors, additional auxiliary power generating locations to ensure that electric power will always be available for the site and steps to minimize the effect of sandstorms. The overall and final assessment on safety, following its interim report, submitted at the fourth IAB meeting, was submitted to FANR by ENEC on December 30th 2011. A copy was delivered to the IAB Board in February 2012 before the fifth IAB meeting.

The ENEC safety report did not identify any design deficiencies in the APR 1400 similar to those that were the major causes of the accident in Japan. However, ENEC did identify other design features and additional measures to increase the robustness of the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant to prevent or cope with the potential consequences of severe natural events. ENEC confirmed its earlier conclusion that earthquakes and flooding do not represent significant dangers. Sand storms and dust storms are expected to be present periodically at Barakah, which represents a more significantly probable threat than earthquakes or high water; however, the plant has been designed with several layers of defense against sand storms/dust storms. Fire, explosions and oil spills have to always be guarded against; and loss of electrical power, ultimate heat sink and severe accident management are important areas for review. The UAE set up its own internal process to monitor the implementation of the IAEA safety action plan. FANR conducted its own review to distinguish between those issues that need to be resolved prior to the issuance of the construction license and those - such as mitigating design changes - that would be introduced in the course of construction. Together, working with the Board, ENEC and FANR carried out a complete review of the project after Fukushima - introducing valuable design modifications - and generally leaving no stone unturned to achieve the highest possible level of confidence. It was a model of how a significant crisis should be addressed and resolved.

The UAE decision to select a fully developed reactor type which came with a fully engaged seller and a competitive reactor purchase contract has always been supported by the Board. The Board recommends a continuation of this process if there is a decision later on to acquire additional nuclear energy reactors. Having a contract with a partner that can make a reference plant available is also a big plus.

It is very important, in the Board’s judgment, to address and resolve technical issues as they come up - as ENEC has been doing. If a program leaves difficult technical issues to be resolved at the end, this could result in programmatic delays of many months. During the entire construction period, the project management team has demonstrated a strong safety culture: in the event of quality concerns, the conduct of work has been stopped until proper corrective actions have been taken to respond in full to the concern.

The UAE has been committed to public outreach from the earliest days of the UAE Program. Many workshops and public presentations have been held. The Board urges continuance of this Program - not least because it is one of the five Basic Principles.

Lastly, in this part of our discussion, we want to mention the role of women in the UAE Peaceful Nuclear Energy Program. From the very beginning, the hiring and advancing of women in the UAE Program is something that was urged upon the UAE by the IAB. We were ‘pushing on an open door’. The Program has done a superb job of bringing women into the work force and training them, at all levels, to fulfil high-level positions. The UAE Program has one of the highest percentages of women of any nuclear program in the world. And this is not just in management offices but in the field as well. There is a significant number of trained UAE National women preparing to be Reactor Operators and Senior Reactor Operators on the ground at Barakah. As capable young women are attracted to the UAE Program, this doubles the potential workforce for the nation in developing and utilizing the Program.

Dr. Kunmo Chung requested that the following important remarks be included in this report, and this is endorsed by the other members of the Board:

1. The reference plant of Barakah units, Shin Kori 3, has been running successfully since it started operation in December 2016. Its sister plant, Shin Kori 4 is getting ready for its operation. As of now, Barakah Unit 1 is expected to start its operation in the fall of 2018, whereas Barakah Unit 2 is expected to start its operation in early 2019. All four units will be operating by 2021 thus meeting the original project schedule. Such expectation is based on successful adjustment of systems operations and tuning of components. IAB commends the productive technical collaboration among ENEC, Nawah, FANR and Team Korea.
2. The IAEA Ministerial Meeting held at UAE in late October, 2017 noted the successful collaboration and execution of the Barakah project by the multi-national project team. In view of the Paris Agreement on global warming and climate change, the large and successful Barakah project takes on special importance and deserves global attention and will be a major policy initiative affecting many nations. The parties of the UAE nuclear project should consider enhancing their public acceptance activities.
3. The EU APR1400 Standard Design passed the European Union Requirements (EUR) by Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) in the Fall of 2017. EU-APR meets the latest European technical standards, recommendations of EU Stress Test in addition the WENRA requirements.
4. The USNRC proceedings of APR1400 Design Certificate are progressing on schedule. The NRC Staff is completing its review of the Safety Evaluation Report and the USNRC ACRS will review the Final Safety Evaluation Report by June 2018, The Report will be published in September 2018.
   These reviews and certifications were recommended by the Barakah project plan and its successful execution should be regarded as a success of the UAE Barakah project.
5. Following the recommendation by the UAE Barakah project planning team, KEPCO established a unique graduate educational institution, KEPCO International Nuclear Graduate School (KINGS), to train NPP professionals at the site of Shin Kori 3 & 4. One half of the students came from nations intending to have nuclear power generation, the other half from Team Korea institutions. KINGS is oriented to train committed professionals in nuclear energy development using project-based team teaching - team learning method. KINGS also pioneered cross-cultural networking. KINGS is expected to graduate its fifth class of Masters Course in February, 2018. More than 25 KINGS graduates are actively working on the Barakah project as senior professionals. KINGS, an associate program of the Barakah project, should make positive contributions to the global nuclear electric power program in the coming years.
6. The Barakah project is a product of a first time NPP exporter (Team Korea) and a first time NPP constructor/owner (UAE) with the help of IAEA, IAB and individual experts from experienced nuclear organizations.
   It is a truly global project and a successful one. The Barakah project is the ‘Largest On-Time, Within-Budget and Quality-Assured NPP project’. In view of the experience of the previous NPP projects, the UAE Barakah Project is certainly a successful milestone for the clean, environmentally acceptable energy projects. The Gold Standards will also be global standards for nuclear power projects in the coming years. For the IAB members, participation in this project has been an exciting, encouraging, and invigorating experience.

The International Advisory Board in leaving the scene does so with a great sense of personal satisfaction. This is the first new build nuclear energy program in over 30 years and its advent could not be more timely. The world community faces the gravest and most dangerous threat it has ever faced since the dawn of civilization - the advent of catastrophic climate change. Civilization faces a long and difficult battle over decades and the UAE Program will be at the forefront of this struggle. The success of the UAE Program will be essential as part of a successful effort against climate change. And now let the Board, this one last time, congratulate the UAE on the continued success of the UAE Peaceful Nuclear Energy Program and confirm that it finds that the country, through its program, has remained and continues to remain fully committed to the principles of safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency and sustainability.

Chairman's Preface

With great pleasure, I deliver to you the fifteenth report of the International Advisory Board on the recent developments of the United Arab Emirates’ Nuclear Power Program. This report outlines the overview of the Barakah licensing status and the progress of the Operating License application. In addition, the report highlights detailed information on engineering issues that were noted in Unit 1 commissioning tests.

For the next report, the Board looks forward to hear more about the waste disposal issue, recruitment status and an update on the technical issues of Unit 1

Once more, the Board congratulates the UAE on the continued success of its nuclear energy program and finds that the UAE in its program remains fully committed to the principles of safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency, and sustainability.

Introduction

The Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR) held the first briefing in April 2nd, 2017. The Director General, assisted by the Deputy Director General for Administration, and the Nuclear Safety Director led the FANR’s briefing.

The second part of the meeting was carried out on the following day of April 3rd. This meeting featured two briefings, the first conducted by the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) and the second by Mr. David Scott, ENEC Board member and member of the Committee on Nuclear Power (CNP).

Following these meetings, the Board held its own private discussion, as has been the regular practice.

The Chief Program Officer (CPO), assisted by the Engineering Director led ENEC’s briefing. Nawah’s senior management consisting of its Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO) assisted by the Nawah Chief Human Capital Officer, Vice President of Strategy, Projects and Controls, and the Nawah’s Nuclear Performance Improvement Director provided an operational readiness update for the plants.

The UAE’s nuclear energy program is based on upholding the highest standards for the five principles of safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency, and sustainability. The IAB is tasked with reviewing the UAE program bi-annually and reporting on how the UAE has adhered to these principles. As a result, and in line with previous publications, this report is divided into five sections that review each of these principles based on the presentations of FANR, ENEC and Nawah.

The fourteenth meeting of the IAB was held in late October 2016, less than two weeks prior to entry into force of the Paris Climate Agreement of December 2015. The Report of the fourteenth meeting noted that the Paris Agreement marked the first time that the world’s governments have undertaken legally binding obligations to attempt to limit the rise in global temperatures. This fifteenth meeting took place nearly five months later amid worsening prospects for combatting climate change, initially raised by the Paris Agreement. The United States is backing away from the commitments of the Paris Agreement and China continues to increase the use of coal in power generation. In this context, the example of the UAE nuclear peaceful program is even more important to the world community than it has been before.

Safety

Safety assessment and recommendations

The FANR Director General, having given information on recent developments, began the FANR presentation on safety. The current number of FANR staff at the time of the meeting was more than 200. ENEC currently covers 90% of the costs of FANR’s regulatory work. In addition, about 1,600 other licensees are owners of various radiation sources. These smaller licensees collectively pay 1-2% of FANR costs, based on fees set out in a Cabinet Resolution. An electronic licensing system (e-licensing) is being introduced to make the regulation of sources more effective and reliable.

The FANR Director General stated that, at the time of the meeting, part of the leading staff of FANR as well as of other UAE nuclear entities were in Vienna, participating in the seventh review meeting of the international Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS). The UAE acceded to the CNS as a contracting party in 2009. The review meetings are held every three years and this is the third meeting that the UAE has participated in. The FANR Director General noted that, with the exception of Iran, all countries having nuclear power plants in operation or under construction are parties of the CNS.

Ambassador Al Kaabi made the presentation of the UAE nuclear program to its country group (the review meeting is split into six separate country groups according to fixed rules, based on the number of operating nuclear power plants in each participating country). The UAE national report had been prepared with the support of FANR, ENEC, Nawah, and the Critical Infrastructure and Coastal Protection Authority (CICPA), and all these entities were represented in Vienna as part of the UAE delegation for the UAE review day. The reviewing parties had noted with satisfaction the impressive progress of the UAE program. The nuclear legislative and regulatory system is in place, and the licensee and regulatory organizations have achieved a mature state.

Following the UAE presentation at the CNS meeting, the reviewing parties noted three challenges for the UAE that still require special attention:

1. Completion of construction of all four Units and commissioning them without significant non-conformances.
2. Demonstration of operational readiness of Unit 1, especially the adequacy of capable human resources.
3. Preparation of the regulatory oversight process for the operation phase.

The FANR Director General also mentioned the main recommendations of FANR’s International Advisory Group from its most recent meeting held in February 2017:

• Attention to transition from the licensing stage to oversight of operation.
• Assessing the needs for Technical Support during the operation stage and beginning actions to find the required qualified TSO’s
• Taking note of worldwide measures taken to address lessons from the Fukushima accident.
• Special attention should be directed to the harsh environmental conditions that are unique to the Barakah NPP site, including the possible need for the assessment of site related hazards before the first periodic safety review that will be conducted every 10 years.

The FANR Director General concluded his part of the presentation by discussing the visit of experienced regulatory experts that the IAEA had sent to assess FANR preparedness for Unit 1 commissioning and operation oversight. The experts had specifically reviewed:

• FANR organizational adaptation to operation oversight.
• Preparation of plans for operation inspections.
• Verification of consistency of the as-built plant with the approved plans.

The FANR Director of Nuclear Safety continued the presentation with an overview of the Barakah licensing status. Since the previous IAB meeting, FANR has issued a Nuclear Fuel Transportation License covering fuel imports for Units 1-4 and the Nuclear Fuel Handling and Storage License for Unit 1. All nuclear fuel for Unit 1 is already on site in its normal storage, in full compliance with the License.

The Operating License application for Units 1 and 2 is still under review, and the decision on the Operations License from the FANR board can be expected after September 2017. The licensing requires inputs from inspections of Nawah readiness, which is not expected to be complete until well beyond September 2017.

FANR has taken a position that the Operating License for Barakah Unit 1 will be issued only when:

• All FANR requests for additional information and all relevant inspection findings have been closed.
• FANR has documented its evaluation in accordance with its procedures in the Safety Evaluation Report (SER).
• Nawah, with support from ENEC is ready to implement conditions of the Operating License, including Emergency Preparedness.

Meanwhile, applications for the Nuclear Fuel Handling and Storage license for Unit 2 and the Operating License for Units 3 and 4 were recently submitted. FANR will begin thorough review of Units 3 and 4 only when all licensing issues for Unit 1 are closed and all Units 3 and 4 differences from Unit 1 have been identified and addressed in the application.

There are different types of open issues to be resolved before granting the Operating License for Unit 1:

• Completing the safety analysis: for example, remaining areas such as large break loss-of-coolant accident and containment performance during severe accident.
• Operational readiness issues including control room staff training and certification.
• Technical issues with respect to the plant hardware, noted in Unit 1 commissioning tests.

In the area of systems turnover from construction to operations, the commissioning of separate systems of Unit 1 has required more time than planned. On March 20, 2017, 11 systems out of the total of 150 were accepted by the operating organization. Some of the systems were not completely installed at the time of the integrated Hot Functional Test (HFT). This requires repeating the HFT at least once to demonstrate that all identified non-compliances have been eliminated and all systems and subsystems needed to perform the first HFT were in place to complete the test. Such demonstration is required as a prerequisite for fuel loading. The targeted level of readiness prior to fuel loading is thus higher than in commissioning of plants in most other countries, including the reference plants in Korea.

In parallel with completing the construction and commissioning work by the Korean supplier and completing the reviews and inspections by FANR, Nawah is building and training its operating organization. To gain advice from experts with extensive experience in nuclear power plant operations, ENEC has established a subcommittee of its Board called the Committee on Nuclear Power (CNP). This group comprehensively assesses the nuclear safety issues and the regulatory issues, meeting at least every two months for a three-day period each. In 2017, eight meetings have been scheduled. Additionally, ENEC has established a Nuclear Safety Review Board (NSRB), which reports to ENEC management, but also shares its findings with the CNP.

The ENEC Engineering Director provided detailed information on engineering issues that have been noted in Unit 1 commissioning tests and need to be addressed before loading fuel as indicated by FANR.

ENEC then presented an operational readiness update led by the Nawah Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO). A status of the licensing effort was included.
With respect to the Operating License Application for Units 1 and 2:

• The application was submitted on March 27, 2015.
• FANR review continues.
• There have been 1,232 requests for additional information by FANR; of these, 62 remain open. Approval for operations for Unit 1 is anticipated by February 2018.

Recent licensing actions include:

• Unit 1, Nuclear Fuel Import License.
• Unit 1-4, Nuclear Fuel Transportation License.
• Unit 1, Fuel Possession, Handling, and Storage License.
• Units 1-2, Core Monitoring System License.
• Unit 2, The Fuel Possession, Handling, and Storage License application has been submitted.

Operating License Application, Units 3 and 4:

• It was submitted on March 27, 2017.
• It was modeled after the Units 1 and 2 Operating License Application and is materially the same as the licenses for Units 1 and 2.
• There were nine departure reports consisting of differences between the Units 1 and 2 and the Units 3 and 4 PSARs.
• Independent Safety Verification found no significant safety findings.
• The requested approval dates are:
  • Unit 3-June 2019
  • Unit 4-February 2020

The ENEC Chief Project Officer (CPO), assisted by the Nawah CNO, presented a construction and schedule update. The ENEC CPO stated that Unit 1 was 94% complete; Unit 2, 82% complete; Unit 3, 69% complete; and Unit 4, 44% complete. Unit 1 has been delayed, but the construction knowledge gained through this process has de-risked the schedule for Units 2-4. Due to this transfer of learning, the CPO expressed confidence that the 2020 final operational date of all four reactors will be achievable.

As Nawah prepares itself to operate the plants, several work areas remain in progress. After the Hot Functional Tests (HFT), there were a few areas for improvement resulting in the construction organization re-testing some of the systems. The operating organization will then reheat Unit 1 back up again next month for a second HFT, to ensure the reliability of safety-related components. ENEC intends to resolve all potential operability issues before Unit 1 fuel load.

The present timing is for fuel assemblies loading for Unit 1 to take place during the first quarter of 2018, pending regulatory approval. Following this, Unit 1 will commence the process of Power Ascension Testing (PAT), which involves criticality and stepwise power increases up to full power and is expected to take at least eight months for Unit 1. If PAT can be conducted in the optimum schedule, the first refuel takes place about twelve months later. The first spent fuel assemblies will thus move to the spent fuel storage at the earliest end of 2019.

Because of these developments the real driver for Unit 2 is Unit 1; Unit 2 will not load fuel until Unit 1 has done so; most likely the wait will be until May 2018 although Unit 1 would be ready well before then. Fuel will be delivered to Unit 2 in the summer of 2018, but it will become operational not long after Unit 1 in early 2019.

Meanwhile, Nawah is working hard to become staffed for Unit 1. The CNO noted that Nawah seeks proficiency in its hires. At fuel load, Nawah will own the responsibility for the management of the fuel assemblies, as per the Operating License.

ENEC CPO stated that throughout all this, ENEC has not lowered its standards. However, the ENEC CPO believes that Team Korea will benefit from this and become even more efficient globally based on what they have learned during the development of this project.

Lady Barbara asked the CPO if he was happy with the current progress. ENEC CPO affirmed he is, but that more attention and focus needs to be placed on the safe delivery of Unit 1. He said yes, it has been tougher than anticipated, reconciling some of these differences. ENEC has pushed forward to get Unit 1 to the operational stage, now they have to deal with some of the small but urgent issues that should have been resolved earlier. For example, some of the pipes were painted the wrong color, which created a discrepancy that needed to be addressed, as the color of certain pipes do not match and this is critical for maintenance. ENEC has encountered many issues like this and they are resolving them. The pipe painting issue is a typical problem. ENEC and Nawah’s priorities are and will continue to be:

• Safety;
• Quality;
• Schedule; and
• Cost

The CNO noted that Nawah was doing everything possible to get ready for operations. Targeted staffing levels will be greater than that of most other nuclear industry companies. Mr. Laaksonen asked why this is so. The Nawah CNO responded that Emiratization is the reason; as they are including the employees being trained in the workforce. Nawah will be well staffed with a robust shift management. There will be three senior reactor operators on each shift. It will be a mix of Koreans, expatriates, and Emiratis. Mr. Laaksonen asked whether all such operators will be equal with others at their level or will some be able only to do certain things while others do different things. The CNO replied that there will be language assessments and English remediation courses conducted. Even expats have to improve their English skills. ENEC wants the most effective communication possible in the multicultural environment that they can have. Mr. Laaksonen asked whether employees are permitted to raise questions on any safety concerns, they have in mind. The CNO replied that they encourage this. Nawah’s CNO explained that management shares information with employees weekly.

Chairman Blix asked about waste management which the CNO explained is one of ENEC’s strategic objectives and that they are awaiting a decision on the disposal subject. ENEC recently held a workshop on this.

Security

Security assessment and recommendations

During the afternoon of April 3rd, David Scott, ENEC Board member and member of the CNP presented a briefing initially focusing on security but moving on to several other subjects. He informed the board that the Committee on Nuclear Power, as a subcommittee of the ENEC Board, is responsible for evaluating safety, security, and regulatory compliance. The CNP has been in existence for three years and includes among its members Mr. Dale Klein, a former U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman, two former heads of major nuclear power utilities, and a retired senior executive of the Bechtel Corporation.

Mr. Scott explained that, while the recruitment of new staff, via the Energy Pioneers program, was an important component of knowledge transfer and long-term sustainability, an immediate concern, particularly for ENEC’s new operating subsidiary, Nawah, was recruiting sufficient numbers of experienced nuclear operators in the disciplines required to operate the Barakah units. In response to a question by an IAB member as to whether Nawah was simply “too big”, Mr. Scott responded, “even with a thinner organization, Nawah would still be short in several areas.” “Our recruitment simply needs to be improved,” observed Mr. Scott.

Mr. Scott described an approach that included recruiting young Emiratis with minimal years of experience, but supplementing them liberally with veteran nuclear experts, who boasted real and relevant operational experience. As part of the effort to improve recruitment, Mr. Scott noted that a new strategy is being developed in this area, including the liberal use of recruitment in Korea and elsewhere, where large numbers of retired or idled nuclear operators might be found.

In the area of security, the goal for ENEC is to implement and commission the full physical protection system and have it reviewed and accepted by the relevant bodies, including FANR and the Critical Infrastructure and Coastal Protection Authority (CICPA) before loading fuel assemblies into Unit 1.

In building the physical protection system for Barakah, ENEC and CICPA studied physical protection models from around the world. What they discovered was that each country appears to have its own approach to physical protection, sometimes influenced by the geopolitical context, as well as the structure of national governments as it relates to matters of security (e.g., the existence or absence of a national police force, etc.). In this regard, the UAE discovered that physical security standards and practices have not evolved toward the same kind of standardized templates as other aspects of the peaceful nuclear energy industry, requiring new-comers to invest more effort to determine what standards and practices are appropriate for their specific circumstances.

In the UAE, this effort, which has included the liberal use of experienced foreign experts, has tended to result in relatively robust and advanced approaches, possibly reflecting what these experts would have liked to implement in their own nations, but were unable to achieve owing to economic or other factors. As a result, Mr. Scott observed that the physical protection system implemented at Barakah was likely to be an order of magnitude beyond what is generally found elsewhere in the world. Mr. Scott also noted that, because much of the Unit 1 plant had already been completed, the final stages of the implementation of the Physical Protection System had been hampered by the complexity of building around existing infrastructure.

Special attention has been given to cyber security because cyber risks, due to their anonymous nature, are considered a higher probability than the risk of physical attack on the plant. The UAE is engaging with relevant foreign government partners to ensure that its efforts are in keeping with best practices. The principal threat is malware infection of devices.

Cyber security has been taken into account also in the design of the Instrumentation and Control (I &C) system. It will be less vulnerable to cyberattacks than systems generally used in other industries and in other types of power production. The I &C system is provided by an experienced vendor and FANR conducted vendor inspections in November 2016.

There is national co-operation through a working group established to discuss the critical information infrastructure protection in the nuclear sector. Among others, this group has members from FANR and the National Electronic Security Authority (NESA).

Non-proliferation

Non - proliferation assessment and recommendations

Safeguards - UAE Full Scope Safeguards

The UAE provided the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with the required advance notification on the first introduction of nuclear material to Barakah NPP. This introduction signaled the start of the full-scope Safeguards Agreement (Part I and Part II).

• The licenses needed to date have been issued.
• Nuclear material (nuclear fuel) was introduced in Q1 2017.
• Installation of the IAEA camera and seals is progressing well with the final contract between IAEA and ENEC completed in March 2017.

FANR has cooperated with the IAEA and the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs to prepare pre-final drafts of the UAE Subsidiary Arrangement - General Part and Barakah NPP Unit 1 Facility attachment. FANR has managed the procedures for Barakah NPP to ensure complete and correct compliance with these strategic documents.

FANR submitted the UAE Safeguards Initial Report to the IAEA on March 20, 2017.

• A detailed declaration of all nuclear material received in the UAE was included.
• This represents the start of routine accounting reports to be submitted to the IAEA.

Safeguards - general updates

• All companies possessing nuclear material have been licensed by FANR and registered.
• The first simultaneous physical inventory taken across the entire UAE was carried out on February 28, 2017. This records the starting point of the full-scope safeguards for the UAE Initial Report to the IAEA.
• Over 250 safeguards inspections have been performed.
• The IAEA conducted the third Complementary Access visit to the UAE in December 2016. This was the first such visit to Barakah.
• All Annual and Quarterly Additional Protocol declarations have been issued representing over one hundred verified declarations, each requiring multiple inspections.

Export Control

Some of the recent highlights were:

• More than 30 transfer license applications were submitted, 10 for Barakah.
• 20 transfer licenses were issued in 2016; six were for Barakah including the import licenses for fresh fuel and fission chambers.
• A Memorandum of Intent between the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Federal Customs Authority was signed to strengthen export/import control of nuclear related dual use items.
• Second annual reports to Japan and Australia have been submitted pursuant to bi-lateral safeguards agreements.
• Four training courses were conducted on a quarterly basis for local customs administrators in collaboration with the Federal Customs Authority.
• More than 100 companies involved in the transfer of regulated items have been inspected up to 2016.
• The second National Workshop on Implementation of International Requirements of Nuclear Import-Export Control was successfully conducted.
• An awareness workshop was conducted for Dubai police officers in subject related import/export control and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Transparency

Transparency assessment and recommendations

Both ENEC and FANR remained committed to their transparency obligations and understand the importance of keeping the public involved.

ENEC and Nawah hosted the first Women in Nuclear (WiN) Annual Global Conference held in the Middle East in Abu Dhabi in October 2016. The Conference was held under the patronage of H.H. Sheikha Fatima bint Mubarak, Supreme Chairwoman of the Family Development Foundation, President of the General Woman’s Union, Chairwoman of the Motherhood and Childhood Supreme Council.

There were 300 attendees, both days of the Conference 75% of the attendees were international in origin. Panel discussions during the two days conference included:

• Regulators: Current and Future Issues
• Do you have to come from a STEM background to become successful in the nuclear industry?
• Nuclear Professional Attributes in the Nuclear Industry.
• Gender Equality in the Nuclear Industry.
• Succeeding in a Multicultural Environment within the Nuclear Industry.
• Radiation Application Status and Involvement of Women Professionals.

Sustainability

Sustainability assessment and recommendations

The number of Nawah employees has rapidly increased in 2017 after several improvements were made in the area of recruitment. Nawah is currently staffed at 1,200 employees and is projected to be at 1,800 employees by early 2018. As mentioned above, the manpower in the Nawah organization will thus be higher than the typical manpower level at European, US, and Korean plants. Such high manpower is considered necessary because the organization will be a mixture of Emiratis, Koreans, and expats from many countries where work cultures are different and a new generation of nuclear energy experts needs to learn from international experts in nuclear operations. However, as David Scott pointed out in his briefing, professionals that are more skilled are required, and recruitment must be strengthened. This is particularly true with respect to the more experienced professionals.

Training and consolidating of the entire organization is a major area for improvement and needs adequate time. A large number of teams have to be built for different tasks, and well-structured internal communication and co-operation between teams is necessary. Management of such an organization requires experience and skills from the managers at all levels.

The ongoing large recruitment process should ensure adequate entry qualifications of expert staff. Proper qualifications of Korean staff could be confirmed with the help of the plant supplier, which can get direct information on the background of candidates. Good professionals can be picked up also from the project organization. Emirati experts come directly from universities and ENEC human capital officers can confirm their qualifications.

In general, Nawah should not be satisfied with meeting the minimum FANR requirements on organization and performance in practical tasks, and they should strive to more ambitious performance targets.

Nawah Capacity Building and Training

Currently, there are 109 Energy Pioneers in the program, which is critical for the future and some 22 expatriate experienced operators in training status. In technical training, there are over 150 UAE nationals who are qualified Energy Pioneers. One hundred and fifty three have completed this training and 19 are in progress. In chemistry and radiation training there are 45 Energy Pioneers, all UAE nationals, where 32 have completed this training and 13 are in progress of completing the program.

With respect to Barakah NPP general training:

• Plant access training has been completed by 2,476 employees, contractors, and stakeholders.
• Radiation Worker Training (I) has been completed by 933 employees, contractors, and stakeholders.
• Radiation Worker Training (II) has been completed by 731 employees, contractors, and stakeholders.
• Also nuclear industrial safety training and respirator training are available for appropriate groups.

In the professional development field:

• The Westinghouse Senior Reactor Management Certification program is available. Thirty eight have completed this program, and five are currently in progress. Only handpicked, very talented individuals are sent to this program.
• The UAE-IAEA Nuclear Energy Management School represents an important program. Forty two completed this education in 2012 and 2015. Twenty are now enrolled.

The Nawah Nuclear Performance Improvement Director presented the Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment. Nawah has been conducting these assessments since 2011, which is unprecedented and this potentially reflects industry best practice. Nawah and ENEC have used these results to accelerate improvement in Nuclear Safety Culture leading up to operations. An assessment of the Nuclear Safety Culture (NSC) at Barakah NPP, which consists of four phases, began in January of 2017 and is scheduled to be completed by February of 2018.

The first phase, which is complete, involved the distribution of a survey questionnaire, which was to be completed by over 95% of ENEC and Nawah employees. In addition, there were individual interviews, focus groups, and observations of meetings and work activities.

Phase 2 involves presentation of the NSC assessment results to ENEC and Nawah leadership teams, workshops on gap analysis, and development of solutions. This phase is scheduled for April 15 to May 15.

The third phase is scheduled for mid-May to the first of July, and the fourth and last phase from July 2017 to February 2018. These phases will be focused on sharing the assessment results with the remainder of the staff, identification of gaps, contributions to development of solutions and tracking, and implementation of any necessary course corrections.

The final phase 1 results of the Survey Questionnaire were completed by more than 98% of all ENEC and Nawah employees. There were interviews with both ENEC and Nawah CEOs and Executive teams; eleven focus group meetings with sections of the workforce at ENEC and fifteen at Nawah; and many observations of work activities and meetings with various divisions of the two organizations.

With respect to the second phase, combined results will be finalized in early April 2017; there will be many workshops and communication sessions on these results; corporate media channels will be used for discussion; and there will be a general sharing of results of the first two phases by the ENEC CEO at a staff meeting in May 2017.

Conclusion

The Board would like to hear a presentation on the waste disposal issue at the next meeting. In addition, more information about specific measures to protect the plant against the harsh environmental conditions at Barakah site and on the remaining FANR concerns on containment performance during severe accident conditions is requested. A briefing next time on recruitment status would also be appreciated. This would include the qualifications of new employees and the building of cooperation inside the Nawah organization.

The Board congratulated H.E Ambassador Al Kaabi for his successes at IAEA.

Although this has been discussed in previous meetings, the Board would like to reiterate that it is content with even substantial delay for safety, whatever is necessary. For non-safety issues, however, the Board urges as few delays as possible.

The Board wants to be fully briefed at the next meeting on the technical issues of Unit 1.

The Board is grateful for the considerable effort undertaken by the UAE supporting entities to provide the IAB with highly competent, informative, and valuable presentations.

Once more, the Board congratulates the UAE on the continued success of its nuclear energy program and finds that the UAE in its program remains fully committed to the principles of safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency, and sustainability.

Chairman's Preface

The UAE program is nearing the date when commercial operations will begin at Barakah Nuclear Power plant (NPP). Plant systems have been turned over from construction to commissioning already. Fuel loading for Unit 1 is expected to be around Q2 or Q3 2017, pending regulatory approval. Unit 1 is 91% complete; Unit 2, 78%; Unit 3, 62%; and Unit 4, 32%.

This report discusses a host of items: the updated status of the Barakah NPP, the Decommissioning Trust Fund (DTF), Barakah licensing update, ENEC’s next phase of development-the New Nuclear Corporation, construction progress, the Units’ key milestones in 2016, an overview of operational readiness, Physical Protection Plan (PPP) and cybersecurity, capacity building as well as international cooperation.

At its next meeting the Board would appreciate further reports on the outcome of the initial malfunction of the pressure operated system relief valve (POSRV) problem at Shin Kori 3 and its consequences to Barakah Unit 1.

The Board congratulates the UAE on the continued success and progress of the nuclear power program and concludes that the UAE remains fully committed to the principles of safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency and sustainability.

Introduction

The Chairman stated that while ENEC was well aware of the program schedule planned at the inception of the project, that the number one priority for ENEC in managing this program was safety. The project will continue to progress rapidly while adhering to the rigorous safety standards that are in place. The first two briefings were carried out in the evening of October 23rd by the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).

FANR’s briefing was led by the Director General Christer Viktorsson supported by senior members of his staff. The MOFA briefing was conducted by the UAE Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Ambassador Hamad Al Kaabi. The second day of meetings was held at the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant site. It featured a walkthrough of Barakah Unit 1 buildings that are nearing completion, followed by a briefing by ENEC. The briefing was led by the ENEC CEO who was also accompanied by senior staff and specialists. Lastly, a briefing by the Critical Infrastructure and Coastal Protection Authority (CICPA), led by the Commander of the Barakah Center and his senior officers, was conducted in the afternoon. Following the briefings, the Board held its customary private discussion to conclude the session.

Other major project related developments since the last IAB meeting was the announcement of a joint venture between ENEC and the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) for a “long-term partnership and cooperation in the UAE’s Peaceful Nuclear Energy Program” as reported by World Nuclear News on October 20th, 2016. Both companies also announced the establishment of Barakah One PJSC, an independent subsidiary of which ENEC that is owned 82% by ENEC, and 18% by KEPCO, to “represent the commercial and financial interests” of the Barakah project. ENEC’s Chief Financial Officer, has been appointed as the CEO of Barakah One.

KEPCO will also receive an 18% stake in ENEC subsidiary Nawah Energy Company, which was established in May 2016, with ENEC holding the remaining 82%. Nawah will operate and maintain the four units at Barakah.

In connection with signing the joint venture agreement, ENEC’s Chairman stated that the joint venture agreement represents an “unprecedented partnership” between the UAE and Korea in the field of nuclear energy and is designed “to further enhance our joint capacity to develop and operate a peaceful nuclear energy program in adherence to the highest standards of safety, quality, security, and operational transparency.” Hwan Elk Cho, President and CEO of KEPCO, said “It is our top priority to devote our resources and efforts towards the successful delivery and operations of the first Korean-designed nuclear energy plant being built outside Korea.”

The Barakah Nuclear Power Project status according to ENEC is now 71% complete for all four plants.

The fourteenth meeting of the IAB was held less than two weeks before entry into force of the Paris Climate Agreement of December, 2015. This marks the first time that the world’s governments have undertaken legally binding obligations to attempt to limit the rise in global temperatures. All governments that have ratified the Agreement, which includes the United States, China, India, and the European Union, now carry an obligation to apply their best efforts to hold global warming to no more than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.

Safety

Safety assessment and recommendation

FANR’s Director General gave the opening presentation and he reported that FANR had moved to a new office that provides good working space and includes an emergency management room that he considered to be among the most advanced in the world. The Director General summarized developments since the last meeting.

1. The license for operations is nearly complete
2. FANR has conducted reviews for operational readiness and emergency preparedness
3. New arrangements have been made since the last meeting to ensure the independence of FANR, including financial independence. It has been agreed with the government that FANR can bill ENEC for 90% of its costs. The remaining 10% will come as fees from licensees who use radiation for medical and industrial purposes and from the Abu Dhabi government. FANR thus is no longer dependent on financing from the government budget and is able to operate without cost constraints. FANR’s Board of Management has approved this
4. The overall workforce size is approximately 200, of which 125 are Emiratis, representing 62%
5. FANR female employees are 74, of which 66 are Emiratis
6. Two groups of trainees are almost complete, with the first group already graduated
7. The IAEA has been in existence for 60 years; the UAE has been a member for the last 40 years

Following the recap, FANR’s Deputy Director General discussed the Decommissioning Trust Fund (DTF). There is no legal requirement for establishing the DTF prior to the operation of Barakah Unit 1, however, the UAE’s Nuclear Law requires that anyone who generates or will generate radioactive waste shall pay fees into the DTF pursuant to a decision by the UAE Cabinet. FANR prepared the DTF Cabinet resolution draft and the draft DTF implementing resolution. In the draft implementing its resolution it is proposed that fees be paid into the DTF based on decommissioning costs estimated by the Licensee with a review as to whether the cost calculations are credible and in agreement with the latest management plans. FANR provides its approval to the DTF Board if payments being made comply with the purposes of the Law. In the event FANR concludes inconsistency between the fees payable to the fund and the estimated waste management costs, it proposes to the Cabinet any needed adjustments to the fees. In order to be fully informed on waste management measures and plans, FANR oversees and regulates the Power Plant Operator and the Waste Management Organization regarding the handling, storage, and disposal of radioactive waste.

FANR then presented an update on the licensing of Barakah. The pending license applications are:

• Transport of Fresh Nuclear Fuel—ENEC
• Storage of Fresh Nuclear Fuel in the Facility (pre-operational)—Nawah
• Operating License—Nawah

The storage and transport licenses will be coordinated in order to ensure that a valid storage license will be in place when transportation begins.

ENEC still must resolve important legal issues that are pending for all three applications.

• Nawah will hold the operations license and ENEC must establish the legal identity of Nawah and describe its ownership and management structure, as well as its relationships with ENEC and other subsidiaries
• Liability insurance pursuant to Law No. 4 of 2012 must be obtained by ENEC and presented to FANR as a condition for getting the transport license. Given that it is not possible for a single insurance company to provide the liability insurance, ENEC must seek an insurance pool to underwrite the coverage. Nawah will also need insurance for fuel storage and operations

The majority of requirements for the Transport License Application (TLA) for ENEC has been complete, with a few submittals still pending subject to a thorough review and remaining Safety Evaluation Reports (SER) must be completed. FANR will then be able to issue the license recommendations to its Board of Management. The current estimate for a Board decision on the TLA is December, 2016.

The remaining items relevant to the Transport License are:

• Approval of the nuclear liability insurance related to the transportation of nuclear fuel in the UAE
• Delivery of the updated transport security plan

FANR’s staff plan to recommend that the license authorize first core shipments for all four units with a condition requiring submittal and approval of unit specific transport security plans for Units 2, 3, and 4.

With regards to the fuel storage (pre-operational) license for Nawah, progress has been made, but a considerable amount more is required. Once completed, FANR will issue its license recommendations to its Board of Management. The current estimate for a Board licensing decision for the fuel storage license for Nawah is December, 2016.

Other remaining items identified by FANR are:

• The establishment of Nawah as a legal entity
• Approval of liability insurance for the storage facility
• Establishment of Nawah readiness to store fresh fuel for Unit 1

ENEC’s full compliance with the UAE Safeguards obligations, which is essential from the standpoint of operational readiness, will be confirmed by FANR. Under the law, ENEC is required to give FANR advance notice of 30 days prior to the arrival of nuclear material. Such nuclear related material can be in the form of fresh fuel or other nuclear materials such as ex-core fission chambers. The advance notification form, part of the IAEA Subsidiary Arrangement, is used for providing the advance notice. Once nuclear material is delivered, a verification on the design information is undertaken by the IAEA and FANR. 100% verification of the received nuclear material must be accomplished by FANR and IAEA; and core verification is performed by FANR and later by IAEA after fuel loading.

FANR reported the status of the operating license:

Detailed review of the Operating License Agreement (OLA) has been completed. The majority of RAIs and SERs have also been completed. The issuance of the pending OLA submittals and the detailed review is underway. The complete pre-operational inspection is currently in progress as well as the completion of the remaining SERs and supporting documents. Once complete, FANR will then issue license recommendations and supporting documents to its Board of Management. FANR expects the licensing decision to be made by May 2017.

Several other remaining issues regarding the Operating License include:

• Legal issues involving: civil liability and insurance; the establishment of Nawah; and the DTF
• Review issues involving: large break Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) analysis; methodologies for calculating radionuclide releases and radiation doses in the Main Control Room (MCR); modelling of the containment purge system in accident analysis; long term containment performance; probabilistic risk assessment assuming no cross-ties between the safety system trains and NPP units; MCR minimum staffing and implications for operator training; and operating limits and conditions for beyond design basis accidents
• Late submittals involving:
  • - Set point methodology and analysis
  • - Management System program descriptions
  • - Commitments for safety enhancements based on lessons learned from Fukushima
• Inspection issues involving:
  • - Completion of emergency exercise
  • - Certification of senior reactor operators
  • - Completion of inspection that verifies construction to be in accordance with requirements
  • - Completion of operational readiness inspection

While licensing examinations of reactor operators were at older nuclear power plants based on accident analysis using conservative assumptions, the Barakah on-site training and licensing examinations for an operator’s license will use best estimate analysis on accidents.

The establishment of Nawah, will require formal acceptance of all recommendations made by ENEC on its behalf with regards to the license applications.

FANR will review the information provided regarding:

• The overall ownership and management structure of Nawah as the applicant
• Nawah’s financial and technical qualifications to complete the proposed activities in accordance with applicable law and regulations
• The relationship and structure of responsibilities between Nawah and related organizations and contractors; and
• Planned joint venture arrangements that may affect the competency of Nawah to undertake the responsibility of the license

The ENEC briefing kicked off with an update of the project by ENEC’s CEO. ENEC introduced the session as “ENEC’s next phase of development—the New Nuclear Corporation.” From 2009 to 2016, ENEC centralized all the responsibilities under one single organization to efficiently carry out the requirements of the UAE Peaceful Nuclear Energy Program. This included the government of Abu Dhabi interface, Prime Contract Management; financial and commercial interests; nuclear operations readiness; program management; and the support office.

Beginning in October 2016, the New Nuclear Corporation will take a different form. Under the new Joint Venture Agreement with KEPCO, there will be three parties to the corporation.

ENEC will address the government part of the corporation and will be the Joint Venture partner of KEPCO. ENEC will be the representative of the Abu Dhabi government for all nuclear related matters. It will be responsible for construction and commissioning, it will be the developer of the UAE nuclear sector, and it will be the owner of the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant.

Barakah One is a commercial joint venture company and it is a subsidiary of ENEC. It will be responsible for representing the commercial interests of the Barakah project and will be the signatory of the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) and other commercial interests for Barakah.

Nawah is also a commercial joint venture company and a subsidiary of ENEC. Nawah is mandated to operate and maintain Units 1-4 at the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant. It will be the holder of the Operating License issued by FANR when the decision to issue the license is taken. It also will be 82% owned by ENEC and 18% by KEPCO.

There are direct loan agreements for the Barakah project of US $19.6 billion made up of loans from KEXIM, international and local banks, and the government of Abu Dhabi. This includes a direct loan from the Department of Finance of Abu Dhabi of up to US $16.2 billion, a direct loan from KEXIM of US $2.5 billion and US $250 million from a consortium of five local and international banks. There is a total of US $4.7 billion in equity commitments for the establishment of Barakah One in exchange for equity interest in the company. ENEC owns 82% of the company and KEPCO 18%.

Looking ahead to 2021, the vision of ENEC is to finance the future growth and prosperity through a safe and sustainable peaceful nuclear energy program. This will be accomplished by delivering safe, clean, efficient, and reliable nuclear energy to the UAE grid, building a nuclear power sector that is entirely sustainable, and ensuring that the Barakah project is fully aligned with the UAE energy strategy.

ENEC strategy going forward in 2021:

Goal A: Short Term Priorities

• Ensure completion of construction of Barakah Units 1-4 and transition to operations
• Establish and maintain effective governance and interface for the subsidiaries Nawah and Barakah One; and
• Strengthen relationship with KEPCO as a JV partner

Goal B: Prepare for the Future

• Ensure nuclear waste management organizational readiness
• Ensure security of supply through development of the nuclear value chain in the UAE; and
• Identify and pursue expansion and business development and opportunities

Goal C: Strengthen Key Enablers

• Reinforce a strong culture of safety and organizational strength
• Develop human capital capabilities
• Deliver efficient and effective support services
• Meet the expectation of the regulators; and
• Proactively engage, educate, and communicate with the stakeholders

ENEC’s CEO then made a presentation on the construction progress at Barakah and on commissioning. Unit 1 is 91% complete; Unit 2, 78%; Unit 3, 62%; and Unit 4, 32%.

The Key Milestones in 2016 were:

Unit 1

• The Hot Functional Test was complete on October 12th. The Structural Integrity Test and Integrated Leak Rate Testing (ILRT) testing phases have been completed. The turbine has been spun at full speed for the first time using the steam generated by the waste heat from the reactor coolant pumps as driving power.

Unit 2

• The Reactor Containment Building (RCB) dome structure has been completed and the fuel pool has been filled with water.

Unit 3

• The reactor vessel (RV) and the steam generators have been installed as well as the steel liner dome.

Unit 4

• The containment building is taking shape and the turbine building foundation has been completed.

Next steps are as follows:

January 2017

• Unit 2, complete the construction of the turbine turning gear.

February 2017

• Unit 1, the first fuel will be on site, pending regulatory approval.
• Unit 3, complete the welding of the reactor coolant loop piping.
• Unit 4, begin the installation of the turbine generator.

March 2017

• The priority scope of the physical plant security plan, phase 1, will be completed.
• Unit 2, complete the installation of the RV internals and head.
• Unit 3, complete casting the reactor containment building dome concrete.
• Unit 4, the condenser installation will be completed.
• The OLA for Units 3 and 4 will be submitted to FANR.

Plant systems have been turned over from Construction to commissioning already. Fuel loading for Unit 1 is expected to be around Q2 or Q3 2017, pending regulatory approval.

Next, the Chief Program Officer (CPO) presented more details on construction activities at the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant.

The CPO began by declaring that, given the chart progress curve; there was a high possibility of completing all four Units of the Barakah Plant by 2020 and having all Units operating. The current workforce stands at 19,792, of these close to 15,000 are non-Korean (from various south and south-east Asian countries). This number will drop somewhat in the very hot months due to reduced working hours. Of the total labor force, a little over 500 are staff and 19,000 plus are labor.

The Unit 1 Fuel Load Target Schedule.

ENEC presented a chart with a detailed schedule on fuel load along with other relevant items. The following are some of the highlights.

The target schedule for the receipt of the operating license from FANR is the end of May 2017, pending regulatory approval. The receipt of the license would allow the plant to commence the next phase of the initial test program, starting with fuel assemblies’ load. According to that schedule, the KEPCO construction and commissioning is to be complete before the arrival of any fuel. The first batch of fuel is scheduled to arrive by Q1 2017.

The 60-day CICPA security review is scheduled to begin in Q1 2017, following turnover of security-related buildings, and be completed in the latter part of April.

The CPO continued that both tests recently conducted for Unit 1, the containment leak-rate and structural integrity test and the hot functional test, had results that were exceptionally good. The Unit 1 reactor turbine came up to full rotation speed very well with very low vibration.

With respect to Unit 2, it will be ready for fuel a year from now. It is important to complete the security arrangements for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 at the same time. The two Units are close together and many efficiencies will be enforced by proceeding in this manner. The Unit 2 reactor containment building will be finished around February 1. The control room is nearly complete. The reactor terminals will also be complete in November 2016. A cold hydro test is planned for March 2017.

Unit 3 is 62% complete. The operations and maintenance building will be up in April. The reactor pool piping is being completed; the construction of the control room is coming along.

Unit 4 is 32% complete. The construction of the containment vessel will begin in the spring of 2017.

There has been considerable progress on the Physical Protection System (PPS). Work has been underway on setting the 2,000 panels that will form closed walls around the Barakah Plant site, 1,500 panels are in place. One thousand feet of duct bank has been laid underground for the PPS.

Next in the ENEC briefing was an overview of operational readiness presented by the Nawah Acting CEO, who is also a Board member in ENEC and will be the overall operator of Units 1-4.

Activities for the near term (Operational Readiness) and longer-term operations are included in the 2017-2021 business plan. A major focus is on “functional readiness” and developing the capability to operate in the “Nawah Way.” This will be a multinational, multicultural effort; Nawah will not do it the Western way or the Eastern way but the Nawah way. Challenge number one is to bring all cultures together. Since cultural integration is essential, consultants will train all employees to work—again—not in the American way, not in the Korean way, not in the Emirati way, but in the Nawah way. All nationalities are committed to working together. Lady Barbara at this point asked, the Western approach might be to complain about something taking place one day late; the Eastern reaction to something being one day late might be, let’s discuss; what is the Nawah way. The Nawah Acting CEO responded by saying if it’s one day late, the Nawah reaction would be, together let’s fix this.

Nawah is recruiting experts who have been instrumental in language programs for other prominent UAE government entities and corporations. Dr. Chung commented at this point that he hoped that the Korean side would benefit from this; one must be very careful about communication.

Nawah is completely committed to a culture of safety. There is a whole team set up to examine this for Nawah. There is considerable interaction between management and employees on this. Today, there are about 1,000 employees in the Nawah workforce. This will peak to 1,800 for Units 1 and 2. The Nawah organizational chart is based on seven principles:

1. Nuclear Safety, Security, and Reliability (NSSR). The Nawah design focus is on NSSR; 80% of the Nawah organization reports to the Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO)
2. Budget/Schedule controls. Through governance design; the annual budget, staffing number, etc., all will be endorsed by the Nawah CNO and Acting CEO
3. CNO role and access to the Board. The CNO has responsibility and authority for all people and processes which directly or indirectly affect NSSR. All nuclear-related support functions report to the CNO
4. "Casting Vote" vote or similar protocol. The Board of Directors will issue this as part of governance considerations
5. The planned focused role of Nawah and its associated oversight responsibilities pursuant to Board of Directors’ directions
6. The interface between the Nawah and ENEC CEOs, again pursuant to Board direction
7. Activating the Service Level Agreements

The following is a description of the status of operational readiness at Nawah. As stated above, the current head count of employees is approximately 1,000. The target for the end of 2016 is in the range of 1,200 and for the end of 2017 around 1,800.

There are 23 nationalities represented in the workforce which is comprised of 60% UAE nationals, 22% Korean, and 18% experts from other countries. To service all four Units from 2020 and beyond, Nawah plans a workforce of around 2,200. An important task for Nawah is to utilize its cultural diversity in building a world class organization. It is important that people from various cultures who are working together on the Barakah project also understand each other and “are on the same page.”

Next, the Nawah Vice President for Licensing and Regulatory Affairs delivered a presentation on overall commissioning and operational readiness. The on-the-job training of operator personnel is underway; 22 weeks to be completed in February; Nawah functional and operational readiness is scheduled to be complete by March 27.

In the process of developing operational readiness, 2,600 procedures must be completed for plant operators, 1,600 of these are from Shin Kori 3. Of these, 1,000 procedures have been approved; a significant effort is involved to deliver all of these procedures by February 2017. Pending regulatory approval, the first fuel receipt is scheduled for February with the contemplated fuel load as stated—midyear 2017. There will be an IAEA pre-Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) Assessment in the first half of 2017, and then there will be a WANO assessment by a 25-man team to give go/no go advice on fuel load. This assessment will require three weeks to complete. A comparable WANO report for Unit 2 is expected to be delivered in August 2017.

The licensing status is estimated as follows:

• The license for storage and handling of unirradiated nuclear material is expected in December 2016
• The license for the transportation of unirradiated fuel is expected for December 2016; The application for Unit 2 fuel receipt will also be submitted in December 2016
• The application for the operation licenses for Units 3 and 4 will be submitted in March 2017; and
• The Unit 1 operation license is planned for issuance in May 2017

Next in the ENEC presentation was a report by the Unit 1 & 2 Plant Manager delivered by the Nawah Vice President for Operations Support, on fuel receipt and fuel load.

The first fuel deliveries consist of 241 fuel assemblies (FAs) for the Unit 1 initial core and in addition there are 61 FAs referred to as strategic inventory—backups to replace potentially damaged fuel. The delivery will be divided into five shipments from Korea to the UAE. The manufacturing of the 302 FAs in the shipment in Korea has been completed. The fuel on site date is expected to be in Q1 2017 with a later date for Unit 2. Fuel loading of Unit 1 is anticipated, as stated above, in midyear, 2017.

The necessary programs for fuel receipt must be in place:

• Radiation protection
• Maintenance
• Fuel Mechanical Examination
• Lifting and rigging
• Fire protection
• Security

In the opinion of the Nawah Vice President for Operations Support, the most important of these programs is radiation protection.

Operatior Training must be on track to support the operations of Unit 1.

Select portions of the first FANR Certification Exam for operator candidates were administered in May 2016. There was a 100% pass rate of written and simulator exams for Wave 1 Energy Pioneers and ORSA (Operational Readiness Support Agreement) batch 1. The fifth revision of the Comprehensive Training Plan has been approved.

Challenges that still exist include:

• Barakah Plant procedures to complete select tasks of On-the-Job Training
• Simulator availability to support all 4 Units’ MCR staff training
• Operations training attrition rate and recruitment of new joiners
• Unit 1-4 Senior Reactor Operators (SROs) and Reactor Operators (ROs) availability vs full crew requirements. The total required at full fuel load is 36 per Unit and 144 for all four Units. ENEC and Nawah are ramping up the training program to be sure that the demand can be met

The following is a brief look at the forecast:

By May 2017 it is contemplated that there will be 12 nuclear reactor operators and 29 senior reactor operators for a total of 41, fully trained and available. This is sufficient to meet the full crew requirement for one Unit.

36 Certified Operators are needed for each unit, so a total of 144 will be required by 2020. So the training program is proceeding consistent with the schedule.

The Chairman had earlier asked a question about protection against sandstorms. Nawah is prepared for this with a program that includes strong doors, ventilators, and a capability to quickly do any necessary cleaning out after a sandstorm.

Security

Security assessment and recommendations

ENEC and Nawah submitted a report on the Nuclear Security Program. Security plans include:

• A Physical Protection Plan (PPP) for construction—to include the receipt of nuclear material
• A Physical Protection Plan for Operation. This involves:
  • - Physical Protection Systems (PPS)
  • - A Cybersecurity Program
  • - Personnel Security
  • - A Training and Qualification Program
• A Transportation Security Program

A transportation security exercise was planned for mid-November 2016 involving all stakeholders. Based on the results of this exercise, a robust transportation plan will be developed. The PPS simulator training has also begun to test possible security incidents that lead to an emergency. A temporary PPS simulator is being configured for the training and is expected to be ready prior to training of the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) operators.

A PPP—CP (Construction Phase) 2 plan has been agreed between ENEC and CICPA for fuel receipt. The new revision includes procedures for arrival of fresh fuel and the handling of nuclear fission chambers. The Command and Communication Center (CCC) operational security plan addresses any on-site accidents and also involves the Barakah NPP Security Communication procedure and fresh fuel security measures. In addition, there will also be a security event reporting procedure.

50 operation guards are going to be handling the fuel delivery, with approximately 25 guards already on duty supporting on safety related functions. The additional 25 guards are also beginning to mobilize and receive training since October 2016. The responsibility of security is expected to be transferred over to Nawah once the fuel is loaded to avoid disruptions. A sufficient amount of trained guards will be in place in time for all operations. In addition, a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) unit from CICPA will also be involved. The security training for fuel delivery guards was completed in October. There are plans for a tabletop exercise five weeks prior to fuel receipt and the first on-site exercise one week before fuel delivery. The CPO and CICPA teams continue to work together to ensure a smooth handover of the PPS to Nawah at the appropriate time. Security personnel procedures are also being developed for drug and alcohol tests and the Behavior Observation Program is being integrated with plant access training.

Operations guard training is scheduled to begin in the first quarter of 2017. The World Institute of Nuclear Security (WINS) is actively involved. Training for Alarm Station Operators (ASOs) already started since October 2016, with 21 ASO’s. The number of ASO’s may eventually reach 40. Workshops are being held with WINS to ensure a strong culture of nuclear security.

ENEC has agreed with FANR to complete the first six milestones for the Cyber Security Plan by the time of fuel load. The first six milestones are as follows:

1. Establish the Cyber Security Assessment Team
2. Identify Critical Digital Systems (CDS) and Critical Digital Assets (CDA)
3. Implement Cyber Security Defense in-depth architecture by installation of a deterministic one-way device
4. Access controls of a portable and mobile device
5. Insider threat mitigation; and
6. Identify, document, and implement cybersecurity controls to a physical security target set of CDA
Two other identified milestones for later implementation are:
7. Ongoing monitoring and assessment activities will commence for the target set of CDA; and
8. Full implementation

FANR is actively reviewing the cyber security program and has issued three Requests for Additional Information (RAI). FANR is also in regular contact with the National Electronic Security Authority (NESA).

An excellent briefing on security was also presented by CICPA. Some of the subjects discussed included:

• Capacity building
• CICPA training programs
• Program development
• PPS development
• Collaborative programs; and
• Internal programs

Under capacity building there was continued nuclear security training. This included site-specific training, access training, and workshops with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) on “Security Plan Development” and nuclear security cultures at ENEC. Among other activities under training, was the development of a training course with DOE and research into European models for nuclear facility protection. Under program development there was continued work on the Vulnerability Assessment, updating of the Target Set, and an update of the security system performance requirements. In addition, there was continued participation with ENEC engineering and contractors on the design phase for PPS.

There were collaborative programs with ENEC on:

• Ongoing program development in the areas of training, operations, safety/security interface, and emergency preparedness
• Incident/event reporting
• Specific work on the safety/security interface whereby CICPA has developed a policy consistent with and subordinate to the ENEC governing program; and
• Security operations procedures whereby ENEC and CICPA develop collaborative procedures to implement regulatory requirements

Internal CICPA programs include:

• A training needs analysis for CICPA to meet the Barakah sector’s training requirements; and
• A review of the annual training plan

Non-proliferation

Non - proliferation assessment and recommendations

The MOFA briefing for the Board was conducted by the UAE Ambassador to the IAEA Hamad Al Kaabi.

The Chairman welcomed Ambassador Al Kaabi back to the IAB and asked an opening question. What in Ambassador Al Kaabi’s impression would be the breakdown in percentages of the contribution to the Abu Dhabi power production by the various sources? Ambassador Al Kaabi responded that his estimate would be: nuclear 25%; gas 70%; and solar 5%. He then proceeded with his briefing.

There has been a 40 year-long partnership between the UAE and the IAEA. The UAE has been a member of the IAEA since 1976. Thus, this is a special year.

The IAEA has supported the UAE in the development of its peaceful nuclear program, both with respect to power and non-power applications:

The UAE nuclear power plants are moving into the commissioning phase; 34 UAE national Technical Cooperation (TC) projects have been completed with the IAEA; and there have been 3,200 participants from the UAE in IAEA activities from over 60 national entities.

The IAEA evaluation and review of the progress of the UAE in the development of its nuclear power program has been a huge benefit. There have been six major IAEA peer review missions’ received as well as official visits from the IAEA Director General and other high-level officials.

The UAE contributes to the work of the IAEA through sharing its experience. The UAE participates in the work of major IAEA Committees, workshops, and international conferences as well as to IAEA major projects such as the Fuel Bank and Safeguards Analytical Laboratories.

The UAE has reached phase 3 of the IAEA Milestones Approach, fulfilling all 19 milestones to develop nuclear infrastructure.

The UAE has joined and implemented all IAEA Conventions and Agreements in the scope of nuclear safety and security as well as safeguards. The emphasis here should be on not only joining but fully implementing.

The UAE has established a dedicated Permanent Mission to the IAEA to ensure full and continued cooperation with the IAEA.

UAE-IAEA Technical Cooperation—which is the main area for IAEA support of the UAE—consists of the following:

• The UAE has completed 34 national TC projects since 1976
• The first Centre for Material Analysis in the UAE was completed in 2014
• The establishment of the Secondary Standards Dosimetry Laboratory is near completion
• Enhancement of radiation safety in the health sector
• Practical arrangements in the areas of: education, training, and research for nuclear science; water management and agriculture; and nuclear medicine (one of these will be undertaken each year beginning with this year
• Nuclear Energy Management school
• Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute; and
• The development of an integrated work plan with the IAEA

The UAE has on average approximately a 10-person team in Vienna that has to meet with multiple committees and groups all the time.

In recent years, the UAE has received six major peer review missions and has always had a positive feedback from the IAEA.

A workshop and preparatory meeting preceding the International Physical Protection and Advisory Services IPPAS mission took place in Abu Dhabi in November 2015. The objective of the workshop was to present comprehensive information on the purpose of the IPPAS. There were 31 participants and they prepared the way for the nine-man IPPAS mission conducted in November 2016. The IAEA offers several modules for the IPPAS and three of them were included in the UAE mission: focusing on the trustworthiness of a state’s nuclear security system; implementation of facility site security; and protection of nuclear material during transport. Cyber security was not assessed at this stage. Another IAEA review was conducted by the Emergency Preparedness Plans Review team (EPREV), which came in March 2016. In 2017, the IAEA Operational Safety Review team (OSART) will come before the commencement of operations.

The UAE has also received a number of official visits from high-level officials of the IAEA, including three visits by Director General Yukiya Amano. In 2016, Director General Amano came to the UAE to celebrate 40 years of partnership with the UAE.

The UAE program is a model for many other countries. The UAE strengthens the work of the IAEA through:

• IAEA committees (on Safety and Security) and working groups
• Providing cost-free experts and consultants for IAEA meetings
• Contributing to the Nuclear Safety Action Plan (post-Fukushima)
• Sharing its expertise through exhibitions/presentations/papers during international conferences
• Participating in the policy making organs—member on the IAEA Board of Governors
• Ongoing updates to other members and the IAEA on progress regarding its nuclear power program; and
• Completing two country profile frameworks with the IAEA

As a result, the general attitude toward the UAE at the IAEA is very positive.

The UAE participated actively in the annual IAEA General Conference. This meeting commemorated the 60th anniversary of the IAEA. The UAE was elected to the IAEA Board of Governors for 2016-2018.

The UAE has consistently met its obligations under the various international conventions:

• It submitted its third national report on the implementation of the Convention on Nuclear Safety in August 2016
• The UAE engaged actively with the IAEA on the implementation of the amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material which is now in force; and
• The UAE has carried out all IAEA requirements for Safeguards at Barakah. There has been timely progress in implementing safeguards—plans and design have been discussed and agreed with the IAEA—the subsidiary arrangement is ready for implementation early in 2017 and the IAEA is moving into full scope safeguards. The Additional Protocol is also in force which means, among other things, that there can be surprise / spot IAEA inspections

Abu Dhabi will host the International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Power in the 21st Century on October 30th – November 1st, 2017. The several main areas of discussion are:

1. Investing in nuclear power
2. The vital role of women in nuclear
3. Nuclear energy as the key energy source for solving three of the great problems of the 21th century
   • - The main one of these challenges is climate change and the invaluable role of nuclear power in climate change mitigation
   • - Nuclear power as an option to contribute to a sustainable energy mix under different national conditions
   • - Nuclear power as an important contributor to sustainable economic development
4. Factors affecting nuclear power development (with a focus on a strong infrastructure, financing, and public acceptance);
5. Safe, secure, and sustainable nuclear energy; and
6. Nuclear diversification—the development of nuclear technologies

The International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification is a public-private partnership between the U.S. State Department and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, an important non-governmental organization. This is a major new effort to further understanding of the complex technical challenges involved in the verification of disarmament agreements. It is designed to build capacity among both states with and without nuclear weapons. This is a different mission than safeguarding nuclear power generation. The UAE, consistent with its policy of support of nuclear disarmament, hosted a plenary meeting of the Nuclear Threat Initiative in November 2016 in Abu Dhabi.

Transparency

Transparency assessment and recommendations

FANR’s Director of the Government Communications Department, presented the briefing on this subject.

A five year communication strategy has been developed by FANR. Since the last Board meeting, FANR has conducted eight stakeholders awareness and training sessions with 160 attendees, for example with the Dubai Police and the Federal Customs Authority. Port and export issues were discussed.

FANR has signed three Memoranda of Understanding’s, with national and international organizations and more are expected.

FANR has published 30 press releases and conducted 10 media interviews. There were over one million social media engagements and website visitors increased by 340%. Also developed were multiple corporate information collaterals, such as: a new corporate video, infographic timeline, annual report, and others.

FANR organized and participated in six international seminars, for example:

• The 2016 spring CAMP meeting which was a technical user group set up pursuant to agreement with the NRC
• A seminar on the latest report on the Fukushima accident; and
• A UAE side event was organized during the 2016 IAEA General Conference. Several internal employee engagement activities were created, e.g. an internal newspaper and an innovation challenge. A new website was launched in November 2016. Work is underway toward establishing a “Customer Happiness Center”

Dr. Chung intervened here and suggested more interaction with the Korean Institute for Nuclear Security (KINS). The National Security and Safety Commission (NSSC) in Korea has become too political.

 

Sustainability

Sustainability assessment and recommendations

The Nawah Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO) presented an update on human capacity development at Nawah. The 2017 headcount target of Nawah is 1,810; the current headcount is 1,025. This level will be reached by increasing recruitment, reinforced by capacity building and training, and a focus to improve retention of staff. It is believed that retention rates can increase by paying closer attention to the employee’s needs as well as the needs of his/her family.

Hiring an average of 65 people a month is the target Nawah is working towards, with a special focus on hiring KHNP retirees from Korea as well as retirees from U.S. stations. Various European countries such as Germany will receive special attention as well as part of the recruitment drive. The objective is not to hire too many from one source in order to maintain the multicultural nature of the Barakah Project.

The Units 1 and 2 resource profile calls for 1,168 employees by the time of fuel load and 1,373 by the end of 2017. For the entire Project, as mentioned above, the end of 2017 target is 1,810.

An update on Women in Nuclear was presented by the Nawah Nuclear Performance Improvement Director.

Women in Nuclear Global (WiN Global) was founded in 1992; it has around 25,000 members including national chapters and includes individuals from 102 countries. It includes women working in medicine and healthcare, regulatory committees, nuclear industry, as well as independent researchers.

Talented females make up an important part of ENEC and Nawah’s growing workforce. The UAE’s first WiN chapter was launched in 2014 and is the first of its kind in the Middle East. It is supported by Her Excellency Sheikha Lubna Bint Khalid Al Qasimi, Minister of State for Tolerance and ENEC Board Member. It makes up part of a global network of WiN chapters established by the World Nuclear Association. 20% of the 1,700 plus professionals that are part of the Barakah Project are female. Nearly 10% of the Barakah-based employees are female and almost 40% of the headquarters-based employees are female. Over 29% of the students in the various ENEC educational programs are female with figure increasing to 34% in the Higher Diploma in Nuclear Technology Program.

The recent WiN Conference in the UAE was held in November 2016.

Board discussion and conclusion

The Chairman and Mr. Laaksonen expressed pleasure with the more upbeat presentation. The new FANR office, that also houses a very advanced emergency management room, was a positive step. The arrangement of FANR financial independence and the progress in the establishment of the decommissioning trust fund were positive developments.

Ambassador Graham welcomed the discussion on cybersecurity. From a previous report, it was recalled that the Board had asked for a briefing from the National Electronic Security Authority. The IAB would appreciate it if this could be arranged.

The formation of Nawah is underway. FANR is doing inspections on Nawah. Congratulations to Ambassador Al Kaabi for his work with the IAEA. The Chairman noted the increasing help to the IAEA by the UAE and the increasing influence of the UAE with the IAEA.

With respect to nuclear safety, the Board agrees that safety is a higher priority than scheduling and is pleased to see the commitment by all to success.

Communication is very important particularly in carrying out any large project by multinational teams. Language skills are, of course, important, but the cultural differences and different ways of expression should also be understood in order to improve communications. The Board observes that communication between Barakah groups of differing English skills and cultural backgrounds has improved greatly.

Multicultural/multinational discussion is of real interest and it was noted that English is the native or the second language of 70% of the ENEC and Nawah workforce.

The Board also recommends more communications between UAE organizations and Korean nuclear organizations for the long-term benefits.

The signing of a JV between Nawah and KEPCO as well would be a good step in the opinion of the Board. The Board expressed its interest in the root cause of the initial malfunction of the pressure operated steam relief valve (POSRV) at Shin Kori 3 and its consequences to Barakah Unit 1. The Board would like a report on the outcome of this problem at the next meeting.

Soon after the Board meeting, the Shin Kori 3 (the reference plant for Barakah units) operation team uncovered the root cause of the POSRV problem. After the technical correction, Shin Kori 3 has been operating at 100% power level and the Korean Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (US NRC equivalent government agency in Korea) declared ‹Commercial Operation› of Shin Kori 3 on December 20th, 2016. The details of the problem and its technical solution will be presented at the next Board meeting.

Following the recommendation by the KEPCO-ENEC Prime Contract, Team Korea headed by KEPCO applied for the Design Certificate (DC) of APR 1400 to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The application has been examined carefully by the USNRC and the staff review has been completed. In view of the successful progress of DC proceedings so far, it is expected that APR 1400 will receive its USNRC-DC as scheduled in 2019. It would be a major accomplishment of the Barakah project.

The Board was pleased to learn of the imminent arrival of the first fresh fuel assemblies.

Great praise from the Board for the WiN Conference in Abu Dhabi.

The Board expresses its gratitude to all of the participating entities in the briefing for the considerable effort involved in presenting such highly competent, thoroughly informative, and significantly valuable reports.

Again, the Board congratulates the UAE on the continued success of its nuclear energy program and finds that the UAE in its program remains fully committed to the principles of safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency, and sustainability.

Chairman's Preface

This report discusses host of items: the updated status of the Barakah NPP, the status of the Operating License Application, safeguards of handling fresh fuel, emergency preparedness & response readiness, major tests that lie ahead, capacity building, the nuclear security program overview, ENEC’s SURE program, outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summit and UAE’s key achievements in 2015 with the IAEA.

At its next meeting the Board would appreciate further reports on how to cope with cyber threats, transparency between ENEC and KEPCO, FANR’s financing and independence and updates on being on time and on budget in 2017.

I would like to thank all the entities for their contributions to the thirteenth meeting of the Board and supporting this report and for endorsing the Board›s recommendations. Thanks are also due to the Board members for their continuous efforts in developing this report.

Introduction

FANR’s briefing was led by the Director General assisted by his team. The MOFA briefing was conducted by the UAE Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Ambassador Hamad Al Kaabi. The second day of meetings, April 4th, 2016, also featured two briefings, the first conducted by the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) and the second by the Critical Infrastructure and Coastal Protection Authority (CICPA). In the afternoon following these meetings, the Board held its own private discussion as has been the regular practice.

The Chief Project Officer (CPO) and the Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO), assisted by their teams, led ENEC’s briefing.

The CICPA brief was given by Commander of the Barakah Center and his team. Also present at the joint ENEC & CICPA briefing was the ENEC Executive Security Director; ENEC’s Site Physical Security Manager and ENEC’s Information and Cybersecurity Director.

The nuclear power program of the UAE is based on upholding the highest standards of the five principles of safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency, and sustainability.

The IAB is tasked with reviewing the UAE program bi-annually and with reporting how the UAE has adhered to these principles. As a result, and in line with previous publications, this report is divided into five sections that review each of these principles based on the presentations of FANR, MOFA, ENEC, and CICPA. While the structure provides a clear and heavy emphasis on safety, which is appropriate, all five principles declared to be observed by the UAE program are also well covered throughout this report.

The thirteenth meeting of the IAB was held shortly after the successful Paris Conference on climate change held in December 2015, where all countries came together in an important agreement to take the first step toward to globally limit and mitigate climate change and its effects. Specifically, the agreement fundamentally aims to limit the increase in global warming to 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, which is the point at which significant impacts of climate change would begin to occur. Furthermore, it was announced that there would be a special effort—pressed by the island states—to limit this increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius. However, world temperature has already reached a level of 1 degree Celsius above pre-industrial levels and it is believed to be exceedingly difficult to keep the average world temperature increase from exceeding 2 degrees Celsius.

Meanwhile, the UAE nuclear power program continues to move forward setting the right example for the world community. Preparations for nuclear operations are scheduled to commence sometime in the coming year. Although commercial operations at the first unit had been scheduled for May 2017, this date will be extended—because of issues mentioned later in this report—to the end of 2017. It is still planned, however, that all four reactors at the Barakah site will be completed and operating by the planned date for the commencement of operations at Unit 4. This is primarily due to the learning curve and experience gained from building and operating the first unit and leveraged for the remaining three units. By 2020, when Unit 4 is expected to commence operations, a significant portion of the electricity produced within the UAE will be generated from a safe, clean, and reliable source of power—the Barakah NPP.

The FANR briefing was held first. Chairman Blix opened discussions by noting that this IAB meeting closely follows the Nuclear Security Summit that was recently held in Washington DC. The Chairman commented that a positive solution to the threat of climate change depends partly on nuclear power, thus the IAEA will have a very important role to play. Similarly, FANR will have a significant impact on the success of the UAE nuclear power program. Ambassador Graham added that the arrival of the UAE program has been timely for the chances of success against the effects of climate change. As a result, the UAE program is of very great importance to the world community.

Dr. Chung said that there is global interest in the UAE nuclear power program; as it is of vital importance for the nuclear renaissance. The Korean president at the Washington summit expressed strong support for nuclear power. The UAE nuclear program offers great confidence and support to the future of nuclear energy in mitigating the effects of climate change should the program remain on schedule and budget.

Safety

Safety assessment and recommendation

FANR’s Director General began by outlining the major developments at FANR since the 12th IAB meeting, held back in October, 2015. FANR is continuing its thorough review of ENEC’s operating license application for Barakah Unit’s 1 and 2. Furthermore, FANR is also engaged in a separate review for an ENEC application related to the recipient of fresh nuclear fuel at Barakah.

FANR’s Director General also mentioned that the first full scope on-site and off-site emergency exercise was successfully conducted at Barakah. FANR is presently preparing for the IAEA Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission. Significant progress has been made on the installation of safeguards and the development of security programs for the nuclear program. In addition, he said that progress was made on the development of a decommissioning trust fund and on the preparation of waste management regulations in view of the upcoming issuance of the Operating License.

Moreover, he reported on the first meeting of the newly reconstituted International Advisory Group (IAG) advising FANR Board of Management on critical technical and policy issues in nuclear safety regulation. He also informed the IAB on ongoing sustainability efforts which are important for the future success of FANR, including leadership training and career path planning as well as recruitment and training of developee engineers. At FANR today, nine out of twelve Directors are Emirati nationals. Lastly, FANR recently had opened a branch at the Dubai international airport for the purpose of enhancing its services to companies in the industrial and medical sectors primarily. The meeting then focused on the status of FANR’s review of the application for the operating license application (OLA). The initial review of the OLA and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) were completed in September 2015. During this initial review, FANR issued 1,400 Requests for Additional Information (RAI) to ENEC and approximately 70% of these RAIs have now been addressed. Most of the safety evaluation reports are expected to be completed by the third quarter of 2016.

The issuance of the Operating License is dependent on ENEC’s operational readiness. The final completion schedule will be set by ENEC’s license submittals and ENEC’s commission and operational readiness activities. Of the “active” RAIs, 956 are completed, while 427 remain active, and a small number—15—are yet to be submitted by FANR. The major reports that are due to be submitted are: the Descriptions of Processes and Programs for operation stage, which is now expected to be submitted to FANR by ENEC by October 31st, 2016 of this year along with the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) by FANR, which is to be completed by December 31st, 2016. In addition, the submission of the Accident Management Plan, is expected on December 31st, 2016 and the SER complete by April 30th, 2017. For the post-Fukushima related commitments, the submittal is expected by January 31st, 2017 with the SER complete by February 28th, 2017. Once all OLA documents have been submitted by ENEC, FANR will then proceed to perform a complete review of the late submittals and resolve any associated RAIs. Following the review, FANR will then issue license recommendations and supporting documents to the FANR Board of Management.

In FANR’s view, at the current pace, they estimate that the earliest date for completing the aforementioned submittals is May 2017. Once the Operating License is issued, the licensed operator of the Barakah nuclear units can then commence preparations for nuclear commercial operations.

As mentioned earlier, FANR is continuing to review ENEC’s application for gaining authorization to import fresh nuclear fuel. Factors such as the Fresh fuel storage readiness, the establishment of safeguards applicable to the import of fresh fuel assemblies, and the transport license to bring in fresh fuel, are closely related to nuclear liability insurance. The licenses for the handling and storage of fresh fuel, the transport of fresh fuel, and the import of fresh fuel, will all be included into the construction license. The nuclear liability insurance must be settled before the Operating License can be issued.

Once the Operating License has been issued for Units 1 and 2, all four of these licenses will then be terminated. For fuel, a long term nuclear material license for the possession and handling of fresh fuel will remain valid. The three fuel licenses, absorbed under the construction license, were requested for April 1st, 2016 in the applications submitted in 2015 but have not yet been issued.

The full off-site and on-site Emergency Plan exercise was conducted on February 23-25, 2016. This was required by a FANR regulation, to be held prior to the arrival of on-site fresh fuel. It was a full scope exercise involving all relevant ENEC units and relevant off-site organizations. The Day 1 scenario posited a sequence of increasing reactor damage and Days 2 and 3 exercised specific support functions. FANR planned and conducted the overall assessment of the on-site and off-site responses. ENEC conducted its own internal evaluation and the IAEA provided observers. An important part of the exercise was testing the interface between the on-site and off-site plans. Some facilities involved were still under construction and had to be simulated—by their nature these have a limited effectiveness and will be fully tested at the next exercise planned by the end of the year, when these facilities are expected to be complete.

The overall off-site response demonstrated a well-organized and managed off-site response capability. Key areas have been identified for improvement.

ENEC presented the on-site response for the Fuel Receipt Exercise which involved the following facilities:

• The Emergency Operations Facility
• The Alternative Technical Support Center
• The Operational Support Center activities were performed at the Emergency Center
• The Nuclear Center
• The Main Control Room Simulation Cell
• The Ruwais Reception Center
• The Ruwais Hospital
• Traffic Control
• Radiation Monitoring
• Public Alerting

On-site performance was a very successful exercise. There was a good demonstration of command and control. The majority of on-site objectives were met despite the unavailability of some emergency response facilities and the lack of a qualified on shift staff. This issue is currently being addressed through ENEC’s Human Capacity Development program. The off-site performance was largely successful. The capabilities of the Reception Center and the Ruwais Hospital exceeded the evaluators’ expectations. Areas of improvement identified by this exercise include: certain processes and procedures that need to be improved; additional equipment is needed to improve communication; and further training and practice is required.

ENEC presented its achievements in its Emergency Preparedness program, including the completion of the Emergency Response Facilities in Ruwais, which are of the highest technologically advanced facilities in the world, and were used successfully in the Fuel Receipt Exercise in February 2016.

The IAEA observers found FANR’s Emergency Planning Response (EPR) facilities to be effectively demonstrated. Some of the areas suggested for improvement were: FANR’s arrangements to undertake the dual regulator/response role; clarify the FANR off-site role; support national organizations to enhance their understanding of the nuclear hazard; and ensure that the operator has appropriate EPR arrangements in place. ENEC has committed to another similar exercise prior to fuel load and start-up.

Ambassador Graham asked a question about the philosophy being followed as the project nears start-up for Unit 1: do all issues have to be resolved before start-up or can some matters, perhaps of less than central importance, be dealt with on an interim basis to avoid any start-up delays? Lady Barbara said she would like to know more about this matter. The Director General responded that FANR has an issues list, for example critical infrastructure that has to be accomplished before start-up, and may not be left unfinished. There will be a few unresolved issues that will become a policy issue for a higher governmental authority. However, FANR Director General was confident that the central issues related to nuclear operations will be resolved by the issuance of the Operating License and that subsidiary issues will be addressed with temporary measures for a few months while the licensed operator proceeds to start-up.

Chairman Blix asked the FANR Director General about the latest studies on low dose radiation. The Director General replied that FANR is following these studies but nothing has been incorporated yet into FANR regulations.

Chairman Blix returned to the EPR issue and said the Emergency Plan must effectively integrate security with safety. Mr. Laaksonen added that it is important to plan and prescribe how the security and safety personnel should communicate and cooperate in the event that an emergency is consequence of an unlawful intrusion to the plant site.

Dr. Chung asked when the first fresh fuel shipment is expected. FANR’s Director General replied that ENEC says June 2017. FANR has met with ENEC recently and had further questions on the schedule. Two issues were mentioned that relate to this subject: acquiring the necessary equipment for fuel handling and storage from Korea has been slower than expected; and standing operating relations have been challenging. FANR does not accept import of fresh fuel assemblies before the storage on-site is completed and all equipments are tested.

FANR reported that the implementation of safeguards for the arrival of fresh nuclear fuel is well underway. There have been regular safeguards technical meetings among FANR, IAEA, and ENEC. Safeguards obligations and IAEA containment and surveillance measures will be integrated into the Barakah NPP before the first receipt of fresh fuel. IAEA conducted two site visits in 2015 and FANR has begun safeguards operational inspection readiness inspections. The UAE provided the IAEA with the required advance notification of the first introduction of fresh nuclear fuel.

This introduction would signal the start of the full-scope Safeguards Agreement. The UAE is finalizing negotiations with the IAEA on the UAE Subsidiary Arrangements and Barakah NPP Facility Attachment. FANR is fully prepared for implementation of the full-scope Safeguards Agreement and the immediate submission of a UAE Safeguards initial report to the IAEA as well as subsequent reporting.

On April 4th, 2016, Mr. David Scott, opened the meeting on behalf of the Executive Affairs Authority Chairman and gave an introduction noting that this IAB meeting represented the seventh year of IAB briefings and that the UAE is very grateful for the Board’s efforts. He said that he had first discussed nuclear power for the UAE with IAB member Dr. Mujid Kazimi (who passed away in 2015) back in 2007. He also had high praises for IAB member Mr. Jacques Bouchard (who also passed away in 2015).

He announced that the total Barakah NPP project is now 60% complete, with Unit 1 at 85% complete. Key construction progress performed in Barakah included the cold hydro-static testing (CHT)—to verify the reactor coolant circuit leak tightness and strength against maximum static pressure—which was conducted in February 2016. The next big test before loading fuel to the reactors is the Hot Functional Test. In this test, the temperature of water in the reactor coolant circuit is increased, to ensure all the systems function properly in this environment.

At the programmatic level, there is significant collaboration with the IAEA. The UAE is one of the most active new-build members of the IAEA. In addition, the UAE is chairman of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) committee of the Arab League; it is much hoped that measures can be developed to permit the negotiation of a WMD free zone. Following the introduction, ENEC’s CPO and the CNO led ENEC’s formal briefing. It was stated that the estimated plan is for the Operating License to be granted at the end of May 2017 and for the licensed operator to begin the fuel load process of Unit 1 with the target to begin operations by the end of 2017. The lack of various nuclear related materials have caused a few months delay in the project. Deliveries from South Korea and long lead time items led to a slow start, however, such minor delays can be recovered later on and help restore the overall project to its original timeline. The lessons learned from Unit 1 are also being applied for Units 2-4 and deliveries have become more efficient. ENEC is now focused on guaranteeing project delivery, as well as testing and commissioning of Unit 1, with operational readiness being shifted to the operating subsidiary. The first hot functional test will be in the September 2016 timeframe. This testing is a practice run for the plant. The present status of the four Units is:

• Unit 1 – ENEC has implemented a safety and a quality rescheduling program of Unit 1 to ensure long term sustainability of the first nuclear reactor; the plant will be physically ready close to being on time even with the materials delay. The operational readiness program of Unit 1 has been shifted to ENEC’s operating subsidiary, which includes a dedicated operational structure
• Unit 2 – is largely on time
• Unit 3 – a few months early
• Unit 4 – a few months early

The consensus is that the delivery of the four reactors is on schedule and that ENEC will be able to deliver the UAE peaceful nuclear energy program by 2020. ENEC continues to prioritize safety and quality over schedule and is working with local and Federal energy stakeholders to coordinate the delivery of the units to the grid.

There have been issues with the Shin Kori 3 reactor (the reference plant of the APR-1400 reactor) and KHNP, the Korean nuclear licensed operator, has not been sharing sufficient operating data. Lady Barbara asked why there would be a problem sharing information with Barakah as it is the showcase of South Korean exports. ENEC replied that while South Korea is the best in the world at building these reactors, right now sharing information is challenging, as this is the first time KHNP has shared its operating experience outside of South Korea.

Mr. Scott said that, in his opinion, it is really an issue of culture. Both countries are discussing sharing operating experience. South Korea has no history of sharing operating experience outside its borders. There is no ill will here; the sharing is in the interest of both sides.

ENEC presented an overview of the Barakah licenses currently active:

• The Site Selection License was approved in February 2010
• The Site Preparation License, Units 1-4, was approved in July 2010
• Units 1 & 2 Construction License, was approved in July 2012
• Units 3 & 4 Construction License, was approved in September 2014

The Unit 1 & 2 OLA was submitted on March 2015 in adherence to the original program schedule set in 2009. The OLA seeks a license to operate Units 1 & 2 for 60 years. The OLA was submitted on schedule but the final Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and the Physical Protection Plan (PPP) are ongoing. Some 3,000 procedures, that ENEC and its operating subsidiary, are developing for operations are being developed.

The operating procedures that ENEC’s operating subsidiary is developing are solid procedures that will ensure that the reactor functions safely at all times.

Operating procedures for the reactors in Barakah are taken from Korean systems that are specific to the nuclear technology being used in the UAE. The procedures adopted can be seen as more rule-based. Korea will also be supplying many highly experienced individuals with more than 30 years’ experience.

Nevertheless, all South Korean nuclear experts working in the UAE will require retraining and a successful completion of FANR’s tests in order to be granted permission to operate the Barakah reactors.

As reported by FANR, ENEC continues to work with the Federal regulator to respond to all RAIs with the target to obtain approval by May 2017. As previously stated, three major license applications related to fuel receipt have been submitted by ENEC to FANR:

• Handling and Storage of New Nuclear Fuel, submitted in October 2015
• Transportation of New Nuclear Fuel, submitted in December 2015
• Import of New Nuclear Fuel, submitted in January 2016
• Import of Nuclear Materials (not nuclear fuel), submitted in March 2016

Unit 3 & 4 OLAs are planned for submittal in 2017. The Unit 3 & 4 OLAs will be similar to the Unit 1 & 2 application and will incorporate the lessons learned from Fukushima.

ENEC CPO presented a construction update. Manpower at Barakah, as of the week of the IAB meeting, was over 20,000.

As per April 2016, there is a .07% accident rate, per million man hours, and no fatalities at Barakah. Many nationalities are involved in the delivery of Barakah: nearly 2,000 of the total are Koreans and the other nationalities include large numbers of Filipinos, Bangladeshis, Indians, Nepalis, Pakistanis, Thais, and Vietnamese.

ENEC pays special attention to the work-life balance of staff at site and announced that a series of on-site facilities that cater to the diverse cultures has been completed to improve the lifestyle offered at Barakah. Construction progress continues at Unit 1 with the reactor pressure vessel, the reactor containment vessel, the monitoring systems, the reactor vessel internal structures, and many auxiliary buildings and other structures about 90% complete.

In addition, the turbine generator building is almost complete and the water treatment building for Units 1 & 2 is 99% complete. Barakah NPP Unit 2, is 67.3% complete as of March 2016 and is also progressing steadily. The reactor containment building and auxiliary building for Unit 2 is largely complete. The Unit 2 turbine building is also progressing well. Unit 3 and Unit 4 are also both proceeding well, according to ENEC’s CPO. The reactor containment building and the auxiliary building are well advanced and the Unit 3 turbine building is making significant progress. These two units are benefiting efficiencies and lessons learned from the simultaneous construction of four APR-1400 reactors at site. They are both ahead of schedule.

As per the Prime Contract, ENEC has tasked KEPCO to execute the commissioning (the initial test program) of the Barakah plants through to 100% power performance. KEPCO has subcontracted this work to its nuclear operating company, KHNP. Of the 255 KHNP staff present at site, over 50% have at least ten years of safe nuclear power plant operations. All the personnel involved in this part of the project are co-located in the same building. It is estimated that teams of 400 to 500 individuals will perform the tests. They are fully focused on commissioning and testing and are highly experienced in this task. About 20% of the overall commissioning process is complete. There are two types of system turnovers being executed in Unit 1:

1. Construction to commissioning. Unit 1 passed the Cold Hydrostatic testing first time
2. Commissioning to plant operations

Turnovers from commissioning to construction have not started yet.

The major tests completed are:

• Initial Energization
• Cold and Secondary Hydrostatic tests
• The major tests that lie ahead are:
• The Structural Integrity Test (SIT)/ Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT) (2nd quarter, 2016) to verify the structural integrity of the containment building and the leak rate test of any extended containment
• Hot Functional Test (3rd quarter, 2016) to verify the operability of the reactor and related auxiliary systems and equipment under hot conditions before fuel loading
• Unit 2 - Initial Energization (3rd quarter, 2016)
• Unit 1 - Fuel Load, pending regulatory approval, (1st quarter, 2017) to verify the serial number and position of the initial fuel, then load fuel in the predetermined order
• Power Ascension Tests (2nd quarter, 2017) to verify that systems and components are ready to be operated at 100% of the full power of the plant

Frequent safeguards technical meetings between FANR, IAEA, and ENEC are ongoing in order to integrate safeguards obligations and IAEA containment and surveillance measures into Barakah NPP before the receipt of fresh fuel. Two site visits were carried out by IAEA in 2015 in support of this objective. FANR has begun safeguard operational readiness inspections to ensure full license and Facility Attachment compliance before the arrival of nuclear material on-site. The UAE is finalizing the negotiations on the Subsidiary Arrangements and the Facility Attachment and FANR is prepared for full scope safeguards implementation and to submit the UAE initial safeguards report to the IAEA. FANR then presented answers to several questions the Board submitted at the end of the 12th IAB meeting.

With respect to operations, can Unit 1 be operated as a stand-alone when it shares a number of facilities with Unit 2? FANR responded by saying that, prior to granting an OL for Barakah Unit 1, FANR will verify that all systems and components, important to safety, have been constructed in accordance with requirements and that the plant has reached a level of readiness to give assurance of its safe operation.

Consistent with the above, FANR will verify that all systems common to both Units 1 & 2, and that are required for the safe operation of Unit 1, have been adequately tested and put into service accordingly.

ENEC will be required to demonstrate that all necessary controls are in place to prevent ongoing construction activities affecting the safe operation of Unit 1

For commissioning activities of Unit 2 that may compromise operation of Unit 1, the governing rule will be that the interfacing elements (e.g., valves, breakers etc.) will remain under the control of the operating unit. Before authorizing operation of Unit 1, FANR will verify that ENEC’s Emergency Response Plan is effective to protect the labor force on-site during construction.

The Board asked, given that Shin Kori plant is going to be delayed, there will be minimal time to conduct tests that ENEC was planning to rely upon prior to Unit 1 beginning operations. Now that ENEC is not likely to have its previously expected testing phase, it is critical to understand what steps or tests are being planned to compensate for this? FANR’s responded that ENEC’s submission for an OL relies upon tests being performed at Shin Kori in order to justify the effectiveness of Barakah’s First of a Kind Tests (FOAK). While FANR is aware of delays in the execution of some tests at Shin Kori, FANR is not aware that any tests have been cancelled. Should some of these FOAK tests be delayed significantly, FANR will require ENEC to review its original plan which may include in some cases performing the FOAK test on Barakah Unit 1, as appropriate.

The Board expressed concerns when FANR indicated in its briefing that it has moved under the Prime Minister’s jurisdiction as to what effect will this have on regulatory independence? The Board also expressed that is also important for FANR to develop its contacts with other government agencies. FANR’s responded that an agency of the UAE Federal Government, FANR is integrating itself within the UAE Federal Government system. As a result, FANR will apply federal government policies and management standards as far as possible.

For instance, FANR is providing its strategic plan and performance indicators to the Prime Minister’s office along with all other federal agencies.

However, FANR’s mandate according to the Nuclear Law has not changed, and FANR will continue to make its regulatory decisions for safety, security, and non-proliferation independently and according to the obligations in the Nuclear Law.

FANR is working with the Prime Minister’s office to integrate the strategic plan. There is no issue about FANR’s complete regulatory independence: FANR writes its own regulations and does its own inspections without interference. FANR has set up a committee to work with other agencies. And FANR management will submit to its Board a paper on what FANR independence means.

Security

Security assessment and recommendations

Dr. Chung initiated the security briefing by asking when the fresh fuel would arrive in the UAE. The briefer responded that it will be in the country during the fourth quarter of 2016, pending upon regulatory approval. With respect to fresh fuel storage and the security of the implementation of storage plans, in December 2015 ENEC submitted to FANR its Transport Security Plan and its review has been completed. In February of 2016, ENEC submitted its Physical Protection Plan (PPP), Construction Phase II, which includes the Fresh Fuel Storage Plan and the Limited Access Area. FANR is currently reviewing this submission.

Regarding the physical protection for operations, ENEC submitted the PPP for Operations (PPP-O) as part of the OLA for Units 1 and 2 back in March 2015. ENEC’s cybersecurity plan was also included in its modification of the PPP-O in the second quarter of 2015 to FANR along with three other related PPP-O plans in 2015. The Contingency Plan and Vulnerability Assessment are also scheduled to be submitted.

The IPPAS workshop and preparatory meeting took place in Abu Dhabi in November 2015 and it was agreed that the IPPAS mission itself, scheduled for the fourth quarter of 2016, will include a national review, a facility review, and a review of the security of sources. The IAB Chairman then inquired about cybersecurity. FANR replied that this was being carefully studied and that prior to the OL getting approved, there must be a robust cybersecurity strategy in place. The Chairman asked about the Belgian incident concerning the reactor there. FANR replied, that while it is outside their jurisdiction, FANR is working closely with the national security services and is following the matter.

ENEC presented an overview of its nuclear security program. This program is being developed by ENEC in partnership with the CICPA. In accordance with FANR regulations, security measures detailed in the various physical protection plans are required to be implemented 30 days prior to fuel receipt at Barakah NPP. CICPA and ENEC are working together to provide guard force training. The training for Barakah’s specialized unarmed guard force will be completed and the force will be mobilized by the end of 2016. PPP-O, Revision 1 addressing nuclear security readiness was developed jointly by ENEC and CICPA and submitted to FANR on March 31, 2016. It included:

• A presentation of the division of roles and responsibilities for security activities between CICPA and ENEC
• A Target Set Analysis summary
• A Contingency Plan detailing actions that are aligned with the Emergency Response Plan
• A Vulnerability Assessment summary
• A description of the testing, maintenance, and evaluation program
• A Physical Protection system overview
• A proposed cybersecurity plan is included in the submission

CICPA also presented a report on their progress. The officers presenting the report described their work with ENEC on the Barakah nuclear security program. The continuation of the nuclear security training, site-specific nuclear security training, the program at Khalifa University and workshops held by Sandia National Laboratories were all covered. ENEC is implementing a fitness for duty and a behavioral observation program pursuant to regulatory requirements.

ENEC’s CNO mentioned FANR’s interest in cybersecurity. In his opinion, the Barakah cyber planning was very sophisticated, and more advanced than in the U.S.

During the CICPA briefing, there were comments and questions on cybersecurity from the Board. ENEC underscored that nuclear cybersecurity is an ongoing global concern. A special task force was organized after the attacks in Belgium. Over the last year, the UAE cybersecurity plan was being established and it is based on the U.S. NRC and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) programs, also aligning to IAEA standards. Regulation and implementation will be carried out by the National Electronic Security Agency (NESA) and FANR working together. Lady Barbara noted that the oil and gas industry has the same problems. The IAB Chairman mentioned the events in Belgium, Stuxnet, and the attack in Saudi Arabia. CICPA replied that the Authority had addressed lessons learned from Stuxnet and added that a Saudi-type attack is unlikely in the UAE given the controls now in place.

The Chairman asked how the behavioral security plan operates. Look at what happened at Lufthansa. What can you do? The trouble in Germany was that the medical services were supposed to report effectively but did not do it. How does CICPA do it? The reply was that they thoroughly check people and there exists a special unit tasked with searching out problem creators. The risks are considerable but it is necessary to balance employee interests.

Mr. Hattori noted that Japan and Korea have opened centers of nuclear security that the UAE can benchmark against. CICPA showed an interest and mentioned that they are aware of the center of excellence in China and plans on benchmarking against this facility in the near future.

Non-proliferation

Non - proliferation assessment and recommendations including Waste Management

Ambassador Al Kaabi delivered a comprehensive report on the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in Washington, along with a report on the progress realized by all four of the Nuclear Security Summits in the last seven years and the UAE’s role in the Summits.

The goals of the NSS process were:

1. To reduce the stockpiles of hazardous nuclear material
2. Improve the security of nuclear material
3. Intensify international cooperation in key areas of nuclear security

At the Washington Summit in 2010, for the first time countries and organizations came together in the NSS process to agree on global arrangements to improve the security of nuclear material and a work plan was agreed to by the members.

Following on the Washington Summit, in 2012 at the Seoul NSS, members discussed the progress made by each country.

At The Hague NSS in 2014, the final communique focused on strengthening the global security architecture, elevating the importance of cooperation between governments and nuclear industry and maintaining the high level of achievement on Summit commitments.

Most recently at the Washington NSS in 2016, which was also the final Summit, members highlighted the continued progress as well as the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism as one of the greatest challenges to international security. Additional action plans were adopted involving the IAEA, Interpol, the United Nations, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

International progress resulting from the NSS process includes the following:

• All of the countries that committed to secure all Category 1 radiological sources in their territories by 2016 have registered their support for the IAEA Code of Conduct
• Many countries have hosted events and meetings on issues such as maritime security, security culture, nuclear forensics, and cybersecurity, as well as taking an array of national, bi-lateral, and multi-lateral actions to counter nuclear smuggling
• Twelve countries have become Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) free since the NSS process began
• Information sharing has expanded
• There have been increased reviews of national laws related to nuclear security
• Several countries have submitted updates to their UN Security Council 1540 reports since the last Summit

The UAE has been actively engaged in this progress. The UAE is party to all relevant international instruments relating to nuclear security, the UAE submitted its national report to the UN 1540 committee, and the UAE nuclear regulations and regulatory guides are based on the IAEA Nuclear Series documents. The UAE has undertaken a considerable effort to counter nuclear smuggling. In 2014, FANR issued an updated regulation on the export and import of nuclear material. The government is an active participant in the international information sharing effort on nuclear smuggling and is an active promoter and participant in the IAEA network for nuclear security training.

The UAE works closely with the IAEA on nuclear security through participation in workshops, Nuclear Security Guidance Committee meetings, and by providing experts for various meetings. Recent IAEA review missions in the UAE include an Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) follow up mission in early 2016 and an Emergency Preparedness Review (EPREV) mission in 2015. There is also considerable partnering with external stakeholders. The Inter-Arab Nuclear Detection and Response Exercise recently concluded a three-day exercise in Abu Dhabi. The UAE, in cooperation with various U.S. entities, established the Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute (GNEII) in Abu Dhabi, an educational institution that provides classroom instruction and hands-on experience in nuclear energy safety, security, safeguards, and non-proliferation. GNEII is associated with Khalifa University of Science, Technology, and Research. The UAE has concluded a number of international cooperation agreements to strengthen its nuclear power program and FANR has signed a number of Memoranda of Understanding with foreign entities.

The UAE has continued its highly commendable program of cooperation with the IAEA on many subjects related to its nuclear power program. Key achievements in 2015 include:

• The UAE completed ratification of all Conventions and Treaties outlined in UAE nuclear policy
• The UAE submitted and presented its second National Report to the Fifth Review Meeting of the Contracting parties to the Joint Convention on Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
• Seven national TC projects with the IAEA were implemented, five of these were completed in 2015
• Three major IAEA Peer Review missions to the UAE were concluded
• There were 827 UAE participants in IAEA activities during the year
• The hosting of high-level meetings in coordination with the IAEA on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear education training was conducted in Abu Dhabi

In February of 2016, IAEA Director General Amano visited the UAE and Barakah. Mr. Amano stated that “as a newcomer to nuclear power, the UAE is setting a positive example in timely and comprehensive planning and implementation of their nuclear power program, and with their strong emphasis on safety.” During his two-day visit he thanked His Highness Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs for hosting the IAEA’s International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Power in the 21st Century, scheduled for October 2017 in Abu Dhabi.

During the CICPA briefing, Sir John Rose expressed that he hoped CICPA and the UAE are being regularly updated on the proliferation threat. CICPA replied that the need for access and updating is regularly discussed. CICPA is part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security information sharing program and has access to open sources, but not classified information. The CICPA representative said that they were working on the matter.

There was also a question by the IAB from the last Board meeting on non-proliferation, specifically on waste storage.

The presentation on waste disposal was excellent, however questions remain. What is the rationale for interim storage? Is 20 years at the site long enough

FANR responded that spent nuclear fuel needs to be cooled for a long period of time to permit radioactivity and heat generation to diminish to safe operation levels before final disposal. ENEC’s OLA indicates that the spent fuel pools at each reactor have sufficient capacity for storage of spent fuel arising from 20 years’ operation.

ENEC has also indicated in its application that it intends to establish an independent spent fuel storage installation to provide on-site additional dry storage capacity for spent fuel before final disposal.

On-site dry storage of spent fuel is an international-established proven technology. The detailed strategy for spent fuel and radioactive waste management is under development in the UAE. More information will be provided to the IAB as available.

Transparency

Transparency assessment and recommendations

In the opinion of the IAB, transparency of information in connection with Nuclear Power Projects is very important from the points of view of public acceptance and safety governance. Prompt release of important accurate and valid information is absolutely desirable in order to remove any intentional or unintentional distortion of facts.

On the other hand, in order to assess the accuracy and validity of information, we need thorough review and objective judgment by authorized experts and responsible agents. This might require time and effort which could be beyond expectations by outsiders and non-experts. There could be innocent misunderstandings about transparency. The IAB considers that there might be the need for patient fact-findings and considerations before complaining about the lack of transparency.

Therefore, the IAB calls for prompt and earnest efforts in providing the required information, and patience and considerate understanding of steps required to release information clearly and professionally. Whereas parties involved try their best to be transparent, there could have been unjustified accusation about the issue of transparency. In its final analysis, the IAB calls for the highest attention to transparency. At the same time, the IAB understands the required time and professional efforts required in releasing complicated technical information.

Since the last Board meeting, there were five public forums in five emirates in the UAE attended by over 1,000 people. One student outreach meeting was held at UAE University in November 2015 and was attended by 75 students. A two-day workshop was conducted for UAE Federal Customs Authority staff on radiation safety and safeguards.

ENEC’s CEO has been very active in public outreach. According to the latest public opinion poll, nuclear power public approval rate is one of the highest in the world and ENEC’s top leadership remain very involved in public outreach and awareness.

Two "Meet Your Regulator" workshops were held in both Dubai and Abu Dhabi to introduce FANR’s e-licensing system to licensees. The workshop was attended by more than 500 licensees from different sectors.

Three public presentations were conducted in different conferences:

• A presentation on lessons learned at the Fukushima Crisis and Emerging Management Conference—held in Abu Dhabi March 13th-14th, 2016
• A presentation on FANR capacity building at the Middle East Nuclear Training and Simulation Forum held in Abu Dhabi, March 14th-15th, 2016
• Government Communications delivered a presentation on March 20th, 2016 at the International Government Communication Forum, held in the Emirate of Sharjah

Lady Barbara asked if there was coordination between FANR and ENEC on outreach. FANR replied that regular meetings are held to discuss key messages in order to be consistent. Key messages include the country’s security and radiation safety.

According to market research, public concern on nuclear energy is low compared to other countries and there are feelings of national pride about the UAE nuclear power program and its strategic importance to the nation, to power its future growth.

Mr. Hattori commented that in Japan the concern of people living far away from nuclear power plants is a problem. The primary concern in Japan is fear about nuclear safety, more precisely, fear of radiation exposure. What are the major concerns in the UAE? FANR reiterated that public concerns were low and people seem convinced that for the next 30 to 40 years at least the power plants currently being built will be safe. In public settings, spent nuclear fuel and questions related to nuclear safety are key issues raised by attendees.

Dr. Chung mentioned that the International Risk Management Governance Conference could be helpful. The Chairman emphasized the importance of continuously educating the public and building trust as people forget and there are more people coming into the adult population all the time as generations mature.

 

Sustainability

Sustainability assessment and recommendations

FANR commented that its approach to staffing and competence was proceeding on two tracks: staffing of senior expatriate staff to address short to medium term needs and a development program to ensure FANR’s long-term sustainability. A strong cadre of experienced professionals in nuclear safety, security, safeguards, and radiation protection is currently present at FANR.

At the end of the first quarter of 2016, FANR had 202 employees plus a strong program of recruitment, education, and mentoring of younger Emiratis. Of FANR’s total staff, 61% are males and 39% females, 125 are Emiratis (83 in operations, 35 in administration, and seven in the Director General’s office), 77 are expatriates (63 in operations, seven in administration, and seven in the Director General’s office).

FANR has in place a robust young professional development program for capacity building. The 12 month program includes elements such as the GNEII program at Khalifa University, department rotation, soft-skills modules, coaching and mentoring, a study tour, and final assessments. Succession planning will help in identifying current and future FANR leaders. The objective is eventually a workforce at FANR that is 99% Emirati.

During the ENEC presentation, Mr. David Scott mentioned that Abu Dhabi is hosting the 24th Women in Nuclear (WIN) Annual Global Conference in November 2016, under the patronage of H.H. Sheikha Fatima Bint Mubarak, the Supreme Chairwoman of the Family Development Foundation, President of the General Women’s Union—Chairwoman of the Motherhood and Childhood Supreme Council. There is a very active WIN chapter in Abu Dhabi; the first of its kind in the Middle East, which was established by ENEC in 2014.

The UAE is a leader in nuclear capacity building. This is a long effort on which the UAE has embarked. The UAE needs to develop enough human capacity for operations and also for sustainability. Recently, the first batch of Emirati reactor operators graduated. ENEC is also making great strides in capacity building. The ENEC Deputy Director for Capacity Building and Training, presented an overview of ENEC’s human capacity development. Currently, there are over 100 female employees permanently stationed at the Barakah site.

ENEC is also delivering a considerable set of professional development programs—and there is a significant investment in Emiratis becoming nuclear professionals. Three important programs should be mentioned:

• The IAEA Nuclear Energy Management School in Abu Dhabi, where 42 Emiratis have completed the program
• The Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute, where 24 Emiratis have completed this program and two are currently studying under it (the program is operated by ENEC in partnership with Texas A&M)
• The Westinghouse Senior Reactor Operator Management Certification Program; 38 have completed this program and ENEC will offer its own four-month program starting in 2018

For the first 10 years of operations, ENEC plans to outsource maintenance work to KEPCO while it builds the local nuclear maintenance capability.

After 10 years, ENEC through its operating subsidiary will have the option to decide whether to enact its own maintenance program or continue to outsource. This will influence the Barakah Technical Training Program which was established in 2013 and has since transferred all training sessions from South Korea to the UAE.

Regarding manpower, ENEC currently has 1,626 employees representing 39 nationalities. 61.5% are Emiratis and 21% (180) are Emirati women.

During the CICPA briefing, the IAB Chairman asked CIPCA officials to give their opinion as to the success of the full emergency exercise that took place at site. CICPA said it was good experience for them and believed the exercise was a success.

During the ENEC presentation, ENEC CNO informed the IAB about the Unit 1 safety and quality reschedule program. The program was launched by ENEC leadership to ensure that the first Unit of the peaceful nuclear energy program commences commercial operations in adherence to the highest standards of safety and quality and to the earliest schedule possible.

ENEC’s CEO launched this program to ensure Unit 1 is delivered in line with international professional management principles. The following seven principles would be the foundation of the program with the first two being the most important:

1. Leadership at the ENEC and operating subsidiary level. The two organizations needed to further focus their priorities to ensure they were working efficiently to achieve the safe and quality delivery, commissioning and operational readiness of Unit 1. The INPO Leadership and Team Effectiveness Model was selected to support this
2. There would be an increase in the number of standing committees on the ENEC Board. This brings the program closer to implementing WANO standards, which have been formed from INPO standards. With respect to ENEC, roles and responsibilities have been further defined following the Excellence in Governance manual, which defines the roles and responsibilities of the Board of Directors, all the committees and draws clear reporting lines up to the CEO of ENEC.
3. Further build the ENEC and KEPCO partnership to ensure long term success of the program
4. Align with external local and Federal stakeholders
5. Concentrate on getting ENEC’s work done
6. Work in close collaboration with KEPCO to get its work done in adherence to the requirements of the Prime Contract and the UAE peaceful nuclear energy program
7. Implement excellence

Conclusion

Sir John Rose, Lady Barbara, and Ambassador Graham would like to be briefed on the degree to which security forces are updated on proliferating threats. They very much hope that CICPA can find some arrangement that will give them access to classified information. There is a rapidly evolving cyber environment; they need to know what is going on. Of course, the Board understands that there may be limitations on what they can say—things that would reassure the Board. The Board would like to hear about cyber threats from the National Electronic Security Agency (NESA) mentioned by CICPA and FANR.

FANR has an office at the airport, at Barakah, and are moving to new offices in the city. Expansion of the regulator is positive news. The Board supports the independence of FANR—they should interpret for themselves what independence means.

FANR financing is an issue related to independence. FANR should look into how regulatory agencies are financed elsewhere in the world. Independence is extremely important. FANR should study this issue. The Board believes that the trust fund for financing decommissioning costs should be established before operations begin.

The Board would like to congratulate Ambassador Al Kaabi on the important role he has played and continues to play at the IAEA and the Nuclear Security Summits. Hosting International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Power in Abu Dhabi in October 2017 will be very important.

There is a need for more transparency from Korea and the UAE should communicate and raise their concerns regarding the essential information acquired for the program success. Both sides should work harder and raise more efforts to stay on time and on budget unless rushing will jeopardize safety and security of the program then that is acceptable.

Perhaps the basic contract needs to be refreshed. Problems that exist are: insufficient transparency in Korea; ENEC has experienced significant delays in the delivery of equipment; and there is a challenge on the source for trained and licensed reactor operators projected by the original planned date of 2017. ENEC needs to have an in depth discussion with WANO about average versus top of the line procedures.

The Board is grateful for the considerable effort undertaken by the UAE and the supporting entities to provide the IAB with highly competent, informative and valuable presentations.

Again, the Board congratulates the UAE on the continued success of its nuclear power program and finds that the UAE in its program remains fully committed to the principles of safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency and sustainability.

Chairman's Preface

The UAE program is nearing the date when commercial operations will begin at Barakah Nuclear Power plant (NPP) Unit 1. Accordingly, increasingly special attention is given to Unit 1, however, construction work at the remaining three Units continues to progress as scheduled with each of the three reactors beginning operations in one year intervals following the start of operations at Unit 1.

This report discusses host of items: the updated status of the Barakah NPP, emergency preparedness & response readiness, construction license and progress, the safety and review task force, receiving fuel, international cooperation, decommissioning, capacity building, physical protection as well as waste policy.

At its next meeting the Board would appreciate further reports on the various time lines involved in waste disposal, the effect on FANR now that it’s under the Prime Minister’s jurisdiction and on how ENEC will coop with minimal time to conduct tests prior to Unit 1 beginning operations.

The Board congratulates the UAE on the continued success and progress of the nuclear power program and concludes that the UAE remains fully committed to the principles of safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency and sustainability.

Introduction

The nuclear power program of the UAE is based on upholding the highest standards of the five principles of safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency and sustainability. The IAB is tasked with reviewing the UAE program twice a year with a focus on the five principles and the degree to which they have been adhered to as the program moves forward. Thus, this report is divided into five sections each of which covers one of the five principles. At this meeting, the twelfth meeting of the IAB, the presentations were made as indicated by MOFA, FANR and ENEC. While there is a consistent and heavy emphasis on safety, the report also covers all activity centered on each of the five principles as with previous publications.

The UAE program is nearing the date when commercial operations will begin at Barakah NPP Unit 1. Accordingly, increasingly special attention is given to Unit 1, however, construction work at the remaining three Units continues to progress as scheduled with each of the three reactors beginning operations in one year intervals following the start of operations at Unit 1.

As witnessed in recent months, the threat posed by climate change continues to increase. More and more the world community is beginning to understand that it must move away from the heavy reliance on fossil fuel sources of energy and increasingly rely on power from non-carbon emitting production. While the world community is reacting slowly to this existential danger –this will likely change as a result of the Paris intergovernmental meeting on climate change. (The Paris agreement aims to limit global warming 1.5 °C by 2100). In order to achieve such a goal, it is necessary to minimize and replace power generation using fossil fuels by expanding electricity supply by renewable energy sources and low carbon nuclear power. Without baseload clean energy such as nuclear electricity, developing nations that rely on importing energy resources may not sustain socio-economic development for a better quality of life. In this all-important area the UAE continues to lead the way. By 2020, when Unit 4 is expected to commence operations, a significant portion of the electricity produced within the UAE will be generated from a safe, clean, and reliable source of power – the Barakah NPP.

Safety

Safety assessment and recommendation

FANR’s newly appointed Director General, Christer Viktorsson began the evening session by introducing himself and his new senior officers. FANR stated that it has established a new Department called the Department of Development, which will be responsible for strategic planning and management quality. It will be developing a strategic plan for 2020 when all four reactors will be in full operation. This plan will be designed to manage operations post 2020.

The Director General noted that FANR was undertaking actions to improve efficiency across the board. Security work recently has focused on the issue of ensuring smooth governmental function in the event of an accident. Priority strategic goals include licensing and inspections. FANR had just received approval from its Board to begin work on decommissioning planning.

The Deputy Director for Operations stated that the review of the operating license for Unit 1 was now fully moving ahead. An application was received from ENEC on March 25, 2015 and FANR followed up with an acceptance letter to ENEC on March 31, 2015. The initial review of the Operating License Application (OLA)/Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) was completed in September 2015, one month prior to the IAB meeting.

FANR has issued over 1,000 Request for Additional Information (RAIs) to ENEC. Of the “active” RAIs 392 were now closed, 97 have not yet been submitted by FANR and the remaining 583 are still open. However, there are a number of late report submittals by ENEC which are yet to be delivered. For example, the grid stability report and the grid reliability study will be submitted to FANR at the end of September, 2016. The Accident Management Plan and the Fukushima related commitments will be submitted on March 31, 2016 and July 31, 2016 respectively.

A realistic milestone schedule based on ENEC’s OLA submittals in 2016 was then discussed by FANR. Some of the late ENEC submittals are not scheduled to be available until the second half of 2016. Once ENEC submits the remaining OLA documents next year, resolves any associated RAIs and FANR approves all Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs); FANR will then send license recommendations and supporting documents to its Board of Management. Chairman Blix asked what will this mean for issuance of the OLA. The Director General replied, issuance will be expected in February, 2017.

The FANR inspection program is ongoing at the site. An inspection is underway for pre-operational testing with respect to Unit 1 to verify that: the test program is being conducted as set out in the construction license application; test personnel, test procedures and acceptance criteria meet necessary requirements; and test results show that System, Structures, Components (SSCs) conform to the design.

There is a plan to inspect ENEC’s general readiness to operate, the plant itself, with the personnel involved and the process. Such inspections will be part of the inputs used by FANR as part of the operating license review.

The discussion then turned to the subject of the transport, handling and storage of fresh nuclear fuel.

ENEC is expected to file for a license later in 2015 to cover the receiving, unloading and storage of fresh nuclear fuel. Justification will be provided relating to which operational programs will need to be in place, either fully or partially. FANR will prepare a license in time to support the delivery of fresh fuel by ENEC. A mock fuel transport exercise in the UAE is planned for December 2015 and the final fuel transport plan is expected to be implemented soon. It will also include the physical protection arrangement. Nuclear fuel is expected to be shipped to Barakah in multiple shipments beginning in May, 2016.

An Emergency Preparedness Review (EPREV) mission was conducted by the International Agency on Atomic Energy (IAEA) in the UAE from March 21-31, 2015. The purpose of the mission was to review the Emergency Preparedness Response (EPR) arrangements and capabilities at the Barakah NPP including: the onsite emergency preparedness and response plan; national and local offsite EPR arrangements; the interface between the NPP and the offsite EPR authorities; and arrangements for international notification pursuant to IAEA safety standards. Numerous UAE government entities cooperated with the Mission, including ENEC, FANR, MOFA, National Emergency Crisis and Disasters Management Authority, and the Ministry of Interior, along with a several others. The outcome was positive.

Many strengths from the UAE planning process were identified, such as the roles and responsibilities being clearly defined; the operational emergency management system well established; the draft EPR plans and procedures consistent with IAEA safety standards; and great progress was observed in the development of facilities and capabilities to manage the mechanical aspects of a nuclear emergency.

There were also a few recommendations and suggestions; there was a perceived need to develop a formalized process for determining protective actions based on all available information; the requirements for the emergency planning zones: the Urgent Protective Action Zone, the Extended Protected Zone (beyond the site) and the International Protected Zone (out to 500 kilometers), should be reviewed to ensure that they are consistent with IAEA safety standards. In addition, detailed evacuation plans for construction personnel should be developed and all relevant emergency plans and procedures should be tested and fully implemented before the full-scale exercise for onsite and offsite emergency plans scheduled before the first arrival of spent fuel.

Ambassador Hamad Al Kaabi also had important comments on the Emergency Preparedness Review Mission of March, 2015. Ambassador Al Kaabi noted that the Emergency Preparedness Review (EPREV) Team identified particular UAE strengths in establishing a clear definition of roles and responsibilities and significant progress in the development of facilities to manage any necessary medical response. Good practices included the co-location of the emergency operations centers for the management of onsite and offsite response; and effective participation in the Gulf Cooperation Council regional response plan to ensure good coordination with neighboring nations during a nuclear emergency. Progress, however, was believed to be needed in the following areas: additional clarification of how to best protect the public during an emergency; consistent public relations arrangements for a nuclear emergency; ensuring that sufficient qualified personnel to protect the public are available in case a prolonged response to an emergency is necessary; and current efforts to complete test plans, facilities, tools and systems must be maintained.

Technical discussions among FANR, IAEA, and ENEC have been undertaken in order to integrate safeguards, containment, and surveillance measures into Barakah NPP. The IAEA in this regard has made two technical visits to the Barakah NPP site. Because the first introduction of nuclear material is expected in the first quarter of 2016, FANR is completing its preparations for full-scope (both Part 1 and Part 2) safeguards. FANR is prepared for the submission of the UAE’s Initial Safeguards Report to the IAEA soon.

FANR is actively reviewing two updated attachments submitted by ENEC in September; in order to be ready to discuss Subsidiary Arrangements pursuant to Safeguards with the IAEA in connection with the ENEC nuclear material license application.

Comprehensive criteria were documented for each safeguards functional area; for example nuclear material accountancy and control, reporting inspections, and lastly design information. There were individual document reviews to ensure accuracy and completeness. In addition, multiple meetings to discuss reviews prior to formal written responses were made to ensure they all understood what FANR expected.

ENEC’s Chief Program Officer then gave an overview of the construction progress. He commented on some of ENEC’s delayed responses explaining that the pace of material manufacturing has slowed down the program. Also, because of slower progress in Korea plant operations, there will not be as many years of operations at Shin Kori 3, as first anticipated, from which to derive lessons learned. However, it is likely there will still be at least a year’s worth of operational experience from Barakah for ENEC to leverage. The delays at Shin Kori 3 were in part caused by the necessity of removing the electrical cable and reinstalling it. Shin Kori 3 still doesn’t have its operating license, and is expected to receive it by next month. Commercial service for Shin Kori 3 could begin in May, 2016. With regards to Barakah Unit 1, the operating license was awarded in October 2015, which may be challenging to begin operations in May, 2017. However, there is a fair level of confidence to begin generating power by the end of 2017. Construction of Barakah Unit 1 is progressing well. All the internals are done. Internal parts of the plant are all completed. In addition, the associated buildings as part of the first unit are nearing completion. Unit one and two’s water facilities are now also providing water. The raw water reservoirs are where water is de-mineralized and sent on to the reactors. De-mineralized water can now be processed on a 24-hour basis. Water is also now in the Unit 1 refueling pool. Given that Units 1 and 2 share a number of facilities, good coordination of such facilities is important.

Significant construction progress was also achieved in the Switchyard for all four Units. This is where TRANSCO transmission lines connect to the Barakah NPP. The switchyard is the point of where electricity generated from the plants is transmitted to the UAE power grid. The gas insulated switchgear is close to being fully installed, while the installation of the overhead line feeder is also progressing. There is much electrical and instrumention & control progress to go along with this. The main transformer is expected to energize the switchyard by the end of 2015. Lastly, Unit one’s bypass pump house and mixing basin is progressing as planned.

Construction progress on each of the remaining three units remains on schedule and is expected to come online subsequently to one another as per the schedule.

Construction progress for Barakah Unit 2 has been progressing smoothly. In July 2015, the steam generator was installed. The circulating water intake structure and the essential service water structure are both also nearing completion for Units 1 and 2. With respect to Unit 3, the pressure vessel is expected to be installed by May 2016 and the steam generator in July 2016. Major construction for Unit 4 is expected to begin in August 2016.

ENEC’s Nuclear Risk Director gave a presentation in which he discussed a safety assessment conducted by ENEC’s Safety Review Task Force following the Fukushima Daiichi accident. This program has led to several proposals on safety upgrades of the Reference Plant design, mostly based on lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident. The Safety Review Task Force was established soon after the Fukushima Daiichi accident in March 2011. The Task Force completed and submitted its safety assessment report to FANR. The implementation of the design improvements proposed in the report (Fukushima action items) is expected to be completed by September 2016.

According to the comparable Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) studies of the Reference Plant design versus the Upgraded Barakah NPP units, the estimated Core Damage Frequency (CDF) has dropped to one third. The calculated CDF for Barakah NPP is now 1.24E-06/year.

The Safety Review Task Force also assessed consequences of external hazards, i.e. seismic events, flooding, and sand storms. Furthermore, the task force also considered ways to further enhance the reliability of maintaining adequate Spent Fuel Pool cooling and inventory.

The improved design features comprise of:

• Improved seismic capacity (i.e. resistance to seismic induced vibrations) of several components and structures;
• Installations of several water tight doors/gates and protection of selected outdoors tanks from flood damage;
• Improving fire protection design features and facilities;
• Strengthening of electrical systems by means of providing manual cross-tie options, DC recharging options with mobile generators, extended battery duty times, enlarged fuel storages of diesel generators to extend autonomic onsite power supply time;
• External water injection connections (for connecting fire truck pumps) to steam generators, the reactor coolant system, and the spent fuel pool
• Installation of passive autocatalytic hydrogen recombiners to spent fuel pool areas; and
• Installation of additional measuring devices.

Some of the assessment areas included material events as the effect of seismic incidents, flooding and sandstorms. The Chairman asked how often sandstorms occur in the UAE. The Nuclear Risk Director replied that there had been several sandstorms over the last few years. The Barakah NPP has several offsite power sources with backup emergency power sources, to provide multiple defensive layers in preventing and mitigating the Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) caused by sandstorms or other external events.

Other assessment areas included fire/explosion, station blackout and loss of the alternate heat sink, Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) inventory and cooling and severe accident management improvements.

FANR also listed a number of issues from the 11th meeting of the Board as “needing attention.”

FANR has found that the Safety Depressurization and Venting System (SDVS) provides a reliable means for depressurizing the reactor coolant system during an accident. The SDVS has four pilot-operated safety relief valves in two independent trains. Severe accident analysis demonstrates that operation of two valves will depressurize the reactor coolant system prior to the occurrence of a breach.

In addition, ENEC’s Probabilistic Risk Analysis indicates that the contribution to the frequency of large releases of radioactivity resulting from the loss of a SDVS is extremely low.

The Accident Management Program (AMP) has been developed to enhance nuclear safety by focusing on Beyond Design Basis Accidents (BDBA). Such incidents may include:

1. Loss of Large Areas (LOLA) including loss of the control room due to an explosion or fire. An event that could potentially initiate such losses include a plane crash,
2. A Fukushima related event, that focuses on the risk management of a Station Blackout with simultaneous Loss of the Ultimate Heat Sink, and
3. Severe accident management, focusing on risk management after core related damage.

ENEC has committed to provide severe accident management guides for the operators use. FANR will evaluate the basis and adequacy of such guides once available by March, 2016.

With respect to the release of non-condensable gases from containment, ENEC’s submittals to date indicated that the containment integrity is maintained under the postulated severe accident scenario for 72 hours without the need for venting. The review of long-term containment performance is currently ongoing.

In 2011, FANR requested ENEC to conduct an evaluation of the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident by following similar guidance to the EU “stress test” specifications. The evaluation included an analysis of the margin versus the probabilistic approach along with an evaluation to identify margins to “cliff-edge” effects. FANR also required deterministic and probabilistic safety assessments in the evaluation of severe accidents.

ENEC’s Deputy Vice President for Operational Readiness gave a presentation on fresh fuel receipt. The presentation began with a brief review of the regulatory requirements. For security, a Physical Protection Plan (PPP) must be established, and FANR must grant licenses for: possession of nuclear materials; receipt and handling of new fuel; transportation of new fuel; as well as the import of new fuel. An operational radiation protection program should also be established and procedures for fuel receipt and nuclear material accounting must be developed. Furthermore, prior to any nuclear fuel management that may take place, an authorized, trained and qualified senior reactor operator must be present who will be responsible for the control and handling of the nuclear fuel.

The fuel will be shipped in multiple cargos to mitigate the risks associated with sea transportation. There will also be intervals between the arrivals of the fuel shipments.

The fuel will be inspected upon arrival for cleanliness, foreign material erosion, discoloration, scratches and dents. The inspections will be carried in order to identify any damage or contaminant developed during shipping, while also ensuring that all fuel nodes are in the correct place within the assembly. There will be ten new fuel assembly inspections daily. A protocol is also expected to be established with the fuel supplier in the case of flawed fuel to secure a necessary replacement.

Once it is time to begin loading the fuel into the core, an elaborate and thorough process will be followed to prepare the reactor for operations. Such activities will require employees with special qualifications, such as overhead crane operators, spent fuel handling machine operators, fuel inspectors, and fuel management engineers.

ENEC officials also provided the Board with an update to the commissioning status. ENEC has contracted with KEPCO to execute the commissioning of Barakah NPP from the initial test program through to full operations of all four units. KEPCO in turn has subcontracted this work to Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP). Currently, there are 449 contracted specialists involved in the commissioning and maintenance activities. Commissioning tests undertaken prior to full fuel load will be completed under the Construction License, while fuel load and tests following fuel loading is expected to be carried out under the Operating License. Several milestones within the commissioning process include:

• The overall commissioning process is 12.38% complete for Unit 1
• 28 out of 28 startup administrative procedures have been issued by KHNP
• 548 of 773 test procedures have been issued
• 70% of the electrical distribution has been energized
• The fore-bay flooding has been completed
• The de-mineralizing water plant is operational and producing demineralized water
• Air systems are also operating

The major tests that lie ahead are:

• Initial energization of the Standby Auxiliary Transformer (SAT) via the switchyard from the offsite power grid
• Cold Hydrostatic Pressure Tests on reactor coolant and Secondary Sides (CHT and SHT)
• The Hot Functional Tests (which verifies the operability of various systems under hot conditions before fuel loading)
• Fuel loading
• Power ascension tests. These tests verify that the systems, components for the Unit are ready to be operated at plant power capacity

There was also a discussion of ENEC’s future operating company and its current status.

ENEC stated that the formation of the operating company is due to be completed soon. This transition has been underway for many months. The launch of the operating company will enable ENEC to bring more focus on its key program milestones, such as the successful completion of the construction of Units 1 through 4 and the continued relationship with FANR to obtain the requisite operating licenses.

The vision of the operating company is to be globally recognized as a top nuclear utility and UAE employer of choice by 2025. Its mission is to safely and reliably generate electricity from nuclear energy to advance the UAE’s growth, development and quality of life for generations to come. The company will be a fully independent utility, capable of meeting all regulatory requirements and exclusively responsible for the safe and reliable operation of the Barakah NPP. This will include:

• establishing a strong safety culture
• overseeing the commissioning and acceptance of new units
• implementing an Integrated Management System
• implementing an operational readiness program
• operating and maintaining the four units at Barakah NPP
• developing local talent capacity building and creating career aspiration
• entering into strategic agreements to support safe and reliable operations
• producing electricity which is commercially competitive

As the operator, it will also be undertaking all liability for nuclear damage. Liability for nuclear damage is channeled exclusively to the holder of the operating license. This is established by the 1997 Vienna Convention on nuclear liability, which is part of UAE law. Once the company is formally established and FANR has successfully completed its review, the operating license will be issued to the operating company. It then will become the Licensee under the terms of the Convention, and therefore be subject to liability for nuclear damage as provided and limited by the Convention. The operator will be required to acquire insurance and is subject to the liability itself if the insurance fails to pay out. This liability is subject to the terms of the Convention.

Security

Security assessment and recommendations

The Nuclear Fuel Executive Director delivered a presentation on the security practices relevant to the shipment of nuclear fuel. The International Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is the relevant international instrument. Under the Convention, states are obligated to protect nuclear material. The Convention has 151 parties, the UAE joined in 2003. Eighty-four states are party to the amendment, the UAE signed in 2009. FANR has adopted extensive regulations in support of this obligation. The transportation and delivery of fuel assemblies to Barakah NPP is a KEPCO Nuclear Fuels (KNF) responsibility. However, ENEC as the transportation Licensee needs to submit a transport license application to FANR for the transportation of nuclear fuel within the UAE’s geographical boundaries. The transport license application is solely based on the security arrangements for the protection of nuclear fuel shipments. ENEC is currently developing a transport security plan in collaboration with the UAE’s security stakeholders and is to be submitted for FANR to gain approval for fuel transportation within the UAE.

ENEC’s Nuclear Fuel Executive Director explained in some detail the design of the shipping casks that would be used. He also described the tests of the casks that have been done, including dropping the cask from a height of 9 meters and subjecting it to a temperature of 800 degrees Celsius for 30 minutes. This is done pursuant to Korean law and IAEA regulations. All tests demonstrated that the casks met FANR’s requirements, in particular the fuel rods inside the cask remained intact after the 9 meter drop and the temperature inside the cask did not exceed a temperature in the range of 260°C, which is below the melting point of the fuel material inside by a wide margin.

The transportation plan was then explained. Final arrival of fuel is expected in 2016, pending regulatory approval. Prior to the fuel shipment, a mock fuel assembly will be shipped from Korea to the UAE to be used as part of the commissioning testing. This mock fuel exercise will be utilized to simulate the actual transportation plan.

With regards to fuel fabrication, all fuel assemblies are expected to be completed by the end of January, 2016. Quality assurance activities are being performed to ensure zero defect quality. Consultants are present at KNF facilities to carry out oversight activities, as well as at other facilities where fuel assembly components are produced for ENEC.

FANR reported that revision four of the Construction physical protection plan, including fresh fuel storage, is to be submitted by ENEC. After approval by FANR, the Transport Security Plan must be implemented at least 30 days prior to the fuel arrival on site. The PPP for Operation (PPP-O) was submitted by ENEC in March 2015. In the PPP-O beyond those tasks already completed, such as the Security Organization on site and the Physical Protection System, two tasks remain; the contingency plan and the Vulnerability Assessment.

Non-proliferation

Non - proliferation assessment and recommendations including Waste Management

Ambassador Al Kaabi gave an update on the development of the national strategy for safe and secure management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste.

In considering its spent fuel management strategy, the UAE is keeping options open but at the same time it emphasizes planning of measures that are common for all options. The fuel cycle choices currently foreseen are 1) fuel leasing, 2) direct spent fuel disposal, and 3) spent fuel reprocessing abroad and return to the UAE for final disposal.

In the discussion with the IAB the importance of the following measures was stressed:

• completing the legal and regulatory framework for spent fuel and radioactive waste management;
• definition of organizational responsibilities for both interim and long term management of spent fuel;
• provision of safe and secure interim spent fuel storage facilities; the strategy should permit interim storing of all spent fuel that will be generated during the entire lifetime of the Barakah plant;
• timely provision of funds for spent fuel management and NPP decommissioning;
• regular review of available fuel cycle choices and their respective costs of options in light of technological development and services being provided internationally;
• transparency and public communication of spent fuel strategy;
• geological studies to find a potential permanent disposal site within the UAE either for high level reprocessing waste or direct disposal of spent fuel.

The legal framework is included in the Nuclear Law of 2009 and most of the regulations are already completed. The remaining regulations on decommissioning, the Decommission Trust Fund and disposal of radioactive waste are under preparation.

The interim storage of spent fuel and the longer term storage for low-level and intermediate-level radioactive waste, generated continuously during the NPP operation, will be located onsite and be under responsibility of the operating organization. A waste management organization tasked to implement the long term management of spent fuel and the final disposal of spent fuel or radioactive waste does not exist yet. The latest international Joint Convention review meeting held in Vienna in 2015 listed that the establishment of such an organization as one of the challenges for the UAE.

Interim storage for spent fuel is provided for 20 years of normal plant operation in the pools located next to each of the reactor buildings. The IAB questioned whether such storage should be available for the entire plant lifetime. Following discussions amongst the stakeholders, it was concluded that 20 years gives an adequate time margin to consider alternative fuel cycle options and make a decision on storage space extension when the future development of available fuel cycle options can be foreseen more accurately. The international practice is to establish dry-cask storages for spent fuel and such storage facilities can be built relatively quickly once a decision is taken. In addition, building extra pool storage capacity in a similar time frame is also feasible. ENEC has kept adequate land space available on site for additional spent fuel storage.

Dr. Chung asserted that Korea should have adopted a longer timeframe for its onsite storage plan. It provided for 30 years storage on site instead of 40 years as the waste should be transferred to long-term storage after 40 years on site. The public understands the safety and reliability of onsite storage. Mr. Laaksonen intervened to say that it is important to have sufficient resources up front so that the optimal option can be chosen by a country, rather than have it driven entirely by economics. Mr. Hattori said that based on Japan’s experience, it is necessary to insure that sufficient funds are set aside for future expenses even though such costs may change with time.

Dr. Chung stated that there should be a public discussion on waste policy. Many people don’t understand physics, and fear can be stirred unnecessarily. It is important to educate the public on these matters.

Dr. Chung applauds what the UAE is doing when it comes to engaging its stakeholders and community. Waste policy should be addressed on a broad basis – a regional discussion, perhaps a global interaction on this issue is appropriate.

Lady Barbara said that children have grown up thinking that nuclear power is bad. We must educate them. The UK had trouble finding a waste depository because people don’t understand radiation. Those that defend nuclear power are educated on the subject and tend to do well. Women seem to do the best job because the strongest critic of nuclear power have been shown to be women. Mr. Laaksonen asserted that public acceptance is essential.

The Chairman intervened to say that there was a long term necessity of reprocessing. Mr. Laaksonen said that he agreed. The Chairman went on to point out that the French and the Japanese took the view that reprocessing means less waste but it proved to be very expensive and as a result both countries went to Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX) fuel to recoup. The public’s fear of waste is still very great.

Lady Barbara pointed out that Kazakhstan recently began work on a regional depository. The Chairman noted locating a depository went well in Sweden. The Chairman further commented that the public acceptance is greater if not only men but also women take part in explaining nuclear power and radiation. Ambassador Al Kaabi noted that the UAE has a policy of including women in nuclear power discussions.

A Decommissioning Trust Fund (DTF) is required in the Nuclear Law from 2009. The DTF consists of two separate funds: a Decommissioning Fund and a High-level Radioactive Waste Disposal Fund. Fees to the funds should be annually paid by the Operator of the Barakah NPP, based on cost estimates that shall be reviewed every three years. The funds must be adequate to cover all decommissioning and all high-level radioactive waste disposal costs, including research and development, regulatory oversight and fund management. FANR is currently preparing a detailed proposal on the DTF that will be established by a Cabinet decision. The DTF should be fully established by the time the first unit starts to operate.

According to the current plan, the funds should be fully paid in at the end of the 40th operating year. The Board commented that in some countries it is required to collect most of the funds during the first years of the plant lifetime to ensure that sufficient funds are available should plant operation be terminated prematurely. It would also be possible to guarantee the funds at the beginning of the plant lifetime by insurance.

Concerning the fuel cycle choices, the IAB noted that the costs of different spent fuel management options depend on the strategy to be chosen. The highest cost alternative should be used as the basis for estimating the required fund value. According to the experiences in Finland and Sweden that are developing direct disposal of spent fuel, their approach has today significantly lowered costs than the fees charged on international markets for reprocessing. Therefore the cost estimate of the UAE should be based on the reprocessing service costs offered by current service providers, added to the cost of high level waste disposal. The cost estimates on high-level reprocessing waste disposal are found in international studies. The leasing option may not be offered by any service provider but one could expect that due to the public acceptance effect, the leasing service provider could ask for the highest price.

Transparency and public communication on nuclear waste plans is generally important for acceptance of nuclear power. Direct disposal is an option that can be implemented with existing technology and all steps can be explained in clear and understandable terms to the general public. Direct disposal could be the basic alternative to be explained, with an explanation that there is also the reprocessing alternative that is proven and thus technologically available. However, the reprocessing and high-level waste disposal technologies are improving fast and are being tested on a pilot scale. It is therefore wise to wait to consider this option until improved and lower cost reprocessing alternatives are offered on a large scale.

Domestic geological studies are well funded because it is uncertain whether the fuel leasing option will ever be available. Each country using nuclear power should be aware that it may have to dispose in its own territory either the spent fuel or the high-level waste that is returned to the customer after reprocessing.

FANR selected a consultant to provide guidance on arrangements for decommissioning, spent fuel and high level waste disposal. The consultant is also providing feedback on the drafting of a Cabinet resolution establishing the Decommissioning Trust Fund. A FANR review and recommendations for the Decommissioning Trust Fund which addressed the proposed UAE solution for the Fund was presented by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). It was based on international practice and guidance and its approach in various countries and included the funding of different waste categories, existing legal requirements and current thinking on fund management in the UAE.

The solution proposed by FANR’s consultants involves the establishment of a Fund Entity as a public authority reporting directly to the Cabinet.

Recently as stated by FANR, the UAE presented its second national report in accordance with the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management at the fifth review meeting of the Joint Convention. The report described the legislative, regulatory and administrative measures undertaken by the UAE as a Contracting Party. Progress since the fourth review meeting was noted with respect to the development by the UAE of a national strategy on radioactive waste in a timely manner; sustainable human capacity development consistent with the strategy; and continued development of comprehensive regulations and regulatory guides to support the national strategy. Challenges recognized for the UAE are:

• establishing the waste management organization to implement the national strategy;
• ensuring that the Decommissioning Trust Fund is in place by the time of the operation of the first NPP Unit at Barakah;
• recruiting the necessary skilled workforce;
• and necessary timely decisions on radioactive waste and spent fuel.

Ambassador Hamad Al Kaabi completed the presentation for MOFA with an analysis of the outcome at the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. He noted that the UAE played a constructive role throughout and contributed significantly to the debate.

The UAE was quite disappointed that consensus at the Conference fell apart over the issue of a conference on a Middle East Zone free of nuclear weapons. That means there is no way forward for this issue. But the UAE will continue its work and hope to contribute to a success at the next Review Conference.

Transparency

Transparency assessment and recommendations

The UAE continues to carry out all activities related to the nuclear power program in a fully transparent manner. The week previous to the IAB meeting, FANR conducted a successful outreach event.

 

Sustainability

Sustainability assessment and recommendations

ENEC noted that its current staff headcount stood at 1,522 with women representing 20% of the total workforce. Emiratization has now reached 61% with the remaining workforce representing a total of 40 nationalities. There were also 202 new employees that joined ENEC from January, 2015. Forty-five scholarship graduates joined ENEC during 2015 and 39 candidates have joined the Energy Pioneers program. ENEC website showed 150 vacancies and stated that there have been 20,000 applications submitted for the vacancies. Scholarship students continue to select this field upon graduation. There are 106 reactor operators and 14 senior reactor operators amongst the students and additional students will be expected for Units 3 and 4. The first 300-400 Energy Pioneers will be working on Units 1 and 2.

FANR announced progress as well. Total headcount of staff stood at 185 of which 107 are Emiratis (58%) and 66 are women (36%). FANR has developed a Knowledge Management Framework which integrates Knowledge Management into the management system to assure knowledge transfer and FANR business sustainability. FANR has made it a high priority to develop the skills and competency of its existing and future management and leaders.

Conclusion

Dr. Chung emphasized the importance of National Laboratories in the nuclear field. The UAE doesn’t have this capability so it is important for the UAE to develop its relationship with the global network of research facilities. This should be a high priority.

The Board welcomed progress reported on Emiratization, and noted that the 20,000 applications were impressive.

The presentation on waste disposal was excellent however questions remain. What is the rationale for interim storage? Why two moves instead of one? Is 20 years at the site long enough? The Board would like to learn more about the various time lines involved.

With respect to operations, can Unit 1 be operated as a stand-alone when it shares a number of facilities with Unit 2? The Board would very much like to be present at the commencement of operations, this will be a truly historic moment for nuclear power. The UAE Barakah NPP Project is not only important to the UAE but also to the global energy economy. It could be providing a realistic and viable option for curbing climate change.

Given that the Shin Kori plant is going to be delayed, there will be minimal time to conduct tests that ENEC were planning to rely upon prior to Unit 1 beginning operations. Now that ENEC may unlikely have previously expected testing phase, it is critical to understand what steps or tests are being planned to compensate for this?

FANR indicated in its briefing that it has moved under the Prime Minister’s jurisdiction. What effect if any will this have on regulatory independence? It is also important for FANR to further develop its contacts with other government agencies.

The Board is grateful to the UAE and the supporting entities for three thorough and highly informative presentations at the 12th meeting of the IAB. The Board congratulates again the UAE on its continuing inspiring success and the progress of its nuclear power program. And as always, the IAB finds that the UAE in its nuclear power program remains fully committed to the principles of safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency and sustainability.

Chairman's Preface

At its next meeting the Board would appreciate further reports on the fuel and its preparation, on waste management, on the margin approach, and on tests conducted before operations.

The Board congratulates the UAE on the continued success and progress of the nuclear power program and concludes that the UAE remains fully committed to the principles of safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency and sustainability.

Introduction

The UAE peaceful nuclear energy program is based on upholding the highest standards of the five principles of safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency, and sustainability. The IAB is tasked with reviewing the UAE program bi-annually and with reporting how the UAE program has adhered to these principles. As a result, and in line with previous publications, this report is divided into five sections that review each of these principles based on the presentations of the FANR, MoFA, ENEC, and CICPA. While the structure provides a clear and heavy emphasis on safety, which is appropriate, all five principles declared to be observed by the UAE program are also well covered throughout this report.

The UAE peaceful nuclear energy program is rapidly progressing with Unit 1 at Barakah Nuclear Power Plant (Barakah NPP) scheduled to commence commercial operations in just a little over two years. [There is equal or even bigger focus on Unit 1] The other three reactors under construction at Barakah NPP are planned to commence operations at one year intervals following Unit 1.

With the global community increasingly threatened by the effects of climate change, transitioning away from fossil fuels with an emphasis on energy sources that emit less carbon is essential. While the world community has slowly been reacting to this challenge, the UAE is among a few nations globally that is leading by example. It is expected by 2020, when Unit 4, is scheduled to commence operations that up to 25% of the UAE’s electricity production will be generated from safe, clean, reliable nuclear energy.

Safety

Safety assessment and recommendation

FANR Director General and his staff briefed the Board on the main safety issues that FANR is currently addressing in its work. He was accompanied by senior staff members John Loy, Ian Grant, Saif Al Kaabi, Mohammed Al Zaabi, Rashad Al Falahi, and Osama Al Shekhi.

A short summary of safety-related developments since the last IAB Board meeting included the following:

• Preparation of the application for plant operation.
• FANR is expecting to receive the Operating License Application (OLA) from ENEC for Units 1 and 2 by March 27, 2015.
• A pre-submittal meeting has been held with ENEC on March 12, 2015. Review and assessment work for the operating license by FANR will last until October 2016; which is the prospective time of issuing the operating license.
• There are three resident inspectors of FANR working at the Barakah NPP site.
• The relevant Technical Service Organization (TSO) contracts, concerning independent analysis and advice to FANR to support its review of the OLA were ready for approval by the FANR Board of Management.

Other items mentioned included the notice that the regulation for pre-disposal management of radioactive waste has been approved. The regulation for the import and export of nuclear related items and nuclear related dual-use items has entered into force. There was an IAEA technical visit to Barakah NPP to support the implementation of a safeguards system for accounting for and control of nuclear material. This visit identified possible positions for IAEA surveillance equipment (cameras, seals and servers). The Director General noted that it is important to develop the infrastructure of inspections, both for equipment and procedures. Lastly, the FANR Board meets every few months and its members remain very active.

The IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Services (IRRS) follow up mission was completed. The IAEA Emergency Preparedness Mission (EPREV) mission is scheduled to take place on March 21-31. This is a follow up from the 2011 mission. There will be ten IAEA officials present for two weeks. The mission will be reviewing emergency response capabilities.

During the follow up mission of the IRRS, the IAEA team determined that the responses to 13 out of 14 recommendations and 30 of 34 suggestions had been effectively addressed and therefore could be considered closed. This is an excellent achievement by FANR.

However, the IRRS mission noted the following areas are still in need of development:

• The Government of the UAE should develop a national policy and strategy for the management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste.
• FANR should consider strengthening its capacity to implement its regulations on the safe transport of radioactive material.
• FANR should consider developing a procedure, to be included in its integrated management system, to periodically review its regulations and guides to maintain consistency across the different regulated facilities and activities.
• The Government of the UAE should issue a Resolution on administrative penalties and fines, to provide FANR with the necessary authority to enforce its regulations.
• FANR and the relevant health authorities should develop and publish reference levels for radiation doses that patients are exposed to in connection with x-ray diagnostics.

ENEC will seek to request FANR to issue the operating license for Unit 1 prior to October 1, 2016 as nuclear fuel may only be loaded into the reactor of Unit 1 once the license is issued. In order to receive the license on schedule, ENEC has deployed significant efforts to ensure the quality and accuracy of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). Its overall content is consistent with FANR requirements and the application also covers the Physical Protection Plan (PPP). The focus will be on changes to the design since the FSAR was issued, as well as the operating organization and detailed operational plans. There will also be an inspection program to verify the as-built status of the plant, plus successful “non-nuclear” commissioning.

Nuclear fuel is expected to be first delivered to the Barakah NPP site in 2016. The construction license did not authorize receipt of nuclear material, therefore, ENEC has applied for a license to possess and use nuclear material in accordance with FANR regulations. Licenses will also be required to cover the safety and security of storage of nuclear fuel, as well as its import and transfer within the UAE.

During its tenth meeting the IAB expressed its interest to hear an integrated summary of all physical phenomena that have been assessed as potential threats to the containment integrity, in the event of severe reactor core damage (i.e. fuel meltdown). In addition, a FANR conclusion on the adequacy of the measures to protect the containment as the last barrier to prevent radioactive releases was expected.

FANR presented an assessment of severe accidents regarding Barakah NPP. The presentation highlighted that to date, FANR’s found that the Barakah NPP satisfies FANR requirements for prevention of severe reactor damage and for mitigation should the prevention fail. FANR also informed the Board that ENEC has committed to providing a revised Severe Accident Analysis Report (SAAR) that outlines how the analytical models and computer codes used in the analysis have been verified. Furthermore, FANR presented a summary of physical phenomena that have been assessed as potential threats to the containment integrity. These threats are the following:

• In-vessel and ex-vessel steam explosion: Steam-explosion caused by dropping of molten reactor core material into water is a phenomenon that cannot be excluded in the Barakah NPP design. However, FANR has concluded that the largest conceivable pressure and impulse loads from potential steam explosions have been shown to be with adequate margins less than what the reactor vessel, in the in-vessel case, and the robust containment structures, in the ex-vessel case, can withstand such an impact.
• Molten core concrete interaction: Interaction between the molten core, postulated to have dropped to the reactor cavity, and the concrete floor of the cavity has been extensively studied with two of the most advanced computer codes that are recognized worldwide. The calculation model was tailored to the Barakah NPP scenario and calculations have been done independently by KEPCO, ENEC, and a specialized organization working for FANR. Calculations have shown that the molten core will be cooled and transformed into a solid state before the concrete floor erosion has progressed close to the leak-tight steel liner of the containment.
• High pressure melt ejection from the reactor vessel: FANR has analyzed the performance and assessed the reliability of the system that is designed to provide rapid depressurization of the reactor coolant system to a low pressure before the reactor vessel would be breached by impact of the molten core. FANR has concluded that the high pressure failure of the reactor vessel has been practically eliminated by the pressure relief system and there is no risk of violent melt ejection that would endanger the integrity of the reactor containment.
• Combustible gas (hydrogen) control: ENEC has calculated the maximum conceivable rate and amount of hydrogen generation in chemical reaction (oxidation) between high temperature core metals and water. This has been used as a basis for designing a system that reduces hydrogen concentration in the containment. FANR considers control and limitation of hydrogen accumulation inside the containment to be adequate.
• Containment overpressure: A dedicated system called “emergency containment spray back-up system” is included in the Barakah NPP design, taking into account the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident. It uses mobile pumps to inject water to the containment through spray system pipes; in the event that the permanently installed spray system pumps malfunction. Based on the analysis presented by ENEC, FANR has concluded that the start of the spray system within 24 hours from the onset of core damage is adequate to prevent containment overpressure.
• Containment bypass: FANR has concluded that the design features and the credited operator actions are adequate to eliminate the potential leak paths that could by-pass the containment boundary via pipelines and cause radiological doses to exceed acceptance criteria.

FANR informed the IAB that it is participating in the multinational safety review of the APR-1400 type plant, starting as part of the Multinational Design Evaluation Program (MDEP) coordinated by the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). This review is a joint project consisting of several nuclear safety regulators who are assessing APR-1400 safety in their own countries. The results of MDEP will comprise common regulatory positions on selected safety features of APR-1400 type plant. Furthermore, the Board was informed that the US NRC has started a generic safety review of the APR-1400 type nuclear power plant, for issuing a Design Certificate to be used in the licensing of such plants in the USA. The briefing on Barakah NPP’s current status by ENEC was provided by several members of the company leadership and senior staff. The ENEC Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO), spoke first and introduced the Chief Program Officer (CPO) of ENEC.

At the beginning of the ENEC presentation, ENEC’s CNO explained that every meeting at ENEC begins with a safety moment. He then related how off-site power was lost to Brunswick 1 and 2 power station in the United States in 1993 when salt deposits on switchyard insulators were rewetted and caused ground contact. The insulators had been inspected but the salt deposits were not visible on the dry white insulators. The significance of this event for Barakah is that it emphasizes the importance of being able to quickly identify and resolve issues before they arise to be problematic. With respect to this type of issue ENEC needs to regularly review its maintenance programs to ensure that lessons learned from other plants are incorporated into the program. In this case, risk caused by salt or dust deposits on the switchyard insulators would be eliminated by adequate maintenance and cleaning.

At this point the ENEC’s CEO Mohamed Al Hammadi added that ENEC had already considered how to protect the insulators from sea water. The CEO stated that TRANSCO has considerable experience with this issue and experts there have worked on this problem. In addition, ENEC’s CEO stated that the traditional design has already been improved by using contained insulators where salt deposits cannot accumulate.

Dr. Chung questioned who ENEC plans to interact with for support if something abnormal happens as it is important that the staff at Barakah understand the procedure. ENEC’s CNO replied that in 2011 ENEC signed an agreement with Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP) which calls for KHNP to provide the staff at Barakah NPP with names and dedicated channels on who and how you call for support.

Presently the operating staff at Barakah NPP is six percent Korean. However, ENEC is hiring additional Korean nuclear professionals, particularly experienced nuclear power plant experts who have recently retired but want to rejoin the industry for a few more years. ENEC expects to hire in the range of 300-400 more employees. In addition, Emiratis are beginning to develop to senior positions as part of ENEC’s training program.

Lady Barbara inquired about expert hires from other countries. ENEC’s CNO responded that there was a considerable amount of them. Mr. Hattori interjected that it was important to hire the best. ENEC’s CNO replied that ENEC has a very sophisticated recruitment and training program aimed at determining who is going to work on what.

There has been significant progress in plant construction since the last Board meeting. Unit 1 construction is far advanced on the reactor containment building and the turbine generator building. The water intake structure is also expected to be on line in less than two months. With regards to Unit 2, construction of the containment vessel and construction of the turbine generator building are moving along smoothly. Unit 3, is expected to have the containment vessel walls by the summer and will begin rising as the containment liner is set. Lastly, Unit 4’s basemat ground works are being constructed as it is required prior to the deployment of rebars. The casting of the concrete on the bottom plates of the reactor containment building and the turbine generator building are close to completion. This is in line with preparation for the placement of the first safety concrete for Unit 4, scheduled for Q3 2015. With respect to Units 2, 3 and 4, each is about one year behind its immediate predecessor. Unit 1 is 69.1% complete and Unit 2 is at 43.2%.

ENEC also gave a presentation on its future operating company’s Integrated Management System (IMS). ENEC’s operating entity is currently under formal establishment and will operate the Barakah NPP. In developing the IMS, ENEC studied the models of several foreign organizations involved in nuclear power that included KHNP, Exelon, Bruce Power, Duke Energy, Tennessee Valley Authority, EDF Energy, British Energy, and Sellafield. There were also site visits to Leibstadt NPP in Switzerland and Koeberg NPP in South Africa. ENEC’s operating company will follow the regulations and standards of FANR, the UAE federal government, WANO and the IAEA.

ENEC’s future operating company will be a multinational, multicultural and Emirati-led organization with a robust safety culture underpinning the conduct of all safety related tasks. The IMS Summary Document defines the way officials work and the IMS handbook provides the information that employees need to know. Nuclear programs in the IMS exist through the lifetime of the power plant and each program will have a dedicated owner. The IMS Procedures are a standardized set of work instructions. There are 3,000 dedicated procedures which are safety related. The entire integrated process model was presented to FANR in three meetings. Recent achievements include: a navigational tool that integrates IMS (documents and systems) through multiple levels across the organization; the publication of the first revision of the IMS Summary Policy and the first releases of the Handbook, and the early submittal to FANR of Chapter 13- Conduct Operations of the Final Safety Analysis Report and the Quality Assurance manual.

During responses to questions, it was pointed out that ENEC’s future operating company’s system of management is based on European systems and it also parallels how Exelon in the United States is managed. ENEC’s CNO added that safety is embedded into all activities and there is a booklet describing this. All employees receive the handbook along with the policy summary.

Once operational, there will be joint crews in all control rooms: Koreans, Emiratis and other expats. Once ENEC’s operating company is formally established it will be the plant operator and operating license holder that has full liability for the safety of the plant and protecting the health and safety of the public; the Korean operators are part of the operations support activity for the Barakah NPP for at least 10 years. Each shift manager must have 20-25 years’ experience. Success of Unit 1 will be an indication for the future.

The briefing then turned to the Corrective Action Program (CAP). The CAP in its most basic form is the process by which ENEC identifies, analyzes and corrects its problems at the lowest level of consequence in order to prevent larger problems. FANR provides regulations for the program and internationally INPO and WANO provide industry guidance for the program through INPO 09-011, Achieving Excellence in Performance Improvement. The IAEA also provides guidance through its guideline, the Management System for Nuclear Installations. The CAP reached the initial stage of operational readiness in 2014 and stage 2 of its readiness was in place on March 31 of this year. These programs represent a healthy culture for identifying and resolving problems.

The briefing then turned to the issue of severe accident control and mitigation. ENEC’s CNO noted that FANR had required ENEC to establish an effective accident management program. ENEC is in discussion with utilities around the world, and this is very much a work in process. Dr. Kazimi asked what the objectives of the program are. ENEC’s CNO said that the first action in this program is to analyze previous significant accidents and to demonstrate that a Fukushima-type incident would not cause large radioactive release in the APR-1400 design. ENEC’s CNO promised to report at the next IAB meeting on how Barakah NPP technology compares to what was used at Fukushima and an update on the actions of the Task Force. There were 38 actions stated in the ‘Lessons learned from Fukushima’ report and the Barakah NPP is the only new-build in the world to be implementing these many modifications.

The part of the ENEC briefing, “Potential Threats to Reactor Containment Integrity,” tracked in substance the presentation by FANR the evening before. FANR REG-03 specifies that for accidents beyond the design basis, including severe accidents, best estimate methods may be used. The SAAR has been revised to present analysis of the single best estimate/realistic event using code MAAP 5.03.

When ENEC used a computer code specifically developed to calculate accurately the molten core cooling and core-concrete interaction in the reactor cavity, it was able to make an improved analysis and ended up – pursuant to the analysis – with a wider safety margin than was previously thought to exist. FANR pushed ENEC to a safety margin-oriented approach that emphasizes the importance of healthy margins beyond design basis, in order to avoid “cliff edge” effects where a small deviation of acceptance criteria would lead to disproportionate consequences. Dr. Kazimi replied that this is exactly the problem – safety margin must always be added beyond the design basis limits; nobody in the United States or Korea has specified this margin. ENEC’s CNO in response said that ENEC will retain a certain margin right now but will work to increase this over time. This margin management program is over and above the regulations set by FANR. ENEC advised it has made changes in the plant to get more safety margin beyond design basis.

The following issues were considered in an integrated assessment of potential threats to containment integrity as set forth by ENEC:

• Hydrogen Generation and Control
• Molten Core Concrete Integration
  - Containment Bottom Melt-through
• Fuel Coolant Interaction
  -In-Vessel Steam Explosion
  - Ex-Vessel Steam Explosion
  -Steam Spike
• High Pressure Melt Ejection (HPME) and Direct Containment Heating (DCH)
• Slow pressure increase inside the Containment

It was noted that the OLA submittal for Units 1 and 2 was imminent and the SAAR which will accompany the application has been concluded to reflect this analysis.

The most significant initiating event for an accident involving the highest contribution to core damage frequency is the Station Blackout (SBO), i.e. Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) and failure of all onsite Emergency Diesel Generators.

For hydrogen generation and control, the two model cases were hydrogen generation due to metal water reaction and hydrogen generation due to molten core concrete interaction. Criteria for successful control were:

• Maintain hydrogen concentrations below 10% by volume
• Demonstrate that no local hydrogen concentrations have the potential for detonation
• Demonstrate that the containment can withstand the pressure due to deflagration of hydrogen

The results of the analyses indicate that operation of the Hydrogen Mitigation System (HMS) keeps hydrogen concentrations generally below 10% due to the large volume of the containment. Temporary concentrations exceeding 10% in certain compartments are mitigated quickly.

In addressing the molten core concrete interaction and debris coolability for the OLA, it was observed that a relatively large amount of gas contained in the limestone concrete at Barakah is conducive to melt eruption. Melt eruption is the dominant cooling mechanism to stop erosion in the reactor cavity. The conclusions were that core debris on the cavity floor is quenched after only minor concrete erosion and is thus solidified with large margin before challenging the containment boundary. Also in the cavity sump (“drain” in the cavity floor), concrete ablation is stopped well before the containment liner. Dr. Kazimi commented that limestone concrete is more forgiving; he worked on that issue while Argonne National Laboratory was conducting experiments to simulate core-concrete interactions.

Another issue of potential concern is a fuel-coolant interaction caused by contact between hot fuel and the water coolant. An in-vessel steam explosion may occur as corium relocates to the reactor vessel lower head and an ex-vessel steam explosion can take place in a flooded reactor cavity following a reactor vessel failure. Also a non-explosive reaction – a steam spike – may occur because of contact between the reactor core material discharged from a breached reactor vessel and the underlying water in the reactor cavity. The various computational codes that were applied to these cases indicated that in this reactor design the maximum strain after in-vessel explosion remains far below the allowable limit of the reactor vessel and an ex-vessel explosion would not cause pressure higher than fifty percent of the critical containment pressure. The steam spike would also be well below the containment performance.

A reactor vessel failure during high-pressure could result in core debris being ejected from the vessel. This would lead to Direct Containment Heating (DCH), which means a rapid temperature rise and high pressure inside containment as a result of the direct transfer of corium debris heat into the containment atmosphere. The Safety Depressurization and Vent System (SDVS) prevents the occurrence of high pressure melt ejection by rapidly depressurizing the reactor coolant system before reactor vessel failure. When analyzing the slow containment pressure increase, caused by complete loss of containment heat removal capability in parallel with core meltdown accident, it was found that during the initial 24 hours containment pressure does not exceed allowable containment pressure. After this period, it can be assumed that the emergency containment spray back-up system will reduce and control low temperature and pressure.

In summary, severe accident mitigation features at Barakah NNP, the performance of which has been analyzed include:

• Large dry pre-stressed concrete containment.
• An emergency containment spray back-up system, based on use of mobile pumps such as fire engine pumps.
• A gravity driven cavity flooding system to cool down corium that would drop to the reactor cavity after reactor pressure failure.
• The Hydrogen Mitigation System (HMS) to control in-containment hydrogen concentrations and to prevent concentration from reaching levels where flame acceleration could occur. It includes passive and catalytic recombiners and igniters.
• The SDVS which involves motor operator three-way valves for rapid depressurizing of the reactor coolant before reactor vessel failure, to preclude HPME causing DCH. The system can divert hydrogen or other materials blown out of the reactor vessel to a safer area. Dr. Kazimi asked how this operated and ENEC’s CNO promised to give an answer at the next meeting.
• A robust and convoluted reactor cavity design which includes a large cavity floor volume.

Security

Security assessment and recommendations

FANR included in its briefing a discussion of physical protection for operations. The OLA will include:

• The physical protection plan for operations (PPP-O) including the security organization on site (to be defined taking into account the February, 2015 visit to France by FANR, CICPA and ENEC).
• The cyber security plan
• A target set analysis
• A vulnerability assessment
• The contingency plan

The PPP for the transportation of nuclear material as well as the PPP for the temporary storage of nuclear fuel is to be developed and submitted to FANR.

Much effort is going into cooperation and future collaboration in nuclear security. There was the aforementioned visit to France in February to discuss the physical protection of nuclear power plants. An MOU with the French Security Authority is to be drafted. An MOU with CNSC Canada is being prepared and FANR will participate in the IPPAS mission in Canada at the end of 2015. There is a general effort underway by countries to harmonize their efforts in physical protection.

In its tenth meeting the IAB requested joint presentations by ENEC and CICPA on the on-site security plans and the continued collaborative working between CICPA and ENEC.

In their presentations ENEC and CICPA indicated that the Physical Protection Plan (PPP) and Physical Protection System (PPS) are being jointly developed by these two organizations and FANR. Work takes place in stages that take into account the progress of the project. Joint benchmarking and training missions to foreign countries have been made to learn about practices elsewhere.

The PPS is reviewed by experienced nuclear engineers, including the technical director of the ENEC Chief Program Office, and site security operations are discussed in weekly meetings. Safety and security interface is coordinated also in daily meetings. Continuous presence of the security organization on site is most helpful to develop mutual understanding. The regulations issued by FANR express very clearly that the authority of the senior on-shift nuclear plant supervisor shall take precedence over the security shift supervisor regarding the control of access to equipment and information important to safety.

Representatives of ENEC and CICPA assured the IAB that they understand in the same way who is the “captain of the ship” in contingency events. The safety and security interface will be further clarified in the PPP for Operations Stage, which will be submitted to FANR in connection with the OLA.

ENEC and CICPA continue to coordinate on the division of responsibility and are working jointly to ensure Barakah NPP complies with FANR regulation.

In its presentation CICPA began with its program of capacity building. Nuclear security training is developed in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Energy. A comprehensive training and qualification plan, which is site specific, has been developed. There is also a related program at Khalifa University. Two workshops with U.S. Department of Energy in the UAE have been hosted by CICPA.

The first, December 15-19, 2013, focused on physical protection for nuclear facilities and material. The second, on vital area identification, was held June 15-19, 2014. These workshops were attended by FANR and ENEC personnel.

There was a discussion of the historical evolution of the DBT and the Vulnerability Assessment which is based on the DBT. This assessment is part of a continually evolving process through the design phases. There is a continuing re-evaluation of the Vulnerability Assessment, both with respect to physical systems as well as staffing and response. An MOU was signed by CICPA and ENEC in 2011. Roles and responsibilities were established for the construction phase at Barakah NPP and the development of a matrix for the operations phase is underway. This includes the areas of training, operations, the safety/security interface and emergency preparedness. In addition to the safety/security interface, there are also collaborative programs between CICPA and ENEC on management systems, nuclear quality assurance and security operations procedures. Another collaborative program which should be mentioned is the Fitness for Duty program. In this context CICPA has implemented a behavioral observation plan to meet regulatory requirements. The ENEC and CICPA Fitness for Duty programs will be separate but closely aligned and consistent. ENEC has the first responsibility in incident and event reporting, however the CICPA plan co-ordinates and is consistent with it.

Non-proliferation

Non - proliferation assessment and recommendations

In line with previous meetings, the MoFA briefing focused primarily on international cooperation and non-proliferation issues. The MoFA briefing was presented by Ambassador Hamad Al Kaabi.

Ambassador Al Kaabi described first the growing close cooperation between the UAE and the IAEA.

The UAE obtains assistance and advice from IAEA experts, and requests peer reviews by the IAEA and assistance in developing its work and its standards. In 2014, there were more than 714 UAE participants in 150 IAEA activities. More than 59% of the participants were Emiratis. The three main areas of focus with respect to UAE activities with the IAEA are 1) nuclear safety and security, 2) nuclear infrastructure, and 3) emergency preparedness and response.

In 2014, the UAE also contributed to IAEA programs by providing more than 55 experts to 45 IAEA activities, primarily from FANR. The total number of UAE participants contributing to IAEA programs has continued to increase from year to year.

The IAEA technical cooperation (TC) program is the primary mechanism through which the IAEA helps the UAE to build, strengthen and maintain a safe, peaceful and secure nuclear program. In 2014, there were 7 national TC projects along with 16 regional TC projects and 3 that were international. In 2016-2017, the UAE will have 5 new national TC projects with additional support dedicated to the infrastructure for Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety and for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response. Focused efforts such as the integrated work plan with the IAEA and TC projects are meant to strengthen and make more effective the UAE/IAEA partnership and are a response to the evolving needs of the nuclear program beyond 2017.

As part of the deep interest and commitment of the UAE to international nuclear affairs, MoFA has established an International Nuclear Cooperation Office. The Office’s main role will be to support the country’s growing interests related to nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation. It will support and coordinate all of the international activities in nuclear related fields, will manage in cooperation with relevant government agencies the UAE’s adherence to all international related obligations, and ensure an adequate representation of the country in diplomatic and international fora.

After discussion on international co-operation, Ambassador Al Kaabi turned to developments within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. He noted that at the 2010 NPT Review Conference an action plan document containing 64 actions was adopted. The 2015 Review Conference is coming up soon, scheduled for April-May 2015, in New York. It will face many challenges:

• Slow progress on nuclear disarmament. Distrust continues to grow between the nuclear weapon states parties and the non-nuclear weapon states parties.
• No progress on the issue of a dialogue, promised in 2010, on a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East.
• The changing security environment.
• The humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. (The UAE recently joined the Austrian Pledge to agree to stigmatize nuclear weapons and to support serious discussion of the elimination of nuclear weapons in UN fora.)

The Board raised some questions following the presentation. Dr. Chung noted that Ambassador Al Kaabi had not mentioned cooperation among GCC nations. The Board was interested in learning more about the status of GCC cooperation and also about small modular reactors (SMR) in the region. The Ambassador responded that the UAE and Korea have the intent of working together with other countries on nuclear power issues to some degree. The UAE is working on an agreement for cooperation with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Dr. Chung noted that the APR-1400 is on the US-NRC docket for its design certification review. The APR-1400 is based on the US technology; information on the safety of that plant type should be shared so that all benefit. Ambassador Al Kaabi agreed that there should be continuous cooperation and high level discussions between the UAE and Korea and others. It is positive news that the US-NRC is willing to share APR-1400 review information with others. Agreements exist between the UAE and many experienced countries – but not with China yet. The UAE continues to build the right partnerships with all relevant international players.

The Chairman followed up by asking the Ambassador about safety. The Ambassador responded that after the post-Fukushima meeting there was an immediate global emphasis on safety. The Europeans took stress testing to a high level while every country also conducted their own stress tests including the UAE, China and others.
The Swiss, at the 2014 Convention on Nuclear Safety Review Conference, proposed to amend Article 18 of the Convention to require stricter standards for nuclear power plant construction and safety improvements. If the Convention is amended countries will move faster towards adhering to the convention, the Swiss argued. Some non-European nuclear power countries however did not believe an amendment was needed at that time. In addition, to implement an amendment a diplomatic conference was required, as opposed to a review conference. It was agreed to hold a diplomatic conference within one year, and the UAE stated that progressing on safety was part of its national policy in line with its vote for the diplomatic conference. At the Diplomatic Conference, held in February 2015, the UAE, among others argued that only a majority vote for the amendment would be the wrong message to send on safety. There was therefore a compromise, a declaration that all states are guided by what are the IAEA safety standards on this issue, this was approved by all parties.

Chairman Blix noted that it was common to refer to ‘renewables.’ As the UAE has a large nuclear power program which represents sustainable energy, it would be desirable to normally use the term ‘sustainable energy’ that covers both renewables and nuclear power, neither of which generates CO2. The Chairman went on to say there is no progress with respect to the proposal for a conference to discuss weapons of mass destruction / nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East. He expressed the hope that this would change. The UAE made an important contribution in forswearing enrichment and reprocessing. The zone to be negotiated, in his view, should also cover enrichment and reprocessing in addition to weapons and fissile material for weapons. Ambassador Al Kaabi replied that the UAE approach of forgoing enrichment and reprocessing would indeed help to build more regional confidence when it comes to nuclear non-proliferation, but some countries in the region may not be willing to follow these steps.

Transparency

Transparency assessment and recommendations

Public outreach sessions were conducted by FANR in Fujairah and Ras Al Khaimah during the past several months.

 

Sustainability

Sustainability assessment and recommendations

FANR stated that its Board approved FANR’s Education and Training policy, an important step in the realization of sustainability initiatives.

ENEC also delivered a positive report on the subject of sustainability. ENEC’s HR Director and the Corporate Training Manager presented ENEC’s report to the Board. Currently, ENEC has 1,469 staff members, 38 nationalities, of which 62% of these staff members are Emirati and women make up 21% of the work force. There were 509 new employees in 2014, 103 new employees in the first two months of 2015, and 450 new employees that are projected for the remainder of the year.

ENEC CEO, intervened and said that, “ENEC is changing the rules,” especially with women but also with an extremely high level of qualifications that are required of all employees. “If one woman is hired, she brings 10 and they bring 100. ENEC’s staff is nearly 1,500 people, we set our standards high. The oil and gas community is very impressed. We need to continue raising the bar.” ENEC’s CNO added that the organization’s future operating entity will follow ENEC with 20% as 700 employees were females at the end of 2014 while over 50% of its top performers are females. The CEO also said that ENEC began recruiting for every vacant position beginning in 2014, with 30 per month at the beginning of the year, and reaching 80 per month by the end of the year. An ENEC employee, Head of Site Communications, engages females in a common community, which helps them stay despite the remote location of Barakah NPP. There are 50 female employees working at the Barakah NPP site. The site is gender friendly with facilities that include female gyms and a community clubhouse amongst other things.

Lady Barbara responded to this saying that this is the Gold Standard, not just only for forgoing enrichment but also everywhere. Diversity is an important part of that- “My congratulations!” In the U.S., UK, and Japan it is women who are most vocally critical of nuclear energy, so diversity is good for the plant and the nuclear industry overall.

The presentation then turned to scholarship programs. ENEC’s Energy Pioneers program for Units 1 and 2 currently has 231 students in total. Sixty of these students are Reactor Operators and Senior Reactor Operators who will complete their training in three to four months. 92 students have completed their training, and 139 students are still in progress. For Units 3 and 4, 280 students will be trained. There are also 143 male students and 25 female students in the Bachelor of Engineering program. 60% of these students are studying at Khalifa University and 40% outside of the UAE, mostly in US universities. 21 students to date have graduated with a degree of Bachelor of Engineering. There are also nine students of which four are females that are seeking Master’s degrees in Nuclear Engineering and one student in the Ph.D. program for Nuclear Engineering at MIT. There are also 209 students at Abu Dhabi Polytechnic seeking the Higher Diploma in Nuclear Technology. This course is for maintenance technicians (mechanical, electric, and I&C), local operators, chemistry specialists and radiation protection specialists. Finally, there are 22 being trained as Reactor Operators and Senior Reactor Operators in Korea by KHNP. Once the students return, they are expected to return to the UAE and receive further training at Barakah NPP.

The total workforce at Barakah NPP is now 17,571. This includes 1,077 Koreans working primarily on the power block along with 13,407 workers from various other nationalities. On infrastructure related work, there are 56 Koreans along with another 1,795 others currently on site.

ENEC emphasized on the progress made in recruiting and training of staff for the Barakah NPP operating organization. It was noted that sustainability of the operating organization is confirmed by significant overstaffing. A minimum number of 18 licensed operators are needed for each Unit, to operate the Unit with six shift crews. At the time of the IAB meeting, 101 Senior Reactor Operators and Reactor Operators were in training for Units 1 and 2, while another 20 operators are being trained for Units 3 and 4. The number of trained field operators already exceeds the minimum number required. ENEC’s management explained that the trained operators will be used for many other tasks that are necessary to support plant commissioning and normal operations.

ENEC’s CNO stated that the digital control room requires three officers to operate it, and 50 officers per reactor on the team, working outside the Main Control Room (MCR), of the plant. ENEC staff will begin to occupy the control room prior to the fuel load. It is scheduled that the control room will be occupied by mid-2016 and the fuel loaded by the end of 2016. Most of the Emirati Reactor Operators and Senior Reactor Operators are currently in the ENEC Energy Pioneers Program, and will be returning from South Korea in time for commissioning. There will be 130 of the Reactor Officers for Unit 1 but then more will be needed for Unit 2.

Mr. Laaksonen asked whether there will be enough work for such large numbers of staff. The CEO responded that there will be adequate work as part of the project as a large number of engineers will be needed in maintenance. ENEC’s CNO said that ENEC is planning for a 20% turnover, also adding that there will be plenty of work to do. It was also mentioned that there are 3,000 operating procedures and that every one of them has to be worked on. It is a good time to get everyone to see the plant from the inside before it starts up. The ENEC Chief Program Officer (CPO) noted that ENEC was working hard to maintain the one year divide for Units 3 and 4. Beginning in 2009 the program has been set up to complete construction of Units 1, 2, 3 and then 4 with a deployment of one unit per year. The UAE has been one of a few countries able to do stage the plant deployment and it is now. It is now yielding the benefits of complimenting the training and commissioning schedule. The operating organization requires one year at a time for commissioning each unit as planned.

Ambassador Graham asked about the price of oil, whether its decline had affected the program in any way. ENEC’s CNO and ENEC’s CPO all participated in the dialogue that followed. Construction has not been affected at all and that inspections had now increased given there was more equipment on site. The CEO said that ENEC was trying to be economical, cutting things that were not deemed necessary, however safety was and will never be compromised. ENEC’s CNO added that ENEC sticks with the Gold Standard. The CEO further added that ENEC stays with the five principles no matter what. The Abu Dhabi Crown Prince in his Government Summit speech had invited the crowd of 4,000 to come to the startup of power in 2017. Lastly, a senior Korean official had said to the ENEC CEO at a recent lunch, that Korea had learned nuclear technology from the Americans. He said, “I studied just like you, now I am teaching you.”

ENEC’s CNO also commented on recruitment. Two opportunities that had presented themselves to ENEC with regards to acquiring talent. First was that U.S. nuclear power plants were closing and highly capable people were becoming available, and second the retirement age in Korea being at 58, meant a number of outstanding Korean experts and executives were made available who wanted to continue their careers. ENEC’s CPO said that the program is doing well because of its great partner, highly focused Korean workers and management, and the strong support of the UAE government.

The IAB Chairman, Dr. Blix, asked about retention. ENEC’s CNO replied that everyone is committed to stay for the plant start-up and that staff departures are trending down.

Lady Barbara asked about after hour social opportunities. ENEC’s CPO replied that ENEC was working hard on that, tournaments of all types, there were 100 participants in a dart tournament recently.

ENEC’s CNO intervened to say that ENEC was hiring expat experts and putting them at a somewhat lower level to mentor Emiratis as mentoring is a full time job at ENEC.

Chairman Blix said that speaking again of leisure time, you need not just darts but intellectual activities as well. The CEO and others strongly agreed with this. Chairman Blix added, “You are now engaged in a great adventure,” but after operations begin, there is the day to day routine. Some people need the chance to advance, to move on, employees should be encouraged to move on to a new phase, “another great adventure.”

Conclusion

The IAB considered the presentations by FANR and ENEC on mitigation of severe reactor accident consequences very thorough and informative. Both parties have properly addressed the related safety issues and have come close to the final conclusion that the Barakah NPP design is adequate for protecting the environment from significant radioactive releases. However, the IAB considered that in addition to the ongoing validation of the computer codes, a few issues still need attention:

• A lesson from the Fukushima Daiichi accident was that a major contributor to the core melt was the difficulty of relieving primary coolant circuit pressure when control power to the relief valves had been lost. Pressure relief in all severe accident conditions is one of the key actions to be taken by the operators and increases the options for successful accident management. This possibility should be confirmed also after loss of normal control means. In order to manage properly severe accidents, it is necessary to give the operators unambiguous guidance on the accident stage where they should deviate from the normal operating rules and take emergency actions to avoid serious core damage, even though it might cause damage to some other plant equipment. For instance, they could be advised on the conditions for starting fast pressure release from the primary circuit, in order to permit water injection into the primary circuit by means of low pressure pumps. Basis for such advice should be proven by an analysis of the respective scenario.
• Possible need to release non-condensable gas from the containment after serious core damage should be analyzed. Gas could be generated for instance in connection with concrete erosion. If necessary, a method for gas release should be planned.

Also, the margin approach is viable but should not neglect the probabilistic approach. The Board would like to hear ENEC explain at the next meeting its rationale for adopting the margin approach and how to decide on the appropriate margin.

The IAB was satisfied with the information on the safety and security interface, provided by ENEC and CICPA in their presentations.

The Board welcomed greater emphasis on security and non-proliferation and encouraged the exchange of information between Korea and ENEC; and also took note of the exchange of information within the umbrella of US-NRC, KINS and FANR – praise for that.

The Board was pleased to hear from ENEC that there would be no reduction in inspections or in readiness in Operations because of the decline in the price of oil. The Board noted that there is now a certain dynamism being demonstrated by ENEC. ENEC is also doing amazingly well with women – much praise for this.

ENEC’s future operating company will eventually be the operating license holder, with Korean staff operating the plant, alongside Emirati and other expat Reactor Operators, at least for some time. The Board would like to hear if this future operating entity will have liability all the time?

Congratulations from the Board for firmly scheduling reactor units for start-up at one year intervals from the previous one. The Board would like to hear more about tests conducted before operations. It appears that corrective actions are applied quickly enough and there is no backlog – praise for this.

The Board asked whether there is any progress on waste management. Also at the next meeting the Board would like to learn more about the fuel and its preparation.

The Board expressed its gratitude once more to the UAE and the supporting entities for outstanding and informative presentations at this eleventh meeting of the Board. The IAB congratulated the UAE on the continuing success and progress of the nuclear power program and found that the UAE in its program remains fully committed to the principles of safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency, and sustainability.

Chairman's Preface

The Board and I were pleased to see that since its last visit great progress has been made on the plant and that the program remains on time and budget. This report discusses several topics which include an updated status of the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant, the trip to Barakah, physical protection of the plant, capacity building, cybersecurity as well as waste management.

At its next meeting the Board would appreciate further reports on IAEA’s role with the UAE, on readiness in high-stress conditions and on on-site security plans. The Board congratulates the UAE on the continued success and progress of the nuclear power program and concludes that the UAE remains fully committed to the principles of safety, security, nonproliferation, transparency and sustainability.

Introduction

FANR was represented by several officials; they briefed the Board on all the subjects that FANR is currently addressing in its work. These include: the license to construct Units 3 and 4 of the Barakah Nuclear Facility; ENEC submissions on the Molten Core Concrete Interaction (MCCI); FANR review of ENEC outstanding issues; physical protection of the Barakah Nuclear Facility; cyber security; aircraft impact assessment; radioactive waste management; and FANR capacity building.

The following day at the Barakah site, ENEC senior officials, led by the Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO) of the Operating Company, briefed the Board on all matters ENEC is currently working on. ENEC’s efforts are now focused on progress at the Barakah site which, with over 15,000 workers on the site, is truly impressive.

Progress since the previous October when the Board last visited the site has been considerable. The central focus now is preparing the site for the commencement of operations at Unit 1 in 2017. Among the subjects addressed by ENEC were: Operational Readiness and the Integrated Management System of the Operating Company; the Operating License Application; Capacity Building; Construction at Unit 2; and other subjects such as the Corrective Action Program, AC Power Supply Reliability, Spent Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management, and Confirmatory Analyses for MCCI (Molten Core Coolant Interaction) when using limestone based concrete.

Safety

Safety assessment and recommendation

FANR then began the presentation to the Board on Safety. Following the 9th IAB meeting, FANR had completed its review of ENEC’s application for a license to construct Units 3 and 4 at Barakah and accordingly the license to construct Barakah NPP Units 3 and 4 was issued on September 15, 2014. Conditions in this license include the following: requiring ENEC to provide a revised design of the Alternative AC power source (AAC) that meets FANR requirements, and to obtain the written approval of FANR before implementing such revised AAC power source; and requiring ENEC to provide additional information to FANR demonstrating the validity of its MCCI calculations, or, if such demonstration turns out not to be possible, to provide a revised design that complies with FANR requirements. The construction license for Units 1 and 2 was also amended since it needs to be consistent with the amendments of construction license for Units 3 and 4.

At the time of the 9th IAB meeting one significant issue of safety for the Barakah NPP site remained unresolved, that is the MCCI impact on containment integrity in the analysis of severe accidents. Additional information had been requested of ENEC and a number of technical clarification meetings between FANR and ENEC have been held. However, considerable work and additional meetings among FANR, ENEC and KEPCO still lie ahead. FANR noted the new submissions by ENEC on MCCI: an analysis of the loss of all AC electrical power scenario– (station blackout) focused on a severe core damage scenario that had been identified within the Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA), the analysis investigated especially the MCCI phenomena and had been conducted with version 5.02 of the MAAP computer code. This new code version contains significantly improved models; in addition to the base case analysis, the submittal involved considering twelve sensitivity cases to address uncertainties in the phenomena and code modeling. All cases indicate that molten core materials will stabilize in the reactor cavity without breaching the containment liner.

FANR said that the scope of scenarios analyzed satisfies FANR guidance and the results show compliance with FANR requirements. However, additional information is required to confirm the validation of the analytical models and computer code. ENEC has made a written commitment to provide a revised severe accident analysis with complete validation information. The Board asked whether there have been any considerations for replacing MAAP5.02 with some other code. FANR explained that MAAP5.02 currently has the most advanced models for the severe accident analysis. The Board noted that the program may not necessarily be bound by industry protocol, and analysis by another code that is sanctioned by a regulatory agency may be prudent. FANR stressed the importance of industry practices in utilizing best estimate costs and believes that appropriate attention was given to them.

ENEC also addressed the severe accident analysis issue in its briefing. ENEC asserted that ENEC/KEPCO successfully presented a safety case to FANR and submitted appropriate responses to MCCI related information. There was justification presented for the use of MAAP5.02 as an accepted industry computer code. ENEC provided an explanation of the differences between MAAP5.02 and the previously used MELCOR code. MAAP5.02 results, in a single best estimate/realistic event, are showing the design is acceptable and meets FANR requirements. ENEC Engineering Project Director added that looking at molten core loads on the concrete in the Barakah NPP design, the application of the new computer code MAAP5.02, is the most realistic. An earlier analysis by MELCOR code is considered too conservative for the wet reactor cavity analysis and, as a result, the simulated scenarios that would never happen. ENEC does not believe it has a problem with the limestone concrete used for containment, as was thought on the basis of earlier analyses. The new code models, after having been fully validated against test results of the OECD program, give more reliable answers.

In discussions on the severe accident analysis stress tests conducted after the Fukushima accident, recommendations included that arrangements should be made for provision of independent reactor core cooling even without AC power. This “preventive type” measure would reduce the risk of severe core damage and thus reduce the total accident risk. However, severe core analysis would still be needed for ensuring adequacy of “mitigation type” measures that are aimed to reduce risk of large radioactive release. Concerning the mitigation measures, FANR stated that something like a “core catcher” may need to be considered by ENEC to be added to the design, should the future analyses conclude that such an addition is necessary.

A second safety issue for Barakah NPP, addressed by FANR, was the alternate AC power source. This refers to an on-site emergency power source, which could provide power to equipment needed for implementing fundamental safety functions in the event that the connection to the off-site power sources would be lost and the primary on-site power sources (Class 1 emergency diesel generators) would fail. A FANR review revealed that the alternate AC power source design for the Barakah site that was proposed by ENEC did not meet the following FANR requirements: sufficient alternate diesel generators to back up all four units; determining the adequate number of AAC diesel generators for the Barakah site by probabilistic analysis; diversity between the AAC diesel generators and Class 1 emergency diesel generators; and independence between the Class 1E power distribution system and distribution system supplied by the AAC diesel generators. FANR requirements are supported by the preliminary PRA that shows station blackout to be the dominant contributor to the risk of core damage. ENEC has committed to providing a revised AAC design for FANR review by November, 2014.

In general, most (but not all) commitments for Unit 1 and 2 apply to Units 3 and 4 and vice versa; commitments for Units 3 and 4 apply to Units 1 and 2. Occasionally, due to minor or even major design changes, commitments made on one pair of NPPs may not apply to the other pair of NPPs.

Lastly, with respect to safety in the FANR presentation, the current status of FANR’s review of Counterfeit, Fraudulent and Suspect Items (CFSI) issues was described. There will be a follow up CFSI inspection at Barakah in late 2014 and outside experts are assisting with the development of methodology for the inspection of the Korean supply chain, with the first inspection in the first half of 2015.

The Chief Nuclear Officer of the operating company stated that there were 719 days and 3 hours until the first fuel load. There is an integrated schedule to get there. Operational safety is dependent on proactive process development.

Construction continues vigorously at Units 1 and 2. The containment structure is progressing well at Unit 1. Mechanical component installation is moving along and electrical system installation work for Unit 1 is also making good progress. The breakwater is nearly complete. Electrical installations to provide connections to the external power grid is advancing for all four NPPs and the switchyard is moving toward completion in 2015. The power block for Unit 3 was in readiness for first concrete by October, 2014; and excavation for the power block for Unit 4 is underway.

As for operational readiness, there were positive developments to report. The operating company is getting ready with much of the team in place. There are 42 officers in place; there will be important Korean additions; Emiratis are being recruited from other industries. Cultural differences are being overcome.

While making ample progress in the last quarter it has not been possible to eliminate schedule risk. Nevertheless the integrated schedule is growing in integrity—operations are integrated with the construction schedule.

• ENEC is driving the organization more and more by the schedule—with a focus on critical milestones that could threaten operational readiness.
• The Korean part of the leadership team (and organization group) is growing in effectiveness and impact. There is an understanding of how the Korean operational model works day-by day—which is a very important element to the success of safety-driven operations.
• Operational License Application (OLA) is a critical milestone to the project. All parties involved are working to achieve submission of the OLA to FANR by March 2015, which is the program milestone.
• As a result of this, the organizational focus has turned to the OLA. The critical hurdle is the FANR acceptability review – due 60 days post submission.
• The IAB deems that KEPCO/KHNP need to improve the timeliness and quality of its interim submissions.

Both the Korean regulator agency (KINS) and FANR are working to improve the Operating License Application process and to align their systems and procedures to obtain further improvements. Several immediate actions are in progress in Korea, and an ENEC assistance team has been assembled and is mobilizing in Korea. This approach has worked so far but there is a lot of work ahead. A comprehensive corrective action plan has been developed and is being reviewed.

The Corrective Action Program has seen a steady improvement across ENEC and includes implementing a series of initiatives to continue its improvement. For example, the operating company is driving toward operational readiness but there is a high reliance on human performance improvement which has not yet been entirely internalized. Human performance is being improved by tools such as peer review and peer checking. A phonetic alphabet has been adopted to overcome cultural differences in communication. Meanwhile the operating company is becoming increasingly ready, recruitment has been good and there has been an evolution of the leadership team to bring in a greater Korean and Emirati presence. More senior reactor operators are currently being trained.

The baseline date for completion of the review and issuance of the BNPP Unit 1 and 2 Operating License is 30 September 2016. The early completion date was 31 July 2016. Due to delays in getting a complete and accurate FSAR from KEPCO it will not be met. ENEC is instead focused on getting the Operating License by the original date of 30 September 2016. The OLA is currently on track and will be submitted on or before end of March 2015.

The offsite AC power reliability was discussed. The Barakah nuclear power plants will have two switchyards, Switchyard A for Units 1 and 2 and Switchyard B for Units 3 and 4. Each switchyard is connected to the TRANSCO grid by a minimum of two overhead lines (OHLs) (each has two conductor sets capable of transferring a full power of the 2 units). Each OHL is linked to a different substation, which is connected to a different part of the TRANSCO transmission system by separate OHLs from the other. Also a separate OHL will link Barakah NPP to another transmission system, which is a separate Gulf Cooperation Council network and owned and operated by a different operator. The design work for the transmission system is complete and construction is in progress.

Security

Security assessment and recommendations

The next ENEC briefing was on the security project portfolio which engendered an exchange of views on the relationship of security to safety. ENEC reported that a new security system has been created in the operational readiness program to enable better visibility and accountability of the security projects which are critical to the arrival of fuel on site and fuel loading. Additional project management resources are being procured, and the initializing scheduling efforts have resulted in an improvement in the Physical Protection System (PPS) schedule.

The Board asked how security interacts with safety and, where does security fit within the CNO’s portfolio. The CNO replied that he is responsible for nuclear safety and also for security. His office is where safety and security come together. The requirements for safety and security may collide. The objective of streamlining safety and security under the authority of the CNO is to integrate safety with security.

The Board advised that the Physical Protection Plan (PPP) be overseen by someone who is nuclear sensitive. The CNO stated that ENEC will have to ensure and also properly train security officers to respect the authority of the reactor operators who have responsibility for nuclear safety. The chain of command must have a plan to deal with any kind of safety and security related emergency, and such a plan needs to be developed.

The CNO explained that inside the plant the Emergency Director is in charge in case of emergency situations including security incidents, and in all cases has the responsibility to call the emergency situation and make the decisions on actions for responding to the emergency. Outside the plants, the emergency and security measures to protect the public are the responsibility of the Emergency Response Center, located in Ruwais.

The CNO said that the task of the Emergency Director will be the responsibility of the most senior person of the operating organization and this person has to always act with public safety in mind. Dr. Blix and Lady Barbara said that the relevant laws and regulations must be very clear and decisive, and that roles and responsibilities of the relevant authorities also need to be clear. The Chairman commented that the shift supervisor/SRO on duty is like the captain of the ship. The Board also asked about the emergency planning people, what is their function? The CNO replied that all members of the staff have some emergency role; there is their regular job, their outage job, and their emergency job.

There was a presentation on physical protection during the FANR briefing. ENEC as the owner and operator has the sole responsibility for physical protection within the site. The plan for the ongoing construction phase was reviewed by FANR and ENEC received an approval letter for its implementation from FANR on April 24, 2014. Revision 1 of the PPP Construction Phase 2 was submitted by ENEC on September 1, 2014.

There would be two inspections conducted by FANR in 2014 of the implementation at Barakah site of the various physical protection plans. Physical protection for operations will be submitted by ENEC as part of the OLA. FANR wants to see a fully integrated plan. A first version of the target set analysis has been reviewed by FANR – additional information was requested – and a conceptual design of the PPP for operations is to be submitted soon to FANR. Also the PPP for the transportation of nuclear fuel and the PPP for the temporary storage of fresh incoming fuel on the Barakah site are to be developed by ENEC and submitted to FANR.

The Cyber Security Plan, which is part of the physical protection plan for operations was submitted by ENEC in June, 2014. It has been reviewed by FANR and with 13 commitments from ENEC was accepted as part of the construction license for Units 3 and 4. During the OLA review, ENEC will establish: a plan to implement a cyber-security incident response plan, a disaster recovery plan which includes business continuity, emergency and contingency plans and a sustainability program. There will be a workshop on cyber security to be organized jointly with US-NRC on 12-14 October, 2014.

On the issue of the Aircraft Impact Assessment (AIA), the last of the security issues addressed at the 10th IAB meeting, updated reports were submitted by ENEC in February, 2013 and reviewed by FANR. With seven additional commitments by ENEC, the AIA was accepted as part of the construction license for Units 3 and 4. ENEC provided actual or forecast construction completion dates for the design enhancements which is very important in mitigating the consequences of an aircraft impact. FANR prepared an action plan to verify the implementation of the design enhancements. During the OLA review ENEC will submit reports on the loss of a large area due to fire and explosion. FANR will also verify that the actions required to maintain the fundamental safety functions can actually be performed in Spite of the impact consequences.

Non-proliferation

Non - proliferation assessment and recommendations

MOFA briefed the Board on non-proliferation and international cooperation. The first addressed issue was the implementation of international instruments. On July 2, 2014, the UAE joined the Convention on Supplementary Cooperation for Nuclear Damage (CSC), an international treaty that was developed as an umbrella for international liability conventions, providing the basis for a global nuclear liability regime. By joining the CSC, all international instruments mentioned in the UAE Nuclear Policy Document have been concluded and implemented by the UAE.

On the 28th of March, 2014, the UAE presented its 2nd National Report during the 6th Review Meeting of the contracting parties of the Convention on Nuclear Safety at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The UAE also participated in the third Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) held at The Hague. It was focused on nuclear terrorism and security and was well organized. The UAE has been an active participant in the NSS series since its beginnings in Washington in 2010 and has implemented all commitments from the Summit Series.

• The UAE has progressed well in implementing these commitments;
• The UAE is party to all international instruments relevant to nuclear security and has adopted the relevant legislation and regulations.

The UAE supports the nuclear security activities of the IAEA through participation in expert committees, Nuclear Security Guidance Committees, and by providing experts for the development of the Nuclear Security Series publications. The Integrated Security Support Plan for the UAE was signed in August 2012 by the UAE and the IAEA and is being implemented. An Integrated Work plan was signed in 2013 by the UAE and will in the 2013–2017 timeframe enhance the effectiveness of the IAEA–UAE partnership. The UAE contributed $1 million to the IAEA project to upgrade its Safeguards Laboratory.

The UAE endorsed the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and in cooperation with the IAEA convened the International Conference on Safety and Security of radioactive sources in Abu Dhabi in October of 2013. This was one of the pledges made at the Security Summit in Seoul.

The UAE concluded nine bilateral and international agreements on nuclear cooperation and multiple MOUs between UAE entities and counterparts in the areas of nuclear security and nuclear safety. UAE is an active participant in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

It has become a tradition of the Nuclear Security Summits for participants to announce national voluntary commitments by individual heads of state. These are referred to as “House Gifts” and are in addition to the collective commitments in the Summit Joint Communique. There were 14 House Gifts announced for the 2014 Summit, UAE joined eight of them:

• Counter Nuclear Smuggling (ongoing from the previous Summit)
• Supply Chain Security (measures to remove nuclear and radiological materials that are outside of regulatory control from the global supply chain)
• National Legislation Implementation Kit on Nuclear Security (Development of template legislation for nuclear security)
• Nuclear Information Security (ongoing from the previous Summit)
• Nuclear Security Training and Support Centers of Excellence (develop human resources in nuclear security)
• Radiological Security (intent to secure IAEA Category 1 radioactive sources within each country’s territory by 2016)
• Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation (subscribe to the IAEA Fundamental Principles)
• Implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 (full and universal implementation of UNSCR 1540)

UAE policy states that in addition to making liberal use of IAEA technical assistance in a number of areas it is the intention of UAE to seek IAEA peer review on a continual basis. UAE has requested all major review services from the IAEA relevant to its program deployment timeline.

In May 2014, IAEA conducted a detailed evaluation of the legal, regulatory, administrative and technical arrangements undertaken by UAE relevant to its international obligations in the area of nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards, including a thorough review of the state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material. The activities and processes employed by various key stakeholders such as the Federal Customs Authority, Abu Dhabi and Dubai customs and ENEC were reviewed. The draft report highlights the readiness of the UAE for full implementation of its safeguards and non-proliferation obligations and provides suggestions for further improvement.

Ambassador Al Kaabi included in his presentation a timeline of planned IAEA Peer Review services in 2015 which included missions by the Integrated Regulatory Review Services (IRRS), the Emergency Preparedness Review (EPREV), the Occupational Radiation Protection Services (ORPAS), the Operational Safety Review Team (OSART), and also a follow up Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) — probably in 2015 but in any case before initial plant operations.

The Board commented that there are many missions, but would like to know what feedback has the UAE received from the missions, Ambassador Al Kaabi replied that feedback focuses on the evaluation of UAE progress against IAEA guidance in a holistic and integrated manner. One paramount item was the importance of integrated reviews, which would provide the UAE with a good list of recommendations that would establish an endorsement for UAE progress in areas such as safety and security framework and other relevant infrastructure. The Board noted that it was important to work with the IAEA in advance of an EPREV mission to ensure accurate plans for schedule and content of each interview made with national stakeholders and that there should be good coordination with those stakeholders.

Ambassador Al Kaabi also commented on the subject of waste management. He said that the UAE plan for waste management is not yet finalized. Consultation continued between government entities and the industry. He had in the past presented an overview and the timelines. The funding of the management of nuclear waste needs to be decided upon. There is active work going on but the plan is not yet finalized. The Board noted the good work that the UAE was doing with IFNEC. The UAE should seek more support from the IAEA on this issue. The Board said that the UAE is near to licensing operations. Human resources will be very important; UAE needs to get a lot of assistance from IAEA on this as well. Ambassador Al Kaabi commented that there should be more cooperation among stakeholders, also that both ENEC and FANR have their own programs and are in fact working closely with the IAEA on training.

The Board noted that Japan, China, Taiwan, Korea and others have problems even with siting of interim waste storage because of fear and local opposition after the Fukushima accident, although interim storage and final disposal are very different from the time perspective of a hazard. On the other hand, Sweden and Finland have settled their approach for getting approval for sites of final disposal facilities. Korea has constructed an interim storage for low and medium radioactive wastes. UAE could study and follow the example of Sweden and Finland but needs a deadline for the plan and firm timelines. Perhaps a final decision is premature and at present interim storage is a possibility.

FANR has been active in the waste management issue. FANR Regulation number 11 on pre-disposal management of nuclear waste is in place. In addition, a new Regulation, number 26 that includes a new regulatory guide, is under development for the disposal of nuclear waste including high level waste. Also a regulation guide on a near surface waste disposal is to be drafted. The Board questioned what organization would ultimately be responsible for waste management. FANR replied that national policy states the licensee for this function will eventually be named by the Cabinet.

A Decommissioning Trust Fund will be established by the Cabinet upon recommendation of the FANR Board. FANR will develop implementing regulations. The Trust Fund will cover the costs of decommissioning and nuclear waste management. The Operator will pay the fund to cover the costs of waste management, decommissioning, regulation and associated research and development. Legislation on funding must be in place by the time UAE nuclear power plant operations begin.

ENEC noted with respect to low and intermediate waste management that it will follow Shin Kori 3 and 4 (the reference plant) on its waste pre-treatment practices. Storage on site will be for 10 years. As for the discharged nuclear fuel, including high level waste, ENEC will meet national policy and FANR regulations. At the Barakah site, there will be an initial storage space for the spent fuel pool for 20 years of operation. Other options are being explored for storage beyond 20 years. One of the options adopted in many countries is the use of dry storage units to provide interim storage. Designs are available to hold the nuclear spent fuel for 60 years and beyond. Two potential locations for such dry storage casks, near the spent fuel pond, have been identified at Barakah. Beyond that, disposal for all levels of waste awaits the pending UAE national policy.

Chairman Blix asked whether a fee will be added to electricity costs to pay for waste storage; the Ambassador replied we do not have that yet but we will. The Chairman said that there is much to do here for the IAEA; there are such decisions considered in Vietnam, Turkey and others. It will be important for the IAEA will be hard pressed to keep up the pressure on this subject. The Ambassador replied that the UAE was studying whether it had enough support to do this by itself without IAEA; the IAEA can only do so much. The Chairman said that the IAEA may have to charge for its services. The Ambassador replied that a partnership model would be a good model; the Board commented that some countries already do pay the costs of the IAEA missions and that costs for this kind of service could be shared among countries so that the IAEA could optimize its assistance. Ambassador noted that the UAE already contributes funding for some missions and services provided to the UAE.

Transparency

Transparency assessment and recommendations

FANR reported that it has done public outreach sessions in Dubai and in Sharjah. Also, ENEC hosted an important visit by the Ruler’s representative in the Western Region, H.H. Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed in September 2014. His Highness noted that “The use of peaceful nuclear energy has an important role for the future of our country” and also said "The UAE attaches major importance to the principle of operational transparency in dealing with its nuclear programs."

Sustainability

Sustainability assessment and recommendations

FANR is continuing its active sustainability efforts with respect to local expertise. Two students who graduated with Master’s degrees through the UAE Nuclear Scholarship Programs in 2013 joined the FANR Nuclear Safety Department. The FANR Board has agreed to establish a FANR scholarship program to complement the ENEC nuclear scholarship program. The UAE has thus established a nuclear scholarship program, which will produce nuclear plant staff, regulatory staff, and educational infrastructure. The scholars can pursue their studies in the UAE (e.g. at Khalifa Univeristy) or internationally.

KINS in cooperation with KAIST operates an International Nuclear Safety Master’s Degree program in Korea; two graduated in 2014, one FANR employee joined the program in 2014 and will graduate in 2015.

There is a Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute course conducted at Khalifa University and supported by the US Departments of Energy and State. It is a foundation course on safety, security and safeguards lasting four months. Twenty-four FANR employees have completed the course and four more are enrolled for 2015. The course is offered as a regional activity and attracts students from the Gulf countries as well as other countries in the Middle East.

In 2013 a workshop was held in the UAE to advance security education program curriculum development. The workshop was organized jointly by Khalifa University and the Partnership for Nuclear Security and covered:

• Information Security; CICPA and FANR collaborated to develop an Information Protection Program Operating Manual which has been provided by FANR to program stakeholders as the requirement for protection of sensitive nuclear information. The regulations for the physical protection of nuclear materials require that operators develop a Cyber Security plan to protect the facility
• The regulation for security of high activity radioactive sources requires the management of sensitive information as well as background checks on the personnel involved.

A plan of action for individual employees has been developed at FANR for each UAE national employee. The employee is to outline how he or she will meet their specific objectives. Forty-seven such plans were created for employees in the Operations Division in 2014.

Conclusion

The IAB review of activities included an in-depth review of progress in analysis of consequences of severe accidents. As part of the Construction Permit review FANR has required ENEC to demonstrate that a large radioactive release from the containment would be very unlikely even with a severe accident causing reactor core meltdown. This is in line with the most recent issue (2012) of the IAEA Safety Standard on safety of nuclear power plant design. Such requirements on robustness of containment integrity have also been emphasized worldwide after the Fukushima Daiichi accident. ENEC has presented its arguments on maintaining the integrity and leak tightness of the reactor containment after a severe accident but the issue is still open and needs to be closed before the issuance of an Operating License for Barakah Unit 1.

The main question that has been studied and was reported to the IAB relates to the capacity of the Reactor Containment Building to maintain integrity in events such as core meltdown and a lack of a dedicated molten core catcher. ENEC has presented extensive analysis to FANR to prove insignificant risk of containment bottom penetration (i.e. erosion of the concrete bottom plate) by the molten reactor core. According to the information provided by both FANR and ENEC, progress has now been made and independent analyses suggest that there would be an adequate layer of concrete left at the time when the molten core solidifies, the concrete erosion of the reactor cavity concrete stops, and the liner plate is not breeched. Solidification takes place in all studied accident scenarios when the molten core has spread to a large enough area in the cavity below the reactor vessel and is cooled under the water that fills the cavity. The positive feature of the APR-1400 plant type is that the floor of the reactor cavity is wide and the molten core can spread to a layer that is thin enough to ensure its effective cooling by the above water pool. The tentative positive conclusion on resolving the issue is based on comparison between different calculation methods and the results of the calculations made by different organizations.

Calculations have been made independently by the plant supplier (KEPCO) and by two separate consortiums of expert organizations contracted by ENEC and FANR, respectively. The computer codes used are the globally best known severe accident analysis codes, one code (MAAP) was developed by EPRI, which is the research organization of the power industry and the other code (MELCOR) was developed by Sandia National Laboratory from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Both codes have been validated against several experiments and also against recorded data from accidents such as TMI-2.

The most re-assuring results demonstrating adequate safety margin, related to the maximum conceivable concrete erosion by molten core impact, have been achieved by the latest version of the MAAP code, which has a new model describing accurately the situation. This model describes molten core-concrete interactions under water in a geometry that is similar to the reactor cavity in question. The earlier calculations causing concern on concrete bottom penetration were made with MELCOR but now the validation calculations of that code against measurements have shown, that MELCOR gave conservative results in water pool conditions, although in the dry cavity it under-estimates the concrete erosion. Additional arguments on MAAP code validation are being prepared, while new representative models are being added to MELCOR.

Another physical phenomenon that could endanger the reactor containment integrity is a steam explosion that may occur when the molten core drops to the water pool, which is reactor cavity below the broken reactor vessel. However, the structure of the reactor cavity is exceptionally robust in the APR-1400 type plant and this gives confidence that it can withstand loads from even a large steam explosion.

The Board would be interested in its next meeting to hear an integrated summary of all physical phenomena that have been assessed as potential threats to the containment integrity, and the FANR conclusions on adequacy of protective measures. In addition to the containment bottom melt-through and steam explosion mentioned above, the other threats commonly considered include the following:

a. Reactor core meltdown while the reactor vessel is still in high pressure; unless this scenario is eliminated by credible dedicated design for ensuring timely pressure relief, there is a risk of violent dynamic reaction when the melt is ejected to the containment atmo sphere

b. Hydrogen explosion due to reactions of nuclear materials with water

c. Containment overpressure due to gradual accumulation of gas and steam inside the containment

d. Containment boundary bypass via a pipe penetrating the containment wall.

The IAB discussed the management responsibilities in the event that an intruder group has occupied part of the facility and created an immediate threat of an unpredictable accident scenario. FANR representatives stated that their position is clear: plant management that bears overall responsibility for safety and security must retain its authority to decide and give orders to the security forces on counter-measures that are needed to eliminate the security threat. Any counter-measures must be planned and implemented so that they do not create new safety hazards. The commander for security forces has to take guidance given by the plant management into account in all operative actions. However, the IAB considers that it is necessary to confirm that the FANR position is fully understood and shared also by ENEC and CICPA. Therefore the IAB asks to have a joint presentation by all three parties on the on-site security plans, with special focus on the authorities and command relations during a potential security incident.

Recruitment for ENEC may become an even bigger problem with more reactors; people who will be reactor operators are not plentiful in the UAE. KEPCO and KHNP could help ENEC in this area if ample time is given in advance.

The Board believes that if ENEC is very successful and sets a very high standard, others will be challenged to match the standard. In addition, there is an interface between safety and security and FANR must ensure clear lines of authority. The chairman noted that the board has not seen regulations on this yet. The Board agreed that these regulations and the law must be clear and must say: that the Senior Reactor Operator is the “captain of the ship” in case of an emergency.

The Board congratulated ENEC for its work to enhance the ranks of women employees.

The Board commented that it was important to discuss the goals of each IAEA review mission fully with the IAEA; and that the IAEA is not a tool that should be used too often to do things beyond beyond its scope. Also, ENEC should be communicating frequently with the KEPCO group including, KEPCO E&C and KPS, and Combustion Engineering through information exchange and consultations.

The Board said one role of the IAEA is to help countries start the right way and with a thorough understanding of the readiness to cope with high stress conditions in the post Fukushima inspections and preventive measures. The Board would like to hear more in depth on this subject and it is important to cover subjects like overpressure on the containment vessel.

The Board also noted that challenges lie ahead with the beginning of operations. Cultural misunderstandings come easily; there must be more thinking about how work will proceed in a multi-cultural environment. ENEC needs to be world class.

The meetings for the Board in 2015 are scheduled for March 15th and 16th and October 11th and 12th. As noted above the Board would like to hear more at the next meeting on a number of important considerations, such as the countermeasures for a terrorist threat and on the ENEC plan to cope with severe accidents.

The Board is grateful to the UAE and supporting entities for outstanding presentations and informative meetings at this tenth meeting. The IAB congratulates the UAE on the continuing success and progress of the nuclear power program and finds that the UAE remains fully committed to the principles of safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency and sustainability in its program.

Chairman's Preface

The Board was happy to see that since its last visit great progress has been made on the plant and that the program remains on time and budget. This report discusses host of items: the updated status of the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant, the model planned for the operating company, the Korean supply chain challenges, regulatory development, emergency preparedness and response readiness, physical protection as well as capacity building.

At its next meeting the Board would appreciate further reports on the faulty components' issue, on waste management, and on social media.

Introduction

The UAE peaceful nuclear energy program is now reaching a level of young maturity. In July 2014, the first reactor will be two years into its construction period and the second reactor one year. In preparation for Units 3 and 4 construction, excavations at the time of the meeting were about 50% complete. The first pouring of concrete to the reactor building of Unit 3 is planned in June 2014, as soon as the Construction License has been received. The fourth reactor is planned to commence construction in mid-2015. The start of power production for the first reactor is scheduled for May, 2017. This report will focus on the major issues of the program.

Safety

Safety assessment and recommendations

The discussion on safety began with a presentation by FANR. It was noted that ENEC submitted its Construction License Application (CLA) for Units 3 and 4 of the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) on February 28, 2013. The Limited CL was amended to allow-non-safety related preliminary construction activities to begin for Units 3 and 4 as had been done with Units 1 and 2.

ENEC submitted the Severe Accident Analysis Report (SAAR) Rev. 5 in December 2013. At the time of the meeting, 35 Requests for Additional Information (RAI) had been raised by FANR, addressing molten core concrete interaction, analysis of hydrogen production and containment performance analysis. The open questions related to these three subjects involve several technical issues rather than specific scenarios. The responses to the RAIs are scheduled to be submitted to FANR on May 31, 2014.

A safety issue on which the Board has earlier expressed its interest in is the reliability of the external power transmission grid as a source of electrical power in unusual situations. A reliable grid and strong connections to it from the BNPP are important for reducing the risk of Loss Of Offsite Power (LOOP). LOOP is a precursor to Station Blackout (SBO) – a beyond design basis event that would follow if the onsite emergency diesel generators fail to function after LOOP. A SBO without due contingencies was the direct cause of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. ENEC reported that the BNPP will have two switchyards (one for Units 1 and 2 and one for Units 3 and 4). Each switchyard of the BNPP will be connected with five 400 kV overhead lines (OHL) to offsite switchyards in three different locations. Altogether there are five offsite switchyards in direct connection with the BNPP, with one of them connected with one transmission line to each of the BNPP switchyards, belonging to another transmission system that is separate from the other switchyards and is owned and operated by a different transmission company. This connection will therefore be independent from others and will provide protection against large area grid disturbances. Of the four other offsite switchyards owned by TRANSCO (Abu Dhabi Transmission & Despatch Company) each will have two connecting transmission lines to one of the BNPP switchyards. Each OHL will be capable of transmitting full electrical power of one NPP unit. In conclusion, the Board noted that power line connections from the BNPP switchyards to the external transmission grids have significant redundancy. This provides a reliable offsite power supply to the plant in abnormal situations, as well as a high level of supply security to the consumers who are getting power from the BNPPs.

Another important issue for reliable offsite power supply is ensuring grid stability in the event of sudden plant disturbances. The KEPCO and TRANSCO studies on the grid connection in this respect are complete. The KEPCO studies have confirmed successful and stable connection of the BNPP to the transmission grid, and the TRANSCO studies have confirmed stable behavior of the transmission grid in potential disturbance scenarios arising from BNPP or from elsewhere in the TRANSCO grid. The worst postulated scenario is sudden loss of power supply from one BNPP unit. The stability studies showed no ill effect to the grid or to the operation of the remaining BNPP generators have been submitted to FANR, but are yet to be reviewed and assessed by FANR

The arrangements for reliable protection against a Station Blackout (SBO), i.e. loss of offsite power and loss of emergency diesel generators, are being finalized by ENEC and FANR. The initial design by KEPCO provides two identical class emergency diesel generators at each Unit and one common diverse diesel generator as an "Alternate AC power source" for the entire plant. Following the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the design of the BNPP was enhanced to allow for connection of mobile diesel generators. In addition to this, ENEC is currently in the process of developing a modification to add a second Alternate AC Diesel Generator (AAC DG), which would provide both redundancy and diversity.

The next issue that FANR brought to the attention of the Board was the question on staffing resources at ENEC. The increasing complexity of the development of the UAE peaceful nuclear energy program requires an increase in staffing levels. FANR found that ENEC is increasing its staff but needs to ensure that new human resources and talent increase in a way commensurate to the expansion of the project.

Several Board members expressed their views about the ENEC situation. A potential solution is that ENEC outsources some of its oversight of manufacturing to qualified external experts. This structure is a common worldwide practice among Licensees that want to assure the quality of the components supplied to their plant without the need for creating large organizations during the construction period that may be made redundant after commissioning. The Board wants to hear more about this issue at the next meeting.

FANR on the other hand has almost enough people to get its mandate done – FANR has done well with recruiting as well as retention of technically qualified people.

FANR briefed the Board on the Korean supply chain issue called CFSI (Counterfeit, Fraudulent and Suspect Items), and on the next day ENEC provided additional information on the topic. A series of CFSI findings for nuclear plants in Korea have resulted in the Korean Government increasing jail and financial penalties for industrialists and public officials within the energy sector. This subject has been an important topic at the previous two Board meetings and will be addressed again at the upcoming meetings.

FANR, with the assistance of expert consultants, has reviewed a report prepared by ENEC on the issue of CFSI, and has accepted measures taken to date by ENEC. Additional controls and measures regarding CFSI have also been agreed to for the BNPP. The programmatic actions are generally consistent with best practices; however there remains to be several implementation issues that will require additional steps. FANR has briefed ENEC on these preliminary conclusions. The Board expressed that ENEC should increase its Quality Assurance (QA) and Quality Surveillance (QS) resources. The Board also expressed its desire to keep this topic on the agenda for future meetings.

Overall, the Board is satisfied with current progress and steps taken regarding CFSI by FANR and ENEC. FANR is planning on conducting inspections of ENEC and Korean suppliers going forward.

The ENEC QA program has been in place since early 2010 and is based on FANR regulations, US Nuclear QA Standard NQA-1, and IAEA standards. CFSI controls were further strengthened in October, 2013 following the emergence of the CFSI issues in Korea. At the time, ENEC formed a special work team to address the issues. Since then, extensive reviews have been performed for the BNPP. To date, there has not yet been a case of CFSI concerning equipment or materials supplied or installed at the BNPP.

The Korean government has increased jail and financial penalties considerably for CFSI cases. ENEC continues to make considerable progress to further enhance its robust QA programs and strengthen CFSI controls. The QA program at KEPCO has also been aligned with ENEC's QA program. Increased sensitivity and conservatism has been included in the QA programs and extensive training on CFSI has been given to management and staff on site.

The latest developments include: QA programs being updated with a flow down of ENEC requirements to all of its suppliers. Quality verification documents from various Quality Control (QC) steps are kept and compared against original certificates by suppliers. Comprehensive checklists have been developed based on best practices and CFSI is a special topic within audits. Resident inspectors at site are increasingly using "Positive Material Identification devices" (PMI devices) for spot checks: this device identifies the material composition of the target component. The information from PMI devices can be compared with material specification in the component certificate issued by the manufacturer. The Board expressed satisfaction with the steps taken. The Board also stated that hand held devices that can check on elemental composition of components are a recent development, and their use at Barakah is bound to enhance certainty about material quality.

ENEC also presented a strategy and action plan to actively monitor CFSI issues across its supply chain, which includes actions such as independent reviews of ENEC / KEPCO CFSI programs and controls by industry experts in 2014, as well as an increase in QA and QS experts. ENEC and FANR are conducting more CFSI focused audits and inspections to verify program implementation and effectiveness.

The ENEC Chief Program Officer presented an overview of ongoing strategic goals and objectives. The UAE nuclear program has reached a point where it is beginning to transition from construction only, to construction and preparation of the organization that will oversee operations of the plants. The project delivery requires that: project safety performance is always ensured, the integrated construction schedule and budget be met, the Quality Assurance program strict compliance and regulation expectations are observed, and a seamless transition to plant operations must be ensured. In addition, it must always be understood that each goal has a safety related element, at a plant site which is soon expected to have 20,000 workers present.

ENEC's updated operating model is headed by the Board of Directors, with Chief Executive Officer, Mohamed Al Hammadi, reporting to the Board and supervising the Executive Team, which is comprised of:

• Chief Project Officer (CPO), responsible for guaranteeing project delivery
• Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO), responsible for ensuring operational readiness
• Chief Finance Officer (CFO), responsible for providing corporate support
• Chief Operations Officer (COO), responsible for developing capability

The Board requested that all four of the senior officials of the Executive Team be present at the next Board meeting in October 2014, if possible. It was emphasized that safety is the number one priority as the program moves towards first fuel load. ENEC continues to focus on building a Culture of Safety throughout the organization; and that safety as a principle must always come first.

The operational readiness program has three main areas: 1) People (staffing, training, nuclear culture of safety), 2) Process (models, procedures, information and communication technology, operating license application), and 3) Plant (supply chains for operations stage, commissioning, operating, physical security). Operational readiness must be delivered on time in order to ensure reliable and cost effective power production. The goal is to exceed the regulators' expectations across all aspects of the operational readiness program.

ENEC's CPO presented a BNPP construction update. The Unit 1 reactor containment building is proceeding and the reactor vessel is planned to be set on May 25, 2014. The Turbine building is also progressing well. The Unit 2 containment vessel construction is making solid progress. The reactor vessel for Unit 1 was completed by Doosan at the end of December, 2013 in Korea. Doosan also successfully carried out a hydrostatic test on the reactor vessel. It was shipped in late March, 2014 and is expected to arrive in Abu Dhabi in May, 2014. A full scope simulator located on site was taken for training use a couple of days before the IAB meeting. The plant will have two identical simulators that will be used for training purposes.

ENEC reported to the Board on progress made in emergency planning. The onsite Emergency Plan and procedures are being prepared well ahead of the first nuclear fuel delivery to the site. Initial drafts of the plan were prepared by an independent consultant, with ENEC's Emergency Preparedness team further enhancing the plan. An independent assessment of the Emergency Plan has also been performed by an external consultant against FANR and USNRC regulations. The draft plan has been found by FANR to fulfill the general intent of its regulations.

The Offsite Emergency Plan (Incident Commander [IC] Plan) is also being drafted and the Offsite program is currently 70% complete. All primary offsite stakeholders have drafted their parts of the Offsite Plan, while receiving significant input from the ENEC experts. A large Emergency Response Facility and Notification Point is being built, and is located 50km from the NPP site, outside the urgent protective action planning zone. It is scheduled to be completed in Q2, 2015. The facility has four separate areas under one roof: ENEC's emergency operations center, authorities' emergency operations center, public information center, and an environmental laboratory. The Board noted that close cooperation between ENEC and local authorities provides a good model for well-coordinated emergency planning and readiness.

The next steps are to: complete both the Onsite and Offsite emergency Plans and implementing procedures; select and test all of the components in the Emergency Response Facility (ERF) and the Notification Point, select and train the onsite emergency response organization members and the various external stakeholders having offsite emergency tasks, submit the final plans for review by FANR and to prepare and conduct an exercise to demonstrate to FANR that the onsite and offsite organizations can jointly protect the health and safety of the public.

Security

Security assessment and recommendations

The first revision of the Physical Protection Plan (PPP) for Construction Phase I, extending until the receipt of the first Items Important to Safety on site, was submitted by ENEC along with the Construction License Application (CLA) for Units 3 and 4. FANR reviewed the PPP and submitted Requests for Additional Information (RAIs). ENEC responded with four commitments. The PPP for Construction Phase 2, extending until the delivery of nuclear fuel on site, was submitted by ENEC in January, 2014. This is under current review by FANR while other RAIs have been submitted to ENEC. ENEC is working on providing the design of the required Physical Protection System, target sets identification and vulnerability assessment.

As part of its requirements, ENEC submitted to FANR a Cyber Security Plan (CSP) in June, 2013. In response to FANR's review of the CSP, ENEC made 13 commitments, including plans for cyber-security incident responses, command and control, disaster recovery, business continuity, emergency and contingency, and strategies for mitigation and restoration of operations. Before issuing the Operations License for Unit 1, FANR will verify that ENEC has implemented the stated plans and has also a sustainability program in place.

The National Electronic Security Agency will be exchanging information across the business community and government. There have been no major attacks reported within the region since the recent cyber-attack on Aramco which, effected some 30,000 computers.

FANR reviewed the updated Aircraft Impact Assessment that had been initially submitted as part of the CLA for Units 1 and 2 and had been completed to demonstrate applicability for all four Units in the CLA for Units 3 and 4. Before issuing the Operating License FANR will verify that necessary operator actions required for the mitigation of the impact consequences can be performed and will review the enhanced design features, strategies and procedures.

As part of the development of FANR knowledge and competences in the Security area, one nuclear security inspector was seconded to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission for nine months. In addition, FANR has attended several international meetings on nuclear security in recent months: the IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance Committee in October 2013; a meeting with Sandia National Laboratories in the U.S. in February 2014 on potential physical security and cyber security training; an international workshop on nuclear security in the U.S. in February 2014; and an IAEA technical meeting at the IAEA also in February 2014.

Non-proliferation

Non - proliferation assessment and recommendations

Ambassador Hamad Al Kaabi for MOFA briefed the Board on non-proliferation and international cooperation. He noted the fifth anniversary of the UAE Permanent Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA has been well briefed throughout the years on the UAE approach to nuclear power and the ongoing dialogue between the UAE and the IAEA has been of great mutual benefit.

The IAEA continues to find feedback from the UAE program highly valuable and the UAE greatly benefits from guidance of the IAEA. Among other examples from the UAE-IAEA dialogue are: the close cooperation with the IAEA in implementing international agreements and conventions; obtaining assistance and advice from IAEA experts and peer reviews of UAE activities; close partnership in developing the work of the IAEA and its standards; the development of a positive recognition of the UAE nuclear program and its efforts as a model within the IAEA and its member states; and the evaluation of the UAE as an influential player at the IAEA policy making organizations as well as in IAEA technical work. As a sign of trust to UAE international competencies, a representative of the UAE has been selected to lead an IAEA mission to Jordan to assess the development of its national infrastructure in preparation for new nuclear build.

Ambassador Al Kaabi described the importance to the UAE program of technical cooperation with the IAEA. Building the foundation of cooperation with and among stakeholders (ENEC, Critical Infrastructure and Costal Protection Authority, Khalifa University, etc.) for the nuclear energy program has been significant. The stakeholders have not always been aware of what the IAEA has to offer. The UAE-IAEA Integrated Work Plan (IWP) signed in 2013, has significantly enhanced the efficiency and effectiveness of the partnership between the UAE and the IAEA. The current IWP (2013-2017) lasts until the planned start-up of the first NPP in 2017. Between 2010 and 2014, through UAE-IAEA cooperation, 11 national technical cooperation (TC) projects have been completed along with 59 regional/inter-regional projects. This implementation rate places the UAE first among countries in Asia and the Pacific in the execution of IAEA TC programs.

Ambassador Al Kaabi also noted that the UAE is moving to join the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, which was signed in 1997 and is intended to complement the Vienna Convention, Paris Convention or respective national legislation but is not yet in force due to the lack of the required number of ratifications needed. There were several matters to report with respect to multilateral international nuclear cooperation. The International Conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources held in October, 2013 in Abu Dhabi was a great success. The meeting attracted more than 300 participants from almost 90 countries and six regional and international organizations. The Conference highlighted achievements in the past decade since the IAEA General Conference endorsed the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. The Code serves as a guide for national policies and although not legally binding, 118 states have expressed their political support for the Code and used it to establish national regulatory infrastructures. The UAE adhered officially to the Code in 2013 and submitted its implementation report to the IAEA. Ambassador Al Kaabi stated that before there can be a Convention, a broader understanding amongst the international community on how the Code should be implemented must be developed.

Also in October 2013, the UAE hosted and chaired a series of meetings of the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC), a forum formed as a partnership of countries to ensure that new nuclear initiatives meet the highest standards of safety, security and non-proliferation. The 2013 IFNEC Finance, Regulatory, and Energy Planning Authority Workshop (led by the UAE) was held on October 22nd, 2013 in Abu Dhabi.

In February 2014, the UAE MOFA signed an MOU with METI Japan to promote nuclear cooperation. The upcoming Nuclear Security Summit in Hague and the NPT Preparatory Committee meeting to be held in New York in late April – early May 2014, were mentioned in Ambassador Al Kaabi's report. With respect to the latter, Chairman Blix asked about the Conference on a Middle East nuclear free zone, agreed at the 2010 NPT Review Conference but never implemented. Ambassador Al Kaabi responded that it was a big issue, and that Egypt had walked out at last year's PrepCom. He noted there had been consultations but no new date for a conference has been agreed to so far.

The ENEC Executive Director for Fuel Management reported on behalf of ENEC on waste management developments. In 2011, MOFA, under the leadership of Ambassador Al Kaabi, invited, ENEC and FANR to develop comprehensive recommendations to aid in the establishment of a UAE national policy on nuclear spent fuel management. The project was concluded in 2012 and ENEC awaits the development of the UAE National Waste Policy.

Meanwhile ENEC has initiated a project to ensure that there will be sufficient storage space at Barakah for the construction of a dry cask storage facility if needed. ENEC awarded the contract for this project in December, 2013 and a study is expected to be completed in 2014. It will evaluate dry storage design, assess the adequacy of existing and planned BNPP fuel pool infrastructure for cask handling and loading and propose a dry storage facility size and location. The first spent fuel from Barakah is expected to be in the fuel pool by 2018. Worldwide experience to date has shown that spent fuel can safely spend at least 40 years in the spent fuel pool and the estimated safe storage time in dry storage is over 100 years.

As concerns with low and medium level radioactive waste generated during normal NPP operation and having not been transported anywhere on an industry scale beyond national boundaries, the proposed national policy should be established for an eventual final disposal in the territory of the UAE. ENEC has visited waste management facilities in Sweden and France and is in the process of training engineers for radiation protection and radiation waste management at Korean nuclear power plants.

With regard to import/export controls on nuclearrelated items, FANR has been actively cooperating with the Ministry of the Economy on introducing the list of regulated activities of the nuclear sector into the national index of economic activities. There has also been active cooperation with Federal and local customs on the implementation of export/import control of regulated items. Awareness sessions for importers, exporters and shipping companies have been conducted as well.

Transparency

Transparency assessment and recommendations

FANR public outreach events have been planned as follows: Dubai, April 15, 2014; Sharjah/Ajman, April 22, 2014; Ras Al Khaimah/Umm Al Quwain, October 21, 2014; and Fujairah, October 22, 2014.

All UAE federal government entities have been mandated to develop social media policies. Transparency is one of the Core Values of the UAE peaceful nuclear energy program. In order to foster this value, FANR:

• engages truthfully and objectively with stakeholders and communicates FANR's decisions and their bases;

• establishes clear channels of communication with the public and international nuclear community.

In cooperation with national stakeholder organizations, the IAEA Public Information Division produced a five minute film, in addition to separate filmed interviews from the UAE's nuclear energy program. The film "Powering the Future", highlights the rationale behind the UAE's nuclear energy program and shows progress made in its implementation. There is also an interview with IAEA Director General, Yukiya Amano. Ambassador Al Kaabi noted that the interview demonstrates how nuclear countries are implementing IAEA guidance. The UAE is the only new nuclear program in 27 years.

Sustainability

Sustainability assessment and recommendations

The IAB noted with appreciation the great efforts made in the UAE to train a highly skilled nuclear energy work force, and especially in encouraging citizens of the UAE to join the national nuclear energy program.

ENEC reported a highly diversified work force of 971 staff members, with 619 Emirati employees (67.2%) and 225 women. The IAEA has reported that the percentage of women in the world nuclear energy sector is 22.4%. Therefore, ENEC's figures are in line with general industry practice, while still recognizing that there is always room for improvement.

ENEC also updated the Board on its Energy Pioneers scholarship program. Through this program, 159 students are currently pursuing a Bachelors of Engineering in various specialties (21 females), with 78 of these at Khalifa University in Abu Dhabi, which has a nuclear minor program, MS program and PHD program, while a further 76 students are studying in the United States. ENEC also supports more than 120 students in the Higher Diploma of Nuclear Technology, as well as nine Masters of Engineering students, seven of which are females. Of these Masters students, seven are studying at Khalifa University, one at Texas A&M University and one is in South Korea participating in the KINGS program. Furthermore, there is also one PhD student at MIT in the United States. To date, more than 200 ENEC engineers have gone through practical training experience at Korean nuclear energy plants ranging between two to six months. Extensive training of Emiratis by Korean instructors is also underway.

The workforce at the Barakah site continues to increase. The UAE project is becoming recognized both in the UAE and the world over as a premier project, which is helpful for recruiting qualified staff, but there is still work to be done by ENEC to ensure the organization gets the people that it needs. Initial procedures for hiring are being streamlined, and recruitment remains an important issue for ENEC. By 2017, 1,600-1,700 people will be needed in operations and by 2020 over 2,000, with 400-500 more in ENEC corporate. This is more than doubling current levels.

ENEC has positioned itself as one of the preferred employers of choice for young Emiratis, competing with some of the best companies in the nation. The project is well-known and is seen as an attractive career opportunity. Therefore, hiring talented and experienced expatriates has become easier, but the competition on talented Emiratis is more demanding.

As the nuclear energy plants at Barakah will have at least a 60 year life, services have to be prepared for this. ENEC is increasing its international outreach program to hire experienced nuclear energy experts. FANR also reported active work in capacity building. There has been an IAEA assessment of FANR knowledge management. FANR has joined the Halden reactor project as a capacity building measure. Five master qualified students have joined FANR in nuclear radiation safety. FANR has a policy of not building its own laboratory for radiation monitoring but instead it uses the environmental laboratory at Khalifa University. Khalifa University is expanding its capabilities with the construction of a calibration laboratory

Chairman's Preface

The Board was happy to see that since its last visit great progress has been made on the plant and that the program remains on time and budget. This report discusses host of items: the updated status of the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant, the model planned for the operating company, the Korean supply chain challenges, regulatory development, emergency preparedness and response readiness, physical protection as well as capacity building.

At its next meeting the Board would appreciate further reports on the faulty components' issue, on waste management, and on social media.

Introduction

Subsequent to FANR's briefing, Ambassador Hamad Al Kaabi briefed the Board on behalf of MOFA's developments. The subjects addressed by the Ambassador included updates on the UAE's international activities covering several international conferences, re-election of the UAE to the IAEA Board of Governors; preparations for the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit; international cooperation on the safety and security of radioactive sources; IAEA technical cooperation; progress on the export control regime; and international work on comprehensive fuel services.

The following day at the Barakah site, ENEC senior officials delegated ENEC's CEO Mohamed Al-Hammadi, briefed the Board in detail on progress at the Barakah site and related matters. The briefing included an update status of the Barakah Nuclear Power Plants; a description of the model planned for the operating company; emergency preparedness development; security; cyber security; human resources and capacity building including the training of personnel.

The final briefing of the day was carried out by CICPA, led by Musabeh Al Kaabi. The subjects addressed included the development of the Physical Security Protection strategy for the Barakah site with a focus on milestones, potential vulnerabilities, physical security requirements and the strategy for the security forces. Several additional accomplishments were mentioned and current activities related to physical security were described.

The Barakah NPP site has nearly ten thousand construction workers. During the plant tour the Board observed significant progress since their last visit two years ago and noted that the program remains on time and on budget.

Safety

Safety assessment and recommendations

FANR began their presentation on safety. The first matter discussed was the Construction License Application (CLA) for Units 3 and 4. This CLA was submitted by ENEC on the 28th of February, 2013 and was based on the CLA for Units 1 and 2. There are approximately 200 differences identified in the Preliminary Safety Assessment Report (PSAR) from Units 1 and 2 including: safety enhancements suggested on the basis of lessons learned from Fukushima; design changes made at the reference plants Shin Kori 3 & 4, during its construction; updated site data; and modifications made as a result of progress on detailed design.

FANR is conducting a full technical review and assessment of all new material in the CLA, while the evaluation of unchanged application material will rely upon the existing safety evaluation for Units 1 and 2. Over 60% of the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Sections represent draft material approved by FANR.

In order to meet the conditions of the Construction License for Barakah NPP Units 1 and 2, ENEC submitted on January 10, 2013 revision 3 of the PSAR. It embodies all the approved changes from the Unit 1 and 2 reviews. The Barakah NPP Units 1 and 2 SER identified 83 issues that required follow up submittals (conditional acceptance). ENEC committed to these submittals during the review of the CLA for Units 1 and 2 but the delivery has been delayed in several cases. ENEC has requested extensions on due dates for several submittals. To date, FANR has received 35 submittals in response, and expects another 43 by the end of the year. Of the 35 submitted, 7 have been approved and closed, 16 require follow up and 12 are related to the Severe Accident Analysis Report (SAAR). This lack of closure represents real regulatory risk for ENEC. The causes for most delays appear to be related to steps in the procurement process including KEPCO's performance and ENEC's oversight. ENEC has acknowledged the problem and is working to manage future deliverables.

Next FANR turned to the SAAR noting that ENEC and KEPCO have yet to provide a submittal that meets FANR's requirements. To comply with conditions of the Barakah Units 1 and 2 construction license review, ENEC submitted Revision 2 of the SAAR applicable to all 4 units. The FANR review indicated that the revised SAAR was not responding adequately to outstanding request for additional information. FANR suspended its review and requested that ENEC address the problems identified. ENEC is working with KEPCO on a new revision for submittal. The plan was to submit this revision by the end of September 2013. On this matter FANR presses ENEC which in turn presses KEPCO. The problem that exists in this case and others where input for reports is needed from KEPCO is that the respective issues are considered to be adequately proven in Korea because of direct contacts between organizations but the arguments are not written down. When convincing arguments are not given to FANR there are often requests for additional information and clarification.

ENEC has delayed the submission of a report on the electrical grid to which the Barakah NPP will be connected. This report is important because it is necessary to determine grid stability and the potential for the loss of offsite power (LOOP) to the facility. LOOP is a potential initiating event to a Station Blackout (SBO), which would be a highly significant event for safety. ENEC must comply with FANR's requirements for protection against LOOP and subsequent SBO. ENEC and TRANSCO (Abu Dhabi Transmission and Dispatch Company) are studying grid modification alternatives that will best support the UAE's Transmission Code requirements, and hence, maintain the necessary grid stability and reliability. It is also important to study the degree of protection that exists for alternative power sources. FANR regulations require that ENEC understand the operation of the electrical grid as the reliability of offsite power sources is important. All of this is under review by ENEC. The IAB notes that redundant independent external connections of Barakah units to the grid should exist, and hopes to hear about the final determination of the grid connection issues at a future meeting.

The next subject discussed was FANR oversight of ENEC's performance. The implementation of the 2013 Annual Inspection Plan is well advanced.  Fifteen site inspections have been completed while 15-20 were planned for 2013. FANR has also conducted an assessment of ENEC's safety management based on the inspection results from January to June 2013. FANR concluded that ENEC's overall effectiveness in managing safety was acceptable but additional emphasis on ENEC's oversight of KEPCO's activities would be needed. FANR's specific remarks include formal documentation of design control measures by ENEC and more accuracy in translating design and licensing basis information into the specifications written in the procurement documents. In the future, FANR is planning to place more emphasis on review of the ENEC's and KEPCO's supplier oversight process.

The Korean supply chain problems (and their implications for the Barakah project) have become a major public, as well as, a regulatory matter. The chronology in brief for Barakah NPP is as follows:

• KEPCO announced concerns in operating NPP on November 4, 2012;
• KEPCO briefed FANR inspectors (in connection with an already planned inspection a few days after on November 12);
• ENEC briefed FANR on November 25, 2012;
• KEPCO notified ENEC of forged Seismic Certificate Shin Kori 3&4, on December 11, 2012
• A small number of suspect parts were identified at Barakah in April, 2013;
• A cable falsification issue was reported involving six NPPs including Shin Kori 3&4 in June 2013;
• FANR requested a formal report from ENEC on June 13;
• ENEC provided the report requested on July 15, 2013; the review of the ENEC report by FANR is ongoing.

As part of the traditional regulatory review pursuant to the CLA for Units 1 and 2, quality assurance programs had been reviewed. FANR had found that these programs complied with the international recognized standards. No particular concerns were noted with respect to the Korean supply chain in the December, 2010 to July, 2012 timeframe. FANR conducted 15 regulatory inspections of ENEC and its suppliers up to the time of the disclosures in November 2012.

 

In November 2012, ENEC and KEPCO representations to FANR indicated that only Certificate of Conformance issues for operating NPPs were affected and no concerns were indicated for plants under construction. However, the December 2012 revelations indicated problems with respect to plants under construction. A supplier, who is listed on the Barakah approved safety related suppliers list, was involved and a forged Seismic Qualification (not a Certificate of Conformance) was disclosed.

On December 27, 2012 ENEC formed a Task Force chaired by its CNO. The Task Force began developing an overall strategy and briefed FANR in January, 2013 on its plans.

In April, 2013 ENEC advised FANR of suspected parts at Barakah. A Non-Conformance Report was provided that indicated identification of ten suspect safety related parts called elbows (two were installed and four were staged for installation) and three non-safety fittings (not installed). The installed elbows were removed and the other suspected components were put under control to prevent installation. Fraudulent action was not suspected at this time. FANR verified the corrective actions during an inspection in June, 2013.

A cable test falsification was revealed in June, 2013 which impacted the Reference Plant. There were allegations that reported the involvement of the business unit of the ENEC prime contractor. FANR requested the formal Report from ENEC on June 13, 2013. This report was submitted to FANR on July 15, 2013.  Following the review of the report, FANR requested additional information on July 29, 2013. A partial response was given on August 28, 2013 and a full response by ENEC on September 30, 2013. FANR has indicated the objective of completing its initial review by the end of October, 2013.

FANR concluded that there was a low risk of suspected parts being installed at the Barakah NPP up to present time. The ENEC existing quality assurance program for the supply network provides some level of protection. There has been FANR oversight and inspections and the delivery of South Korean sourced equipment is not yet significant. However, the potential risk for the future is not well understood at this stage. FANR must complete its formal review with field observations and inspections. FANR staff will develop recommendations for any additional regulatory actions.

All information brought up by the Korean regulator will be shared with ENEC. The investigation in South Korea was conducted initially on the basis of a tip that technical failures had been covered up. The Board asked at this point of the presentation, "ENEC relies on South Korea for quality assurance, what percentage of equipment comes from South Korea? Do we have quality assurance for goods coming from elsewhere?" ENEC replied that reactor parts are now made all over the world unlike 20 years ago. The complexity of inspecting supply chains is now greater than in the past as the number of chains has proliferated. This has made quality assurance more difficult. It is likely that in financial terms, perhaps 80% of components for the UAE nuclear project come from South Korea and 20% from elsewhere. FANR stated that in 2010 it had greater confidence in South Korean quality assurance than it has now. ENEC will be taking a larger and more active role in quality assurance going forward.

ENEC has stated that it intends to request a license for operation of Unit 1 of the Barakah NPP by end of 2016, and will submit its application in early 2015. Meeting the envisioned timeline would require ENEC to begin the OL application from now. Accordingly, the first meeting for this purpose between ENEC and FANR was held in July 2013. The OL will be granted before the regulated activity of operation, defined as the beginning of the fuel load. There will be a preliminary authorization for import, transport and possession of nuclear fuel. The OL will authorize fuel load, nuclear commissioning, facility operation and the possession, use, handling and storage of regulated material. Barakah NPP units may be licensed individually or jointly and the license period will be up to 60 years. The reactor system is being designed for a lifetime of at least 60 years. Some other components will be upgraded to a 60 year life, but most of the plant components are designed for a 40 year life. ENEC expects to use a rigorous maintenance program which includes provisions for repair and replacement that will ensure a 60 year license life. License conditions will be set by the FANR Board.

FANR also addressed the question of emergency preparedness and response. FANR is developing guidance based on IAEA guidelines for protective actions. This guidance will be detailed and will regulate all activities included operational intervention. Furthermore, FANR is preparing for a radiation monitoring network around the Barakah site. ENEC is also developing emergency action levels for precautionary protective actions based on reactor conditions as part of the onsite plan required by FANR's regulations. The necessity for effective communication to the public is recognized. FANR is developing its own emergency response procedures and building an emergency operations center. An Emergency Preparedness Review mission by IAEA is expected in 2015 and the objective is that the system be fully in place by 2016.

FANR has participated in a number of international conferences and IAEA meetings.  FANR presented a paper "Experience of an Embarking Country" at the Conference on Enhancing Global Efforts in Vienna in July and presented two papers at the Conference mentioned by Ambassador Al Kaabi in his presentation "The Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources" in Abu Dhabi in late October.  Some of the IAEA meetings in which FANR participated recently were:

Security

Security assessment and recommendations

FANR reported that revision 1 of the Physical Protection Plan (PPP) for the Barakah NPP Construction Phase 1 was submitted on April 28, 2013. This was one of the conditions set in connection with Construction License approval (CLA) for Units 1 and 2. This plan will serve for Units 3 and 4 as well and thus is applicable to all four units. Review of the Plan for the CLA for Units 3 and 4 will focus primarily on: different activities among multiple units; cyber security; and the security and safety interface. The PPP Construction phase 2 (before the arrival of nuclear fuel on site) for Units 1 and 2 will be submitted by ENEC in December, 2013.

The Physical Protection Plan (PPP) for operation will be based on the IAEA draft implementing guide. FANR and ENEC have agreed on its content and will have periodic meetings to enable FANR to follow its development. Timelines will be proposed by ENEC and ENEC will submit drafts of part of this Plan to FANR as it develops, on such subjects as identification of target sets, vulnerability assessments and physical protection design.

FANR-Reg-08 requires ENEC to submit a Cyber Security Plan (CSP) as part of the PPP and it was submitted in June, 2013. There are three phases to the CSP, development in 2013, implementation in 2014 and 2015 and maintenance from 2015 onward.

FANR next discussed the issue of Aircraft Impact Assessment (AIA) and Loss of a Large Area (LOLA). ENEC submitted its AIA for CLA 1 and 2 in December, 2010. There were several impact assessment reports as well as a White Paper on LOLA evaluation following the ENEC submission. In February, 2013, ENEC announced that an updated version for the 4 units of the various submittals will be complete by December, 2013. The LOLA assessments will continue through 2014. ENEC expect a final report by the end of 2014 and is planning to submit the report to FANR by early 2015.

The Nuclear Security Inspection Plan for 2014 was mentioned by FANR. It will include access control and physical barriers, the CSP and the organization, training and qualification of the security forces.

The CICPA, along with other relevant governmental entities, is responsible for developing and specifying the Design Basis Threat (DBT) for Barakah NPP. ENEC is responsible for the physical protection of Barakah NPP as implemented by CICPA and FANR reviews the PPPs for Barakah NPP and enforces ENEC implementation of them.

Interactions with the IAEA on security include a meeting on the "Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources" to be held in Abu Dhabi in October, 2013 and meetings at the IAEA during 2013 of the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee, an IAEA consultancy meeting on Current and Emerging Cyber Threats in Security planning and an IAEA Technical Meeting on Computer Security Events.

ENEC also discussed programs to ensure physical and mental fitness for duty, which is an important part of security. The Fitness Monitoring program during construction will be inaugurated on May 15, 2014 and continue to the end of February, 2015. This program with respect to Unit 1 will begin with the installation of the first item important to security and will remain in effect until commissioning and the start of Cold Hydro-static testing. The second stage will begin with the start of Cold Hydro-static testing and will remain in effect until 30 days prior to receipt of the first fuel. This program through the first two stages is being established pursuant to U.S. regulations. The third phase, Fitness for Duty program for operation will be established pursuant to guidance from FANR. Inspectors will be watching for aberrant behavior, and looking for anyone doing something that could raise suspicions about possible drug or alcohol abuse. 

ENEC will implement a Safety and Security Interface policy prior to the end of this year. It will be based on FANR-REG-08 on physical security, the relevant US regulation and CICPA procedures. Interim measures have been established to ensure adequate interface prior to the implementation of a formal program. ENEC has established a Classified Information Protection Program. There will be a physical protection program for system design. All conceptual and detailed design work for the PPPS shall be completed in the UAE, ENEC will grant design team members access to classified information pursuant to approximate procedures. All design documents initially will be controlled as "classified" and subsequently will be reviewed to consider re-classification to unclassified. Any legacy classified documents will remain in the UAE until a process is established that allows documents to be released outside the UAE. KEPCO, ENEC and CICPA will work together to establish PPPS procurement packages that do not contain classified information.

The two security departments of ENEC were consolidated into a single organization in May, 2013. The organization had been restructured into four functional areas, each headed by a Security Director: physical security; site security; personnel security; and information security.  

Turning to cyber security, the CSP describes the cyber security program. The scope of the cyber security program, phase one includes; threat assessment; Design Basis Threat (DBT); cyber security plan; gap analysis; implementation plan; and approval of the CSP.

The second phase, or the implementation phase, has four sub phases: identify crucial assets; assess controls; implement controls; and operational readiness. The elements of the implementation phase include: among other things: roles and responsibilities; security in depth strategy; management, operational and technical controls; cyber security assessment review and update; and cyber security culture. It is important to align security culture with the overall safety culture of the organization.

The third phase is the maintenance of the cyber security program.  

The CICPA briefing was the last before the Board discussion. This briefing included the development of the physical security strategy for Barakah NPP. Since December, 2012 the CICPA has completed a comprehensive vulnerability assessment, a document on physical security requirements and a Security Defensive Strategy. The overall security protection strategy for Barakah NPP includes the IAEA Security Series, FANR regulations, the Barakah DBT, target set identification and the Vulnerability Assessment (VA).

The VA is a systematic method of designing and evaluating a security posture to determine its overall measure of system effectiveness based on defined assets and threats. It is a process recognized by the U.S. Department of Energy and the IAEA. It allows for the use of non-complex technology thereby minimizing maintenance; it maximizes the efficient and effective use of security forces; and it provides a cost-effective, long term security solution. The VA meets the requirements of the IAEA, FANR and international best practices.  

The VA is also tailored to the local environmental conditions at Barakah NPP as well as local security strategy. Modeling is used until the Barakah site is built; U.S. data and real experience is utilized. There is a review of the DBT annually. The final results of the VA are blended with security force strategy. The performance of the plant security personnel will influence the outcome of the exercise, and any remedial action needed. This will be one of the first modeling efforts in security that can show real results after completion.

Security requirements involve a set of detailed requirements for all engineered security features necessary for the physical protection of Barakah NPP including intrusion detection, assessment and surveillance systems specifications and barrier and delay feature designs. International guidelines are available from the IAEA, FANR, international best practices and Fukushima lessons learned. How to make technologies survive at Barakah NPP well above DBT is the objective.  

The purpose of Security Force Strategy, as guided by the VA and simulation modeling is to determine security force strength, deployment and capability; identify positions and job tasks; designate training requirements and focus on optional weapons and tactics.  Simulations are run to optimize tactics and weapons.

CICPA has implemented the first approved Information Protection Program with an emphasis on protecting sensitive and classified information. It continues its partnership with the U.S. Department of Energy as well as seeking international best practices. It has recently toured nuclear facilities in Finland and a new training center in China. CICPA is developing the Fitness for Duty program for itself consistent with FANR regulations as well as a Nuclear Quality Assurance Program. CICPA is aware that time is moving on at the Barakah site, by 2016 units 1 and 2 will have fuel loaded or being loaded. CICPA has developed a department for emergency response to cover all areas.

CICPA is currently developing a protection strategy with ENEC for Items Important to Safety to be delivered in the first quarter of 2014. It is developing the interim phases of the security strategy to accommodate construction and operations for 2016-2020 and is participating in the drafting of the PPP for Barakah NPP Phase II.

Non-proliferation

Non - proliferation assessment and recommendations

Ambassador Hamad Al Kaabi began the MOFA briefing with a series of quick updates:

• The UAE submitted its 3rd national Report in August pursuant to the Convention of Nuclear Safety
• The Japan - UAE Nuclear Bilateral Agreement was signed in May 2013
• UAE active participation in major meetings was noted:
  • the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conference on Nuclear Security in June in Vienna
  • the International conference on Nuclear Power in St. Petersburg in June
  • the IAEA General Conference in September in Vienna
• The UAE was elected again for a seat on the IAEA Board of Governor's for 2013-2015: The Board acknowledged Ambassador Al Kaabi for his excellent work and achievement
• The UAE participated in preparations for the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS). One issue is how to transfer the NSS achievement to a wider group at the IAEA. In 2016 a NSS is to be held in USA. Focus could include efforts to secure radioactive sources as well as nuclear material.

Ambassador Hamad Al Kaabi noted that there is a streamlined process for implementation and submission of declarations to the IAEA and that the 2008 Nuclear Policy committed the UAE to export/import rules in strict compliance with Nuclear Supply Group (NSG) guidelines for nuclear transfers. A new UAE regulation on export control which adopts the NSG guidelines is in its final stages.

FANR in its presentation reported on various regulations and other actions in the Safeguards area. As mentioned by Ambassador Hamad Al Kaabi a new regulation has been adopted establishing a System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material and Application of the Additional Protocol. There have been joint activities with ENEC and the IAEA relating to the installation of IAEA containment and surveillance measures at the Barakah site and additional activities by FANR relative to nuclear material licensing and Safeguards inspections. There also has been broad implementation of FANR export/import regulations at ports, airports and border stations throughout the UAE in cooperation with federal and local customs authorities. 

Transparency

Transparency assessment and recommendations

Director General Travers began the FANR briefing with a discussion of transparency issues.  He noted that FANR had conducted public outreach meetings at Ghayathi, Al Ain and Abu Dhabi since the last Board meeting and emphasized the importance of the process. He also mentioned the FANR internal newsletter. Lastly, Director General Travers indicated that FANR had established a social media policy. The Board would like to hear more about this policy at its next meeting in March, 2014.

ENEC conducted two ENEC forum meetings in October in Ras Al Khaimah and at the Abu Dhabi Exhibition Center. This latter meeting was well attended and it was held during the IAB meeting. All the Board members were invited to attend but were just returning from a visit to the Barakah site and most members found it difficult to attend this meeting. However Lady Barbara Judge did attend and during the proceedings was offered the podium to make a short speech and take questions from the audience. The Board hopes that there will be another such opportunity at the March, 2014 meeting.

FANR also reported workshops and meetings with entities involved in transfer of controlled items. These included workshops for shipping companies at Dubai and a first national workshop on transfer of control of nuclear cargos in cooperation with Dubai World.

Sustainability

Sustainability assessment and recommendations

ENEC provided, as it has done for each meeting of the IAB, an important presentation on sustainability, human relations and capacity building.

The training courses for Barakah NPP personnel currently underway were emphasized. Operations and maintenance personnel as well as engineers are pursuing training courses in ENEC's internal program as well as the Higher Diploma Nuclear Technology (HDNT) degree program. 203 employees are attending internal ENEC training courses and there are 144 students in the HDNT program. The Generic Fundamentals Examination is a FANR required examination, testing knowledge of basic power plant theory. 18 students took the first examination with 15 passing and 22 took the second examination with 15 students passing that one as well. Nuclear development training is available to UAE nationals by scheduling attendance in the Westinghouse program in Pittsburgh. This involves four weeks of introduction training on line, four weeks in the classroom and seven weeks of simulator training. Four employees are attending the current program; four are planned to enroll in the program beginning in December, 2013 and three for the program next summer. ENEC is actively planning for the long term in these efforts.

The Oversight Knowledge Package project was also explained in the briefing by ENEC. This project is becoming part of the national ethos of the country and is helping recruitment. The scope involves some 97 areas of knowledge for effective oversight of Barakah NPP processes of engineering, material management, quality surveillance and construction.

Areas of knowledge are first identified and then fields and sources are defined. Presentations involve: regulations, codes and standards, design and engineering manufacturing, shipment, and storage. There are bi-weekly sessions with mentors and monthly, quarterly and bi-annual assessments, involving some 388 presentations over four years. Accredited training and measurable achievement is anticipated.

FANR presented significant information on sustainability issues. FANR described its program for operator certification and training. Nuclear Law Article 5, Provision 25 and Article 36, Provision 4 mandate FANR to ensure that all operating personnel possess the necessary level of competence. FANR regulations provide for the certification of Reactor Operators (RO) and Senior Reactor Operators (SRO). The first group of ENEC candidates, 11 RO and 7 SRO candidates completed generic fundamentals in March, 2013 and are continuing their training. A second group, 7 RO and 14 SRO candidates, began generic fundamental training in June, 2013.  Simulator installation and commissioning is currently scheduled for dates between October 2013, and March 2014. FANR has been actively reviewing this program, having conducted a formal review and assessment and approved the training plan in June, 2013. Written evaluations have been provided to ENEC and this fall FANR will conduct an observation of the on the job training part of the training plan in South Korea. Initial observations by FANR are that Korean training practices may not conform to ENEC standards and some FANR requirements – ENEC and FANR may have higher standards – and ENEC and KEPCO are developing training procedures and materials shortly before they will be needed for implementation. This comment by FANR is of concern and the Board requests that FANR make a further report on this issue at the next IAB meeting.

FANR described its efforts in capacity building. The objectives are to ensure that all FANR employees are skilled and competent as a result of continuous training and development. There is a strong emphasis on training and development of UAE nationals to acquire the competence to effectively contribute to FANR's core functions. This is arranged through the UAE Nuclear Scholarship program, which is a cooperative program among FANR, ENEC and Khalifa University of Science, Technology and Research (KUSTAR). In addition, individual development plans including an internship program and a mentoring program exist at FANR focused on UAE national employees.

The following examples were provided from the achievements of the Education and Training programs of FANR:

Chairman's Preface

With great pleasure, I deliver to you the seventh report of the International Advisory Board on the development of the United Arab Emirates' Nuclear Power Program.This report outlines the progress of the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant licensing and inspection status, the pouring of the first nuclear safety concrete for Barakah2 Unit, and the submittal of Construction License Application for Units 3 and 4.

The Board commends MoFA, FANR and ENEC for their outstanding performance and findthe UAE nuclear program firmly committedto the principles of safety, security, nonproliferation, transparency and sustainability.

For the next report, the Board looks forward to hear more about the operational company, waste management and addressing the public on accident progression.

 

Introduction

The Seventh meeting of the International Advisory Board (IAB) for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) nuclear power program was held in Abu Dhabi on April 21st, 2013. The Chairman, Dr. Hans Blix presided and all other members were present. The Board meeting began at 9:00AM on April 21st and extended into the evening.

Before the briefings began, Ambassador Graham asked the Chairman for the floor. For the record Ambassador Graham stated that: "The United Arab Emirates nuclear power program started and shortly after the program, the Global Financial Crisis commenced and months before breaking ground for the first reactor there was a severe accident at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Yet with all of this the program remains on schedule with continued full commitment to the principles of safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency, and sustainability. This deserves world-wide recognition and commendation." Other members of the Board associated themselves with this statement.

As said the UAE Nuclear Power Program is based on the five principles of safety, security, nonproliferation, transparency and sustainability and the IAB is tasked in part with reviewing the Program bi-annually and reporting the degree to which the UAE Program has adhered to these principles. Accordingly this report is divided into sections for each of these principles and elements of each presentation are grouped under the relevant principle. This provides a clear and heavy emphasis on safety, which is appropriate, nevertheless all five principles are carefully observed as well.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) briefing was conducted by Ambassador Hamad Al Kaabi. The Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR) briefing was led by Director General William Travers with his full senior team. The Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) presentation was led by ENEC CEO Mohamed Al-Hammadi accompanied by his senior officials.

Safety

Safety assessment and recommendations

Director General Travers at the commencement of the FANR presentation introduced an overview of the briefing to come. Several matters were emphasized in this overview. The construction license application for Barakah units 3 and 4 were received by FANR on February 28, 2013 with ENEC requesting the license by March, 2014. The licensing process is expected to proceed faster than the licensing of the first two units given the commonalities.

Looking ahead to the handling of Construction License (CL) application for units 3 and 4, FANR indicated that there will be approximately 200 minor departures from the Preliminary Safety Assessment Report (PSAR) for units 1 and 2. Among the more noteworthy items are:

• The potential for modification to AC current delivery for all four units, FANR has inquired if this will be sufficient;
• strengthening emergency battery capability and adding battery life up to 16 hours;
• Several enhancements driven by lessons from Fukushima;
• reference plant (Shin Kori) design changes;
• updated site data;
• and modifications that have been considered reasonable in connection with the detailed design progress.

The acceptance review of this new application has been completed. The plan of work has been studied and a schedule developed. Technical support by the appropriate Technical Support Organizations (TSOs) has been secured and is in place.

The new FANR Board of Management which was appointed on March 10, 2013 for a term of three years was mentioned. The Board chairman remains Dr. Ahmed Mubarak Al Mazrouei with four of the nine Board members being new. The Board will continue its practice of meeting every other month. For ensuring coordinated and professional planning of preparedness for radiological emergencies FANR has established regular co-operation with the National Emergency Management Authority. Coordination is provided through meetings of the joint Steering Group of the two Authorities.

The IAB Chairman inquired about the June 2013 earthquake in Iran. The national seismological authority in the UAE announced that seismic instruments estimated the earthquake at 7.8 on the Richter scale. Although Barakah's site does not have an official seismic monitoring station, ENEC is able to measure seismic intensity on site. It was also noted that the UAE is a member of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Office (CTBTO) and it receives promptly information on earthquakes from the seismological network set up by the CTBTO. As a result, the UAE is alert of all earthquakes worldwide.

FANR's Director General went on to describe the principles of FANR's inspection approach. He noted that the responsibility of FANR is to verify that ENEC has met its responsibilities. FANR tries to not cover all of ENEC work through its inspections in order to focus on topics of most significance or where the greatest risk is believed to be. As far as scheduling of inspections is concerned, ENEC keeps FANR informed on its construction schedule and FANR plans its work accordingly.

Given that certain inspection targets are not possible to see when construction is complete, FANR inspectors are at time deployed inspect during the development of various milestones. In addition to FANR's own capabilities, they also leverage in house experienced Korean regulators to assist in on-going inspections.

A major topic addressed in the briefing by FANR was the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant licensing and inspection status. In the context of the granting of the Construction License (CL), ENEC undertook commitments for follow-up submissions. Revision three of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR), revision one of the Fukushima Lessons Learned Report and revision two of the Severe Accident Analysis Report (SAAR) have been submitted and are being evaluated by FANR. There are a total of 40 detailed technical submittals that are scheduled to be presented.

FANR is now also beginning to make necessary preparations for the Operations Phase. A long lead time analysis is currently underway to analyze regulatory requirements for the operating license application as well as requirements for safety in operation. The ENEC operator training program is under review by FANR and the full scope for the main control room simulator is expected to be installed by the end of 2013.

FANR completed its assessment of ENEC's overall performance in 2012. The objectives of the assessment was to review the licensee's overall effectiveness in managing safety and to identify any possible areas of systematic weakness. The results were that ENEC's overall effectiveness in managing safety was acceptable with no significant performance issues identified. FANR did say however that ENEC should put a stronger emphasis on oversight of the management of procurement. Also, a document was delivered to ENEC in December setting forth an integrated plan which will cover the pre-planned inspections in 2013.

Extensive discussions amongst the Board on design requirements applicable to severe accidents ensued. These requirements are contained in FANR-REG-03 titled "Regulation for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants". The regulation requires in applicable parts of the plant that design activities should take into account the following, among other things:

• Provisions for combustible gas control.
• Provisions for mitigation of molten core debris and concrete interaction.
• Provision to prevent and mitigate high pressure core melt ejection from the reactor pressure vessel.
• Provisions to prevent early containment failure under severe accident conditions.
• The establishment of accident management procedures.
• Measures to reduce the likelihood of certain scenarios, which could be leading contributors to severe accidents.

ENEC submitted the SAAR in June, 2011 providing a more detailed description of the severe accident analysis that had been briefly summarized in PSAR. FANR required ENEC to submit a comprehensive revision of the SAAR within six months of approval of the CL for Units 1 and 2. SAAR's second revision was submitted in March, 2013. It is currently under review by FANR and is applicable to both Barakah units 1 and 2 and Barakah units 3 and 4.

The design of Barakah NPP units 1 and 2 contains a number of features to prevent certain event sequences from progressing to severe accidents:

• Anticipated Transient without Scram:
  • provision of a diverse protection system to initiate scram and auxiliary feed-water.
• Mid Loop Operation:
  • diverse, accurate and redundant instrumentation.
  • design of shutdown cooling taking into account two independent and redundant suction lines and interchangeability of the containment spray pumps.
  • steam generator nozzle dam integrity.
  • alternative methods for water addition and decay heat removal.
• Station Blackout:
  • alternate AC diesel generator.
  • two turbine – driven auxiliary feed-water pumps.
• Fire Protection:
  • physical separation of redundant systems and components required for safe reactor shutdown and decay heat removal.
  • provision of fire protection features such as fire detection, automatic and manual fire suppression and fixed fire barriers.

In the discussion with the Board it was noted that there are three things that must be prevented: first, the escape of the molten core from reactor vessel; second, accumulation of hydrogen in amount that forms explosive concentration; and third to prevent major radioactive release from the reactor containment. If a reactor core meltdown can be delayed for at least 24 hours after the reactor shutdown then there is time for decay heat to decrease to a level that gives an opportunity to cool molten core adequately inside the reactor vessel and thus eliminate breach of the vessel bottom. Also, if the reactor containment integrity can be maintained for approximately 24 hours subsequent to potential severe damage on the reactor core, a significant share of the radioactive elements that initially were released to the air inside the containment have time to settle down and stick to the solid surfaces inside the containment.

Deploying more than one reactor at a particular site may increase the total risk of a severe reactor accident given the potential consequences to a national power system. Main accident risk does not arise from failure to shut down the reactor (i.e. to stop the chain reaction) – given that shut downs should happen automatically within a single reactor in the event of detection of an abnormal operational situation. Main risks come from the loss of reactor cooling function, and external hazards that may threaten simultaneously all reactors within a site.

The severe accident mitigation features for Barakah Units 1 and 2 are as follows:

• The containment design (large volume dry containment).
• A hydrogen recombination system (passive catalytic converters change any hydrogen that is produced back to water).
• A depressurization of the reactor coolant system ('primary cooling circuit').
• A cavity flooding system (the system uses gravity force and does not need electric power).
• The reactor cavity structure.
• An emergency containment spray backup system.

Based on the review of the first submissions on the Barakah severe accident design features, FANR staff found that the design of Barakah Units 1 and 2 met regulatory requirements. However, in the analysis of potential severe accident scenarios FANR identified a number of areas of improvement that warranted a comprehensive review of the SAAR. For example, there were quality issues where incorrect information or insufficient justification was provided in the submission and the containment performance analyses are done assuming a basaltic type of containment concrete while limestone is being used in construction at Barakah. This requires confirmatory analyses for limestone. In addition, ENEC has committed to a number of further design and procedural enhancements arising from the safety assessment of lessons learned from the Fukushima accident. FANR will continue to evaluate the revised SAAR and future, submissions to verify the strength of the Barakah NPP against severe, low-probability events.

The ENEC presentation was led by ENEC CEO Mohamed Al Hammadi accompanied by his senior officials.

ENEC noted that in March, 2013 it had submitted the Construction License Application (CLA) for Units 3 and 4. This submission is the result of 18 months of intensive work by ENEC and Korean Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), the Prime Contractor. This CLA is based on the comparable CLA for Units 1 and 2 and the safety analyses completed by KEPCO's Shin Kori Units 3 and 4 in Korea which are the reference plants for the UAE program. The 10,000 page application for Barakah Units 3 and 4 includes the PSAR, the SAAR, a Probalistic Risk Assessment report, an independent safety verification report (required by FANR), a preliminary Safeguard plan, the ENEC Quality Assurance Manual, and the PPP for Units 3 and 4.

In March 2013, ENEC completed installation of the containment liner plate in the Reactor Containment Building (RCB) for Barakah Unit 1. With this installation ENEC and KEPCO remain on track to deliver the country's first nuclear reactor, Barakah Unit 1, in 2017. Subject to regulatory approval, it is anticipated that the Reactor Vessel will be moved into the RCB in 2014. In April 2013, the first nuclear safety concrete was poured for Barakah Unit 2, which marks the official construction start for the UAE's second nuclear power reactor. It is expected to come on line by 2018. Regarding the public support for nuclear power in the UAE, ENEC reported that it has continued to grow.

ENEC provided the Board with an update on the project's financing which specified that external debt (the Korean Export – Import Bank, the U.S. Export – Import Bank and commercial lenders) remains in accordance with the equity structure and commercial risk allocation concluded in 2012 and that ENEC was working towards completing the agreement.

Afterwards, the discussion turned to a report on the evolution of operational readiness and the plans to establish an operational company to operate the Barakah plants. As previously reported the central goals of the organization are: recognized industry leadership in safety performance; reliability of greater than 90%; Emiratization of greater than 60% and development of the Western Region of the UAE; and real shareholder value based on cost effective operation. Global best practices will be pursued, and due account will be taken of the contribution of expatriates. In terms of preparing the infrastructure for operational readiness:

• A mature culture of safety has been developed;
• Significant staff has been hired, trained and certified;
• Relevant policies and procedures have been implemented;
• Significant facilities, equipment and systems have been acquired to support start up testing, commissioning and long term operation and maintenance;
• The necessary licenses, permits and authorizations have been obtained; and;
• Independent readiness reviews have been completed.

The operating model of the operational company will reflect its unique cultural mix. The operational company will be an operating utility company inspired in a general sense by the global best practices in nuclear operations. The operational company has already purchased the Korean software system which is integrated and highly customized. The Operating Model will pull together key elements of business design into one document which will be adapted to the company's circumstances. It will include:

• Strategic Vision – Why are we doing this?
• Scope and Assumptions – What is the extent of the challenge?
• Core Value Chain – What must the operational company do?
• Organizational Structure – Who is accountable for what?
• Functional Strategies – How will it be driven?
• High Level Processes – What is to be done, where and by when?
• Systems and Data – How will it be enabled?
• Values and Behavior – What is important to us?
• Strategic Milestones – When must each piece be in place?
• Benefits Realization – What must it deliver?

ENEC should have answers to all questions at the next Board meeting and the Board looks forward to that briefing.

In addition, Dr. KunMo Chung discussed the importance of – Configuration Management (CM) - The process of identifying and documenting the characteristics of a facility's structures, systems and components (including computer systems and software), and of ensuring that changes to these characteristics are properly developed, assessed, approved, issued, implemented, verified, recorded and incorporated into the facility documentation (IAEA TECDOC-1335).

CM is now one of the essential regulatory requirements specified directly or indirectly by almost all nuclear regulatory agencies in the world. Notwithstanding the regulators' positions, any modern day nuclear power plant operators are required to develop a Configuration Management Program (CMP) to support and ensure the committed principles; safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency, and sustainability. CM also enhances the economics of NPP operation and maintenance.

A CMP shall be used to ensure that documentation defining the design basis, the technical baselines, the actual configuration of the Unit's structures, systems and components, the Unit's construction, operating and maintenance procedures, and all relevant support activities, regardless of discipline or source, are accessible, transparent and traceable over the whole lifetime of the Unit.

The Board wishes to have an ENEC report regarding the roadmap to develop the CMP which should be operational before the commercial operation of Barakah Plant 1 & 2.

With respect to the national UAE Waste Management Strategy (referred to as the National Radiological Waste Management System – NRWMS) which is under development, Ambassador Al Kaabi explained that the NRWMS will assign responsibility for nuclear wastes at all times. Waste ownership will be with the waste producers who are the operators as long as waste is in the various on-site storage facilities. Ownership, however, will be transferred to a Waste Management Organization as stipulated in the Nuclear Law, a national government entity, at the time nuclear waste is removed from on-site storage at the nuclear power plants and placed into the transport system route to the centralized storage facility for final disposal.

On waste storage ENEC described its role in the joint project with MOFA and FANR which began in 2011: providing input data to the project; reviewing individual tasks for the project; and continuously providing comments as necessary. The project concluded in 2012 with recommendations for the UAE to consider. ENEC in the meantime has initiated a project to ensure a sufficient allocation of space at the Barakah site for the construction of a dry cask spent Fuel storage facility if needed in the future.

Security

Security assessment and recommendations

In its presentation FANR reported on the status of the Physical Protection Plan (PPP) for Barakah NPP. Revision 1 of the PPP, submitted in August, 2011, which provides for an overview of the entire physical protection program for all three phases, including the operation phase, was approved as part of the CLA for Units 1 and 2. The PPP Construction Phase 1 (before the installation of any facilities important to safety) was submitted in December, 2011 and has been approved. The PPP Construction Phase 2 (before the first arrival of nuclear fuel) for Units 1 and 2 was submitted in April of this year. The PPP Construction Phase 1 as well as inspections which are scheduled for 2013 will focus on: the protection of sensitive nuclear information; access control and physical barriers; the Cyber Security Plan; and organization and training.

ENEC presented a briefing on the important subject of cyber security. The objective of the Barakah Cyber Security Plan is to protect critical plant systems from cyber security incidents and attacks and the plan is consistent with relevant FANR regulation.

The Cyber Security Plan will be agreed on in 2013 and gradually developed and intensified more and more as the arrival of nuclear fuel on site and through the operation phase approach.

FANR regulations require the development and implementation of a Cyber Security Plan as part of the PPP. A demonstration of a cyber-attack (hacking) was conducted in March of this year by a contractor. A joint ENEC and FANR Working Group has been established to discuss threat assessment; target sets identification and vulnerability assessment; and the schedule and content of the Cyber Security Plan.

Non-proliferation

Non - proliferation assessment and recommendations

Briefing on non-proliferation area was made by Ambassador Al Kaabi. The Chairman asked Ambassador Al Kaabi if he would describe the international group of ten countries which is actively supporting non-proliferation and disarmament initiatives that the UAE has joined. Ambassador Al Kaabi responded that the group was composed of countries that are especially interested in these issues which in addition to the UAE include: Chile, Mexico, Germany, Japan, Australia, Canada, Poland, Turkey, and Netherlands. Their central objective is to support the complete implementation of the action plan adopted at the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference which, among other things, emphasizes complete transparency in nuclear matters by the NPT nuclear weapon states. The Chairman asked about the 2010 Review Conference undertaking to hold a conference on the Middle East nuclear weapon free zone issue. Ambassador Al Kaabi noted that the Conference was not held as scheduled, and no new date is determined as of today. The failure to convene the conference led to much frustrations especially among Arab NPT members who are calling for a new date for the conference. The Group also supports, among other things, a Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty.

In October, 2013 the UAE will host an IAEA international conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.

Cooperation within the Gulf Cooperation Council on nuclear power issues, pursuant to UAE leadership continues to be robust. Led by the UAE the GCC commissioned a joint study on potential enhanced cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The study was completed in June, 2011 and it identified seven key areas for potential cooperation:

1. Legal Framework, Nuclear Liability and International Agreements.
2. Nuclear Regulation (Saudi Arabia is quite interested in this subject).
3. Plant Siting.
4. Training, R&D, Safety Culture and Human Resource Capacity Building.
5. Security of Fuel Supply.
6. Nuclear Waste Management.
7. Emergency Planning and Response, a regional plan for emergency preparedness and response which will include a detailed roadmap report and an emergency and preparedness response center will be created. Much effort will go into training. The IAEA will be engaged on the situation at the Bushehr plant in Iran which is located close to the GCC.

Following this, Ambassador Al Kaabi described the UAE relationship with the IAEA. The UAE joined the IAEA in 1976 and, until the commencement of the nuclear program, the work with the IAEA consisted primarily of small separated technical projects. Since the commencement of its peaceful nuclear energy program, the UAE has been fully engaged with the IAEA. The agency was consulted on the development of the national policy document on nuclear energy which began the program and there were multiple reviews of road map plans as well as consultation on draft nuclear legislation.

Today the relationship of the UAE with the IAEA with respect to the UAE nuclear program is characterized by: close cooperation in implementing international agreements; receiving assistance and advice from IAEA experts and requesting peer reviews; and close partnership with the IAEA in their work related to the UAE nuclear power program. As has been said many times the UAE wants its nuclear power program to be a model for the international community and this is part of that effort. There have been an increasing number of UAE participants in IAEA technical cooperation events. There were 111 in 2010 increasing to 440 in 2012 and the number of UAE national institutions participating increased over the same time period from six in 2010 to 30 in 2012. There also has been an intensive engagement by UAE personnel on IAEA committees, commissions and Working Groups with a special focus on activities related to the strengthening of nuclear safety and security.

In return the UAE has contributed to the IAEA active participation on its committees dealing with safety and security issues and the hosting of international conferences in 2010 and 2013.

Transparency

Transparency assessment and recommendations

Ambassador Al Kaabi noted in his presentation that five years had passed since the April 2008 policy announcement which marked the official start of the UAE nuclear power program. Since that time the UAE had undertaken many commitments related to the program and pursuant to these commitments: has adopted important legislation, has concluded all relevant international agreements, and is keeping nuclear power plant construction on schedule.

The UAE has joined all the relevant international agreements and is actively implementing them. Recently the UAE participated in the Fukushima Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety (December 2012) and in April, 2013 participated in the newly established Working Group on Transparency under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Bilateral Agreements for Nuclear Cooperation have been signed with Russia, Argentina and Japan. These bilateral agreements with responsible nations have played an instrumental role in securing nuclear fuel supply contracts.

The UAE will host the annual meeting of the Executive Committee of IFNEC (International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation – the successor to GNEP – chaired by the U.S. and Russia) in October, 2013. IFNEC has 30 member states and 30 observers. Among other things, it promotes comprehensive fuel services arrangements including fuel leasing, supports expansion of nuclear power in a safe and responsible manner and addresses issues such as funding to finance nuclear power, including waste management.

With respect to public outreach ENEC is continuing to conduct public forums, two in the first quarter of 2013 in the Western Region and in Dubai, and two anticipated in Abu Dhabi and in Ras Al Khaimah later in 2013.

The FANR public outreach meetings were highlighted, FANR emphasized that it has a policy to be entirely transparent to the public. Several Workshops with IAEA were noted along with the comment that this is the international side of transparency.

A research poll conducted by an independent market research company in March recorded 82% of the respondents supporting the UAE nuclear power program up from 66% a year previous.

Sustainability

Sustainability assessment and recommendations

ENEC addressed several disparate other subjects in its presentation.

The operational company will undertake best efforts to hire the best talent to conduct its operations. It will make sure that the concept of proper talent management is built into the way it does business.

An update on the Energy Pioneer Training program was given. ENEC currently offers a variety of training programs such as classroom training, on- the-job training in Korea, as well as an integrated systems course conducted at the Barakah site involving Emirati candidates. A Fundamentals examination was also given to prospective Senior Reactor Operators and reactor operators with very positive results. An assessment of the culture of safety at ENEC was accomplished in 2012 to follow up on the assessment completed in 2011. There was excellent staff participation – 75% of the staff. A high level of commitment to nuclear safety was exhibited with real advances over 2011. Some areas for improvement were identified and ENEC has already implemented an action plan to address these issues.

Capacity building is always an important subject. ENEC reported 630 total employees of whom 181 are females; 421 employees are Emiratis (66.8%) and 128 are female Emiratis (20.3%). Currently there are 257 scholarship students sponsored by ENEC: 158 for a Bachelor of Engineering, 92 for a Higher Diploma of Nuclear Technology and seven for a Master of Nuclear Engineering. 87 of the students pursuing a Bachelor of Engineering and two of the Master candidates are studying abroad, the remainder in the UAE. With respect to summer internships ENEC is planning for 30 of its scholarship students to spend two weeks in Korea under its Global Nuclear Leadership Program, two ENEC scholarship students are to spend eight weeks at CERN in Geneva, Switzerland and 36 high school students will also spend two weeks in Korea in an introductory course. The Emirati Plant Training/Qualification program (18-24 months in duration) currently has seven candidates training to be Senior Reactor Operators, 11 to be Reactor Operators, 13 to be Local Operators and 14 to be Maintenance Technicians. All will be receiving on-the-job training in Korea for five weeks as well as nuclear power plant systems training in the UAE for 10 weeks in the near future. The Board acknowledged ENEC's effort in the area of training and capacity building.

FANR also reported on its own capacity building program. The objectives of this program are: first, to ensure that all employees are skilled and competent by continuously providing relevant training and development solutions as well as career development programs; and second, to train and develop UAE nationals to acquire the knowledge and skill to effectively contribute to FANR core functions. The long term goal is to create a pool of young, technically competent, professionals integrated within the FANR structure. In the discussion the IAB emphasized that it is important to have a continuously operating program to transfer knowledge to the younger UAE generation. It is also necessary to attempt to minimize the risk of knowledge loss due to mobility of employees; both with respect to UAE nationals as well as international employees.

Conclusion

As is its practice the Board conducted a two-hour private discussion at the conclusion of the various presentations. The Board very much appreciates the thoroughness, frankness and professional competence displayed in these briefings. Looking ahead to the next IAB meeting in the Fall the Board hopes that another visit to the Barakah site can be arranged. The Board at the next meeting would like to hear more on cyber security, training and retention of personnel, and further outcomes of reviews related to lessons of Fukushima Daiichi accident. The Board also looks forward to the answers to the questions posed by ENEC with respect to the operational company.

Another topic proposed for discussion in the next meeting was the possible spin offs – physical and intellectual – of nuclear power to other industries and what are the infrastructure costs of nuclear power plants elsewhere.

With respect to waste management the issue of liability versus ownership for ENEC is of interest to the Board and the Board would also like to know what IFNEC is doing currently on the waste management issue.

A subject of interest to the Board that came up in the discussion was the UAE policy concerning the availability of information to the general public on accident progression and on actual or predicted radioactive releases to the environment and also more generally the plans for public protection measures outside the nuclear power plant site.

The Board also conducted another discussion of Fukushima, this time brief, noting again how this accident underscored the importance of clear lines of command in running nuclear power stations and the imperative of ensuring that in serious accident situations ultimate authority for decisions taken must lie with the operator and not the government. This should include evacuation decisions and any relevant food restrictions as well as technical decisions. The Board wanted its thoughts along these lines again to be placed in one of its public reports, given their importance.

Again the IAB commends MOFA, FANR and ENEC, for outstanding presentations and finds the UAE nuclear power program firmly committed to the principles of safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency and sustainability.

 

Chairman's Preface

This report covers the first step towards the implementation of the UAE program as ENEC received their construction license. I would like to congratulate ENEC and the UAE government on the wonderful news! I would also like to express my gratitude and appreciation for the tremendous effort put by FANR to review and assess the construction license application.

For our next meeting, the Board would like to hear more about severe accident management, cyber security, waste storage, sustainability/personnel issues and the joint venture operating company.

Finally, I thank the UAE and all the supporting entities for their success and for the progress in the nuclear program.

 

Safety

The sixth meeting of the International Advisory Board (IAB) for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) nuclear power program was held in Abu Dhabi on October 15th and 16th, 2012. The IAB Chairman, Dr. Hans Blix presided and all other members of the Board were present. The Board meeting was convened by the Chairman on the 15th of October 2012.

The Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulations (FANR) Director General, Dr. William Travers, along with other senior officials, briefed the board on the major areas regarding the UAE nuclear power program. The major topics discussed included the plant's construction license, which in July, 2012 granted the operator Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) to pour of the first concrete for Barakah Unit 1 reactor building on schedule. Furthermore, FANR officials also briefed the Board on nuclear security, nonproliferation, emergency planning and waste management, capacity building and outreach to the public. Subsequent to FANR's briefing, Ambassador Hamad Al Kaabi followed by a briefing on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The subjects addressed by the Ambassador consisted of the implementation of relevant international agreements, progress on a national nuclear liability regime, and the national strategy for nuclear waste management.

The following day, the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) presented to the Board a comprehensive briefing, which consisted of an overview of the nuclear program, including a discussion on the programs' project management and oversight, offsite power and the electrical grid, fuel cycle update, cyber security and the contemplated reactor operating ENEC subsidiary, as well as the current status of human resources. Afterwards, the Critical Infrastructure and Coastal Protection Authority (CICPA)* conducted a presentation on physical security. This briefing was then followed by an internal Board discussion.

In its internal discussion the IAB noted that the UAE is the only "new entrant country" that has made concrete progress in starting construction on a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) since the expectations on a "nuclear renaissance" prompted tens of countries to indicate similar intentions. The approach taken by the UAE on how it prepared and announced its plans from the early beginning is proving to be a good model for other nations to emulate when pursuing a new nuclear power program.

The most important factor behind the UAE's success thus far has been the firm commitment taken by the UAE Government to establish a solid national infrastructure, which is regarded as the top prerequisite for utilizing peaceful nuclear power. The infrastructure has been built in a manner that follows the advice given within the IAEA guidelines for new entrant nuclear countries.

The approach of recruiting experienced foreign experts to hold responsible positions in all relevant organizations, while in parallel strongly promoting the rapid build-up of competence among young Emirati nationals has turned out to be the optimal choice for ensuring both rapid and sustainable development of the program. The IAB noted that the UAE is already considered an intelligent customer and is able to clearly communicate its expectations to the Korean supplier, and to verify the quality of engineering and manufacturing of the plant systems and its structures and components. It is also important that the Emirati experts have brought specific local environmental conditions to the attention of the Korean designers so that proper differences between the original APR-1400 design and the UAE design can be provided.

 

Safety assessment and recommendations

The Construction License of Barakah Units 1 and 2

On July 17, 2012, FANR Board of Management decided to empower the Director General to issue a license authorizing ENEC to carry out the construction of Barakah Units 1 and 2 as well as other related regulated activities. The Director General issued the construction license on the same day. Several conditions were set forth in the license:

• Compliance with the law, regulations and the application
• Fulfillment of all commitments made by ENEC during the process
• Reporting of all modifications and unplanned events
• Compliance with requirements for the import of components for reactors 1 and 2

Construction activities at Barakah Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) involve the utilization of nuclear related items that are subject to international export control regimes. Section 4 of the Construction License contains provisions that allow FANR to verify meeting those conditions of supply and the international obligations related to such nuclear related items:

• IAEA full scope safeguards
• Provisions of information to FANR regarding each transfer and subsequent FANR authorization of transfer
• Compliance with Federal Law No. 14 of 2007 (as amended) concerning commodities subject to import and export control

Conditional acceptance provisions of the Construction License require follow up action by ENEC consisting of additional submissions to the Preliminary Safety Assessment Report (PSAR), as necessary to confirm that all technical solutions meet FANR requirements. They can be briefly described as follows:

• PSAR Revision 3, changes proposed as mark ups during the review before issuing the Construction License; FANR will review the PSAR revisions to ensure correct implementation of changes;

1. Conditional acceptances of solutions resulting in deferred submittals involving the Probalistic Risk Assessment (PRA), the Severe Accident Analysis Report, and other technical topics.
2. Fukushima issues, follow up submittals arising from the review of the Fukushima Lessons Learned Report. FANR will review these additional submittals, including the IAEA action plan and the IAEA comprehensive report on the Fukushima accident ,to be finalized in 2014.
3. FSAR / Operating License application, some information was deferred to the Operating License application.
4. The Construction License application included an application letter and four enclosures. The key portion was the PSAR, which was 9000 pages with 21 chapters covering safety. Other enclosures addressed safeguards including a preliminary safeguards plan, physical protection including the physical protection plan for construction, and the Severe Accident Analysis.

The FANR staff together with its contract consultants conducted a thorough review and assessment of the Construction License application. The outcome of the review was that the information submitted by ENEC was sufficient to demonstrate that the proposed Barakah 1 and 2 facility complies with FANR regulations, and satisfies the relevant principles, objectives and criteria for safety, radiation protection, nuclear security and also non-proliferation requirements included within the law. On this basis, FANR's team recommended that the FANR Board approve the issuance of the construction license for Barakah Units 1 and 2 to ENEC.

According to the IAB members, the Safety Evaluation Report written by FANR to support the decision on the Construction License is a remarkable document. It includes a section of background information on the nuclear energy program in the UAE and the regulatory framework as well as a section on licensing review methodology. The summary of the review findings and conclusions includes chapters on: site characteristics, design of structures, components, equipment and systems, the reactor, engineered safety features, the initial test program, radioactive waste management and a number of additional subjects. Moreover, the report included assessments of the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), and the Severe Accident and Aircraft Impact Assessments. The Fukushima Lessons Learned Report and supporting documents were also provided in the report.

The Safety Evaluation Report Summary sets forth the UAE's national policy for the development of peaceful nuclear energy in a manner that bears reiterating here. The following national commitments are made with respect to the peaceful power program:

• Complete operational transparency
• Pursuance of the highest standards of non-proliferationPursuance of the highest standards of safety and security
• Conformance to IAEA standards in evaluating and potentially establishing a peaceful nuclear energy program
• Development of peaceful domestic nuclear power capability in partnership with the governments and firms of responsible nations, as well as with the assistance of appropriate expert organizations
• Assurance that the peaceful domestic power program is developed in a manner that best assures long-term sustainability

FANR emphasized during their briefings to the Board the following subject areas of the Safety Evaluation Report:

• Reference facility
• Site
• Facility design
• Radioactive waste
• Radiation protection
• Safety analysis
• Management Systems and Quality Assurance
• Construction inspection and Test Plan
• Safeguards
• Physical Protection and Aircraft Impact Assessment
• Use of Operational Experience

FANR highlighted that the Barakah site differs from that of the reference facility of Shin Kori in Korea due to specific site conditions include very high ambient air and water temperatures and dust / sand storms. Such changes have been taken into account and tailored within the Barakah design features. Therefore FANR could conclude that the site is suitable for use as a location for the nuclear facility, has been properly characterized in relevant documents, and complies with FANR regulations and IAEA standards for deployment of a nuclear facility. FANR also noted the additional studies that will be conducted by ENEC during the construction phase including seismic analysis reports (soil structure interaction), stability studies of the offsite power system, and flooding analysis related to equipment and drainage.

With respect to radioactive waste / radiation protection FANR noted the additional low and medium level radioactive waste building and found that offsite doses to individuals are expected to be a small fraction of the approved limit, and the dose to plant operators is estimated to be acceptably low. With regards to the safety analysis, FANR noted that the Shin Kori's 3 and 4 Preliminary Safety Assessment Report (PSAR) did not contain a Severe Accident Analysis or a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), while the Barakah PSAR does include a PRA. FANR concluded that the ability of the plant to mitigate the consequences from design basis accidents has been demonstrated before and that the severe accident analysis adequately supports the relevant accident management strategy for such mitigation.

FANR stated in its report that the ENEC management system conforms to FANR's regulations and the IAEA standards and that an acceptable management system and quality assurance program will be evaluated for construction and commissioning activities prior to the first fuel load of the plant.

In the conclusion of the Safety Evaluation Report, FANR's officials determined that the information submitted by ENEC was sufficient to support the issuance of a construction license and that it complies with FANR's regulations and provisions of the law relating to safety, radiation protection, nuclear security and nonproliferation.

A key reference in FANR's report summary that caught the attention of the Board was regarding Severe Accident and Aircraft Impact Assessment. The reference states that: "During the review, FANR staff identified a number of deficiencies in relevant subsections of the submitted PSAR and severe accident analysis results that include incomplete demonstration of validation and verification of the computer code(s) used and inconsistent data and missing information with respect to the parameters of interest for the event (severe accident), and incomplete technical justifications for assumptions applied in some of the analyses.

In the course of the review, the applicant notified FANR of a design departure from the reference plant design in relation to a change of the concrete material for the containment structure; this resulted in changes to the analysis of containment performance with incomplete supporting evidence for such changes. The applicant has committed to address these deficiencies by revising the Severe Accident Analysis Report in a schedule agreed to by FANR. The Board was informed by FANR staff that this involved computer modeling of severe accidents. A different computer code had previously been used in Korea which produced a different outcome for the UAE.

During discussions, the Board emphasized that, in order to ensure the elimination of significant radiological leaks to the environment, it is important to consider separately each known physical phenomena that could threaten the reactor containment's integrity after a severe reactor core accident. This generally requires implementation of dedicated safety systems or passive features that provide protection against such threats. A list of threats that is generally considered comprehensive for current NPP types (light water reactors) was generated in connection with the safety re-assessment following the Fukushima Daiichi accident. Such a list can be found in the report issued jointly by the European nuclear regulators (http://www.ensreg.eu/EU-Stress-Tests/EU-level-Reports ).

The Board would appreciate a presentation from FANR in the next meeting on how the Barakah plant is protected against such phenomena as:

• Reactor core melting in high pressure
• Hydrogen explosion inside the reactor containment
• High overpressure inside the reactor containment
• Molten core interaction with the reactor containment structures
• Chain reaction in the molten core material

In the Barakah plant design, it is postulated that the molten core can be cooled inside the reactor vessel by providing external vessel cooling, and thus there is no need to consider molten core interaction with the reactor containment structures. However, the feasibility of such cooling depends on the progress of the accident: if the core does not melt within a day following a reactor shutdown (and the amount of decay heat has respectively decreased), the external cooling may be adequate. In accident scenarios progressing at a faster pace, it would not be possible to demonstrate successfulness from an external cooling approach. In such cases, an important issue for environmental consequences is whether the containment's integrity can be upheld till significant spreading of radioactive material to the containment's atmosphere has stopped and most of the radioactivity has settled on surfaces within the containment. The Board would like to hear more about this subject at the April, 2013 meeting.

ENEC Program Overview

Following an 18-month review, on July 17, 2012 FANR approved the Construction License for Barakah Units 1 and 2. On July 18 , 2012 ENEC poured the first concrete for the reactor building basemat at Barakah 1. However, on July 19, 2012 ENEC discovered that KEPCO had given ad hoc direction on the pouring grout of the concrete form instead of the specified structural concrete. The direction at the time of the pouring was granted because the specified concrete was too thick for the hot work conditions which did not allow the right flow to form. This caused a risk of concrete curing prematurely. Although the grout type in question could achieve the same strength levels as originally required this was not evaluated and proven in advance. On July 23, 2012 ENEC issued a "stop work order" and began investigations into the cement situation.

Following a six weeks review, it was concluded that the optimal approach to avoid future concerns was to remove the grout completely (about 100 cubic meters in total) and make a new concrete casting. The methodology for removing the grout, called "water cutting", is known to be well applicable for such purposes because if done correctly it does not cause damage to the steel rebars and also provides a good base for the joints between old and new concrete to pour. The repair was completed successfully in four weeks and no concerns remain on the final quality of the basemat. The incident did not cause any delays to the Barakah unit 1 main schedule since work was already ahead of schedule.

The cement basemat incident turned out to be an important lesson to all parties involved in the Barakah construction. It demonstrated the safety culture expected by the ENEC management and the importance of following the approved plans. ENEC also emphasized to KEPCO that quality must come before schedule. According to the staff from the construction site management, the team spirit and commitment towards achieving the highest possible standards of safety and quality increased among the workers as a consequence of the incident.

An additional measure being taken by ENEC for all future concrete placements is to have experts from four different teams present to observe the work in progress: Construction, Civil Engineering, Quality Assurance and Safety.

Given the importance of safety culture, the Board stressed that, it is expected from all stakeholders and employees to establish and maintain work environments in which employees may feel free to raise safety concerns without any fear of retaliation. The cement basemat lesson is a good example to share among related entities of the nuclear program, to preserve a positive safety culture. ENEC remains committed to improve its performance based on the lessons learned during the course of the project. The IAB highlighted that significant improvement in communication within the project and involved stakeholders has been noticeable following the management teams relocation to the site about nine months ago.

On August 15, 2012 following a year-long nuclear fuel tender, ENEC announced the awarding of Enriched Uranium Product supply contracts to six international firms for the plants first 15 years of operations. The firms are: Converdyn (United States); Uranium One (Canada); URENCO (United Kingdom); RioTinto (United Kingdom); TENEX (Russia); and AREVA (France). Mr. Jacques Bouchard noted that the program will have a large capacity for fresh fuel storage. He suggested that later the UAE might want to consider building a fuel fabrication facility. ENEC replied that there is no intention to consider a fuel fabrication facility at this stage. On September 6th, the U.S. Export-Import Bank approved a 2 billion dollar loan to an ENEC subsidiary to support the purchase of equipment, services and training from Westinghouse Electric Company.

The next step for ENEC will be the issuance of the construction licenses for Units 3 and 4 from the regulator. Focus will be spent on industrial safety, cultural issues and ensuring correct communication over language barriers.

There are now 141 staff members involved in project management and oversight of the projects. They are covering various functions which include the prime contract office, health, safety and environment, construction, quality surveillance, and engineering services. Six highly skilled members have also recently arrived from South Korea to facilitate and support at Barakah. Furthermore, the program's office in South Korea has also expanded as well. Management and oversight staff is expected to grow even further once Units 3 and 4 begin construction.

While, the overall project's quality oversight is part of the subcontractor's contractual obligation (KEPCO), ENEC has been conducting independents reviews, surveillance and audits of all subcontractors involved to ensure that specific requirements for quality are met. It is also noteworthy that ENEC has developed its own capacity in the critical areas of the program such as the engineering organizations (plant designers) and manufacturers. This has in turn improved direct communication between the suppliers and ENEC which helps ENEC address any direct issues and concerns.

Configuration management is an important part of the project given that the prime contract is based on the reference plants, Shin Kori 3 and 4, as well as the Barakah site specific requirements to account for environmental differences. In applying system engineering principles to the project, there is a consistent emphasis on the inter-disciplinary review. ENEC and KEPCO continue to work closely to analyze the design work. While some design efforts use older 2D practices, ENEC and KEPCO are increasing the use of modern 3D practices.

ENEC is also responsible for any non-conformance contract issues and monitors the prime contractor and subcontractors. ENEC issues Deficiency Notification Reports (DNR) to stakeholders to identify any potential shortcomings in engineering. Furthermore, ENEC also issues DNRs for safety, environmental, training, qualifications, housekeeping, procedural and human performance issues. ENEC may also exercise its right to stop construction work when relevant standards are not achieved.

Offsite power generation and connection to the electric grid is an important safety issue. ENEC will comply with FANR regulations to meet with safety and security requirements.

As the power plants at BNPP are completed and become operational they will be operated by a new independent organization. ENEC is currently working on the structure of the operating company and the commercial rights to the plants. ENEC intends to remain the licensee, FANR has requested clarification of how ENEC will meet responsibilities for safety and the supply chain under this arrangement. Nuclear safety will be a fundamental principle for the operating company, as will as Emiratization. Goals of the operating company will include being an industry leader in safety performance, achieving a reliability factor of 90 percent, and ensuring that at least a level of 60 percent of the positions at the operating company are held by Emiratis. The fundamental objective is to be recognized as a top global nuclear utility pursuing continuous improvement with a strong safety culture. Industrial safety and radiological safety will be stressed and considerable attention will be paid to environmental issues.

The IAB Board wishes to stay fully informed on the business arrangements between the involved organizations. The Board stressed that it is important that those with ultimate responsibility for safety operations of the plant are in a position to verify the safety and quality of the plant during construction and to accumulate the knowledge required for operation and maintenance.

FANR Activities During Construction

FANR is continuing its inspection program of ENEC and the prime contractor; vendor inspection; and the construction site. Objectives include determining whether safety related facilities and equipment meet requirements; construction is consistent with regulatory requirements and that the facility can be operated in accordance with safety assumptions. FANR now has set up an office at the Barakah site. In 2012, FANR conducted 11 site inspections and plans to continue at a rate of two per month for the rest of 2012; three vendor inspections have been performed and more are planned at KEPCO the same year. Staff of the teams includes FANR inspectors, specialists and consultants as well as Korean observers.

Lastly on safety, as has been reported to the Board before, at the request of the government of the UAE, an IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission was conducted from December 5th to 14th, 2011 to assess the nuclear safety regulation in the UAE. The IRRS team identified 18 recommendations, 39 suggestions as well as eight good practices. Overall, it was a very positive report. An example of a recommendation was more cooperation with other governments on emergency planning. FANR informed the Board that it plans to fully implement all recommendations and suggestions by the end of 2013.

Security

Security assessment and recommendations

A third amendment to the Limited Construction License was issued by FANR on May 8, 2012 which included the approval of the Physical Protection Plan (PPP) construction for phase 1 (before the installation of any items important to safety). First revision of the PPP provided an overview of the entire Physical Protection Program for the three phases defined (construction phase 1, construction phase 2 [before the first arrival of nuclear fuel on site], and operation phase.) Revision 1 of the PPP demonstrates a sufficient security basis for issuing a construction license and complies with FANR – REG-08 on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities. ENEC will be conducting further studies and analyses during the construction phases, CICPA has conducted targets set analysis and vulnerability assessment. The PSAR regarding aircraft impact has concluded that reasonable assurance exists that the facility will resist the impact of an aircraft and prevent the release of radioactive material, and that adequate containment following such an impact exists. FANR-REG-08 requires sensitive nuclear information to be protected against disclosure. An Information Protection Program Operating Manual has been developed and provided to ENEC by FANR.

CICPA presented a briefing as the competent authority for the country providing security for all critical infrastructure in the interest of national security. CICPA described in depth the strategy for physical security and defense. For security during the construction phase, CICPA has implemented a stringent security environment at the site. CICPA is also developing the design criteria for physical security protection measures and strategies for construction phase 2 and operations. ENEC will design the protection measures and technology, with CICPA's approval, consistent with the Department of Energy (DOE) vulnerability assessment process conducted by CICPA. CICPA continues the training of their security forces who will be responsible for the protection of the Barakah site utilizing the DOE National Training Center curriculum and facilities. CICPA will provide security through all phases of construction and operations.

Cyber Security

FANR-REG-08 also requires the development and implementation of a cyber-security plan. ENEC proposed the following milestones:

• Technical evaluation criteria, April 2012
• Cyber security plan, May 2013
• Cyber security implementation plan, July 2013.

ENEC presented a briefing on this subject to the Board at this meeting.

As an example of continuous enhancement of cyber security, ENEC discussed in its briefing the measures taken following the appearance of the Shamoon computer virus in August, 2012. The Shamoon virus was designed to steal data and cripple the victim's computer. It is unsophisticated and highly destructive. The brief from ENEC also, discussed Stuxnet, a computer worm designed to spy on and then destroy industrial systems. Flame, perhaps the most sophisticated of such software viruses ever created and a follow on to Stuxnet, was also discussed. ENEC is creating a cyber-security and safety culture, in which personnel are trained on how the Shamoon and other viruses works. Updated monitoring tools and the latest anti-virus systems were made available. The Board noted that this subject must be a permanent agenda item.

Also, CICPA included information on cyber security in its briefing. Although ENEC has the primary responsibility, the organization will continue to work closely with ENEC and FANR.

Non-proliferation

Non - proliferation assessment and recommendations

International and Bilateral Agreements

Ambassador Hamad Al Kaabi, speaking on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) led the presentation on non-proliferation and other international and bilateral agreements:

• The NPT Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and the Additional Protocol: Safeguards and Additional Protocol regulations have been issued by the FANR Board of Management and full implementation is currently underway
• The UAE successfully participated in the May review conference on the IAEA Joint Convention on Spent Fuel Management
• The UAE successfully participated in the Extraordinary Review Meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety in August 2012 which included the submission of a second detailed national report
• The UAE signed an Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan with the IAEA in September 2012 pursuant to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
• New bi-lateral agreements for nuclear cooperation have been signed with Canada and Australia and an agreement with Russia will be signed soon
• A joint GCC working group on nuclear emergency planning is underway.

In addition, the UAE deposited instruments of accession to join the 1997 Vienna Convention on national nuclear liability and the Joint Protocol. The international Protocol to amend the 1997 Vienna Convention entered into force on August 29, 2012 and the Joint Protocol on the application of the Convention will enter into force for the UAE on November 29, 2012. The UAE federal law concerning civil liability for nuclear damage, fully endorsed by the IAEA is now in force. It provides for the exclusive liability of the operator with a financial cap for liability with respect to any incident.

FANR made a short presentation on NPT Safeguards. It stated that the first consolidated inventory report on nuclear material was provided to the IAEA in April, 2012, that provided information as of December 31, 2011. The annual Additional Protocol update declaration was also submitted to the IAEA in April 2012.

Progress in Plans Concerning Spent Nuclear Fuel and Radioactive Waste Management

Ambassador Al Kaabi briefed the Board on spent nuclear fuel and waste management plans.

A comprehensive National Strategy for the Safe Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Radioactive Wastes in the UAE strategy is under development to accommodate all radioactive wastes arising in the UAE. It will be consistent with the national nuclear energy policy and will be made available to the public after endorsement by the government in accordance with the UAE policy on transparency. The strategy chosen will strike a balance between a concrete planning base while maintaining alternative options open.

The Federal law of 2009 states that FANR will be responsible for issuing licenses for regulated radioactive materials and that the Government shall issue the policy for long-term management of nuclear waste. Key factors which will influence strategy are: fuel cycle choices (fuel leasing, direct disposal or reprocessing); technologies that are foreseen; where the waste management facilities might be located; and by what dates activities must be initiated. A Waste Management Roadmap will be relied upon and a set of actions that need to be initiated will be identified. The per unit waste production over 60 years is projected to be: 430 cubic meters verified for high level waste; 4,655 cubic meters for intermediate level operational waste and 4,340 cubic meters of low level operational waste.

Four types of scenarios are contemplated: a "central" group of domestic scenarios - waste disposal facilities located within the UAE but away from NPP sites; a "NPP" group of domestic scenarios – waste disposal sites co-located at one or more NPP sites; an "external services" group – spent fuel is either reprocessed in another country or returned to a leasing county; a "sharing" group – some waste management facilities are shared with neighboring countries within GCC area. With respect to external services, the fuel leasing scenario is an attractive option to be kept open.Leasing is preferable since the spent fuel would not remain in the UAE for the long term. The less desirable approach would be reprocessing the spent fuel in another country and returning to the UAE of some of the waste for long term storage.While the least attractive scenario would be reprocessing in another country with shipping of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel to the UAE.

Safety and security will be the prime concerns of the National Radiological Waste Management System (NRWMS). The NRWMS will ensure that the UAE meets its international obligations for the safe and secure management of nuclear waste. There will be no reprocessing facilities within the UAE. The liability for managing nuclear wastes will be with the waste producers until disposal facilities are removed from institutional control and the responsibility is transferred to the government. The NRWMS once finalized will be sufficiently flexible to accommodate changes in the nuclear power program and fuel cycle policy. A roadmap will set forth the main activities and critical decision points of the NRWMS. Critical decision points for the first 15 to 20 years are identified. A dual track strategy will be pursued which will include timely national solutions while maintaining the option of regional solutions.

Some specific determinations that need to be addressed include: funding; fuel cycle choices; waste storage; geological disposal; and regional co-operation.

The Waste Management Roadmap once finalized will provide an identification of the main waste management activities and critical decisions with a suggested route through them that is linked to a feasible time schedule. The Waste Management Roadmap is expected to have the following structure:

• Early Period, a detailed roadmap for the next few years, before the first unit becomes operational and the first nuclear waste is generated, from the present through the end of 2016. There will be a detailed decision map for this period.
• A less detailed roadmap for the period 2017-2025, an approximate period over which an eight unit NPP program could be made operational.
• A general discussion of the period beyond 2025, with somewhat more detail of the 2025 to 2030 time period.

ENEC briefed the Board on its own plans for management of radioactive waste as part of operational activities. It noted that Shin Kori practices and processes will be implemented for waste pretreatment. For treatment and conditioning, ENEC will meet the UAE national policy by following FANR's regulations and requirements. As for the development of a UAE national waste policy, ENEC is working closely with MOFA and Ambassador Al Kaabi.
The Board expresses its appreciation for such a detailed presentation on nuclear waste storage. While this discussion has been comprehensive, the Board nevertheless wants this subject to also be a permanent agenda item, in addition to cyber security and sustainability issues, so as to review appropriate updates. ENEC could benefit by performing an in-depth comparative analysis of its fuel and waste management policy with the evolving Korean policy in this important area.

Transparency

Transparency assessment and recommendations

An important part of the national nuclear policy of the UAE is comprehensive operational transparency. FANR of course recognizes transparency as a core value. FANR held its first public forum in Madinat Zayed in the western region of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. The objective of FANR's public forms is to engage with the public and ensure complete transparency through communication. The next public forums are planned for the town of Ghayathi, also in the western region of Abu Dhabi, then in the city of Abu Dhabi, followed by a presentation in Al Ain. In addition several "Meet the Regulator" workshops were held in Abu Dhabi and Dubai in November 2012.

Sustainability

Sustainability assessment and recommendations

The workforce at FANR is projected by the end of 2012 to be around160 highly skilled individuals; of these 53% will be Emiratis. The remainder, emphasizing the global nature of the UAE nuclear power program, is composed of 23 different nationalities. Furthermore, there are 28 females in administration, representing 34 percent, and 25 in operations, representing 21 percent.

Capacity building at FANR is intended to provide long term sustainability required for FANR; to ensure that all FANR employees are skilled and competent by offering continual training and development opportunities; and to train and develop UAE nationals to effectively contribute to the core functions of FANR. One example there is an Inspector Qualification Programme which includes three weeks of intensive training and a Nuclear Assessor Qualification Programme. In 2012, there were a considerable number of capacity building events such as a workshop on Nuclear Safeguards and Security training, a workshop in Radioactive Waste Management, a workshop on Additional Protocol Training as well as a workshop on Oversight of NPP Construction.

ENEC staffing is now at around 500 of which 65% are UAE nationals. 30% percent of the workforce is female. There is an 18-24 months operational training course for Emiratis which includes 9 to 15 months in Korea. Fifty trainees are currently enrolled in this program. Furthermore, there is a second class of trainees participating in the senior reactor operator training course at Westinghouse.

This four-month course includes three months of simulator training. The scholarship program sponsored by ENEC has 123 students pursuing a Bachelor of Engineering, 42 pursuing a higher diploma in nuclear technology, and eight in a Master degree program of nuclear engineering as of September, 2012. The number of ENEC sponsored students studying abroad is 70 in the Bachelor of engineering program and two studying a Master's program. Most students are studying in American universities such as North Carolina State, Oregon State and Texas A&M. Several students are also pursing their degrees in the United Kingdom at the University of Manchester and the Imperial College of London.

At the conclusion of the meeting, as is its practice, the Board conducted a final internal discussion. The IAB firmly believed that its Report should emphasize a global view of the UAE program, its contribution to the world community, and the leadership in energy policy that the UAE is demonstrating. It was also noted that the so called "gold standard" designation which many around the world have coined the UAE program as is much more than just the commitment to forego national enrichment and reprocessing. Rather, it should be viewed as an overall commitment to excellence. The IAB stated that no other county has interpreted what is required in a nuclear power program as the UAE. The Board also specified that the UAE has been building its peaceful nuclear program with the support of extremely qualified and experienced experts from all over the world while simultaneously training its own nationals. The UAE continuously sends its own staff to vendors and other relevant manufacturing entities. The nuclear program of the UAE involves many countries, cultures, languages, with safety always coming first.

For the next meeting and as stated in the Report, the IAB would like to hear more about severe accident management, cyber security, waste storage, sustainability/personnel issues, and the joint venture operating company. The next IAB meeting was agreed to be held on April 21, 2013. Once again the Board thanks the UAE and all the supporting entities for an outstanding meeting and congratulates the UAE for its world leading continued success and progress.

Chairman's Preface

I would like to express my sincere regrets that medical reasons prevented me from attending and chairing the International Advisory Board (IAB) fifth meeting. Also, I would like to thank Ambassador Thomas Graham who chaired the fifth meeting on my behalf and drafted the report in agreement with me and the other members of the IAB. This is the fifth report on the development of the United Arab Emirates' Nuclear Power Program that will provide an overview of the UAE lessons learned from the Fukushima accident as well as the development of the Construction License.

I am also grateful for the UAE entities who did an outstanding job in addressing the members' concerns and recommendations. I would like to thank all of the members for the efforts put to develop this report. I look forward to attending the sixth IAB meeting and witness the development of the UAE program.

 

Safety

The fifth meeting of the International Advisory Board (IAB) for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) nuclear power program was held in Abu Dhabi on March 4th and 5th, 2012.  The Chairman Dr. Hans Blix was ill and was unable to attend.  All other members of the Board were present.  In the absence of Dr. Blix, Ambassador Thomas Graham chaired the meeting.  The Board meeting was opened by the Acting Chairman in the early evening of March 4th.  As has become the regular pattern, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR) presented briefings that evening with the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), Khalifa University (KA) and the Critical National Infrastructure Authority (CNIA) presenting their briefings the following day.  These briefings covered many subjects but two issues dominated the proceedings: 

1. The status of the application for the construction license being intensely reviewed by FANR, and
2. The comprehensive Safety Assessment Report for Barakah Nuclear Power Plants (on Lessons Learned from Fukushima Accident) prepared by ENEC – and briefed by both ENEC and FANR - pursuant to the request from FANR of March 30, 2011 with a further update request on July 4,2011.

The Board once again emphasized the significance of the UAE nuclear program to the world energy outlook and the international community as it has in previous sessions.  Dr. KunMo Chung provided some remarks regarding the program's importance and the degree to which it is recognized by the Republic of Korea (ROK). He stated: "The Barakah NPP is the first large scale commercial nuclear power plant project in the UAE.  This project is a major nuclear power project on which the entire world is focusing its attention.  Both ENEC and the Korean Electric Power Company Nuclear Group (KEPCO) are doing their best to make it an outstanding success. The UAE is the only newcomer country into nuclear power generation during the past three decades and the Republic of Korea (ROK) is a new exporting nation of nuclear power plants".

The Board praised the UAE nuclear entities for being responsive to the Board's inquiries and effectively addressing the initial issues that were raised during the previous Board meetings. These issues included: the development of the construction license, the lessons of Fukushima, cyber security, the threat of the impact of a large commercial airline, and the effect of sandstorms and dust storms.  While many important issues remain to be addressed, the request for briefings at the sixth meeting will reflect the progress that has been made so far.

 The MOFA briefing was conducted by Ambassador Hamad Al Kaabi via teleconference from Vienna.  Dr. William D Travers, the Director General of FANR accompanied by senior colleagues led the FANR presentation.  The ENEC CEO, Mr. Mohamed Al Hammadi, accompanied by the ENEC senior staff presented the ENEC briefing, which was followed by presentations by KUSTAR and CNIA.

 The UAE entities presenting collectively addressed throughout their briefings the five key areas of the IAB's primary responsibility and focus. These areas included: safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency and sustainability.  Significant emphasis was also placed during this meeting on the construction license and report on the Fukushima accident.  Following the Board's visit to the Barakah site during the fourth meeting, the Board felt that it has now gained a greater understanding of some of the key features of the site, and the progress made in preparation for plant construction.  As previously observed, the IAB found that the government of the UAE, in its nuclear power program remained strongly committed to the principles of safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency and sustainability. 

 

Safety assessment and recommendations

Discussion on Fukushima related issues

Following the March 2011 Fukushima accident which occurred shortly after the third meeting, the Board requested a detailed presentation on the lessons learned subsequent to the Fukushima accident and UAE entities application to safety considerations relevant to the nuclear power reactors to be deployed at the Barakah site.  Specifically, the IAB requested to be briefed on the potential vulnerability of the APR-1400 reactors destined for the Barakah site to earthquakes and high-water levels in the Gulf.  To what extent would the elevation chosen for these reactors and other safety critical facilities affect this?  Will the lessons learned post Fukushima in any significant way alter the existing plans for construction at the Barakah site? 

As said, on March 30, 2011, FANR sent a request to ENEC for an overall safety assessment of lessons learned from the March, 2011 accident in Japan at the Fukushima nuclear power plants, caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11, 2011 and the ensuing tsunami.  FANR sent to ENEC an update request on July 4.  The comprehensive safety is assessment conducted by ENEC was to be submitted to FANR by December 31, 2011.  At the October 2011 Board meeting ENEC presented an interim response to the Board's questions relating to safety.  The IAB also requested a copy of the safety assessment to review .  The assessment entitled "Safety Assessment Report for Barakah Nuclear Power Plants (Lessons Learned) from the Fukushima Accident" was submitted in December 30, 2011 to FANR and made available to the Board in early February 2012, well in advance of the fifth meeting of the IAB in March 2012.  At the fourth meeting of the Board, prior to the completion of the safety assessment, ENEC addressed the Board's concerns, as said, on a preliminary basis.

The ENEC safety report did not identify any design deficiencies in its plant similar to those that were the main causes of the Fukushima accident.  However, ENEC did  identify other site design features and additional measures which can be modified to increase the robustness of the Barakah NPP to prevent or cope with the potential consequences of severe natural events. 

ENEC noted in its presentation in October that with respect to a direct earthquake danger there has been little historical seismicity in the Gulf itself and virtually none on the Arabian shore, although historically there has been considerable seismic activity in Iran and there had been even an 8.5 magnitude earthquake in the recent past (Fukushima was a 9.0) at Makran some 750 kilometers distant.  Based on ENEC's analysis the nearest place where a Fukushima class earthquake could occur was around the western coast of India.  The resulting tsunami of such an earthquake would have some distance to travel whereas Fukushima was not far offshore – and would also have to enter the Gulf through the narrow entrance of the straits of Hormuz.  Collectively this would diminish any tsunami threat to an estimated maximum wave level run-up of 3.12 meters with an associated high-tide of 1.99 meters, totaling a potential 5.11 meter increase.  The power block area of the reactors at Barakah are to be set at an elevation significantly above sea level with the forebay area – between the reactors and the sea, where water level surges will be  dominant to comply with a dry site concept.  Thus, any tsunami threat would be well within the safety margin.  The same is true for storm surges in that the maximum high-water effect from the impact of a cyclone and accompanying high-tide would be significant leaving a sufficient safety margin for the forebay area against inundation from the storm event that was adopted as the design basis.

At the fifth meeting of the IAB in March 2012, the findings mentioned earlier and others were finalized following the delivery of the December 2011 ENEC assessment.  Additionally, as part of the updated letter request by FANR in July 2011, ENEC was requested to determine as part of its assessment the robustness of the ENEC's proposed facilities to cope with extreme natural events, including events that might affect multiple facilities on the same site. The assessment was also to include  any modifications  necessary to strengthen the plant's safety. FANR provided guidance for ENEC using reference materials on the requirements set by other regulatory bodies, including the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) and the Korean Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS).

FANR pointed out in its briefing to the IAB that ENEC's safety report conisisted of four main parts: Initiating Events; Consequential Loss of Safety Functions; Severe Accident Management; and Implementation Plan.  Initiating Events include  earthquake, flooding,  sand storms,  fire,  explosions, and oil spills.  The evaluation of Consequential Loss of Safety Functions includes description of features to cope with loss of safety functions and the assessment of the capability to maintain safe shutdown condition under loss of electric AC power sources, loss of the ultimate heat sink (UHS), and a coincident loss of the UHS and station blackout.  The Submission concerning Severe Accident Management includes such things as  design features for the prevention of severe reactor core or spent fuel damage and for limitation of radioactive releases in case of their potential damage,  availability and sustainability of instrumentation and control room and severe accident management guidelines.  The part on severe accident management also presents the already existing provisions that increase plant robustness against severe core and spent fuel damage beyond a traditional design of nuclear power plants.  The Summary of Implementation Plan includes summary information on design changes and operational procedure changes to be implemented.

FANR's own review objectives are to evaluate compliance of the assessment with FANR's guidance, evaluate the adequacy of ENEC's supplementary safety assessment and verify the adequacy of ENEC's plan for safety improvements.  The review follows a two-tier approach:  Tier A – those matters that need to be resolved to support the issuance of the construction license, particularly, site characteristics and external events; Tier B – those matters that do not need to be be fully resolved before the issuance of a construction license, such as operational procedures to address loss of safety functions, severe accidents, and the implementation plan for safety improvement.  ENEC's proposed enhancements for the Barakah site are similar to measures being taken in Korea.  The FANR Review Team has met twice with ENEC, a list of further issues and questions has been given to ENEC and the review is ongoing with an intent to complete it by May 15, 2012.  The Board understands that the following mitigating design feature changes are included in the proposed enhancements:

•   safety improvement design features against earthquake: improving the seismic capacity of the main control room display, improving the seismic capacity of the AAC diesel generator building;
•   safety improvement design features against tsunami:  preparing counter-measures to respond to possible damage of the outdoor tanks;
•   safety improvement of design features against fires:  improving fire protection facilities and the response capability of the plant firefighting team;
•   safety improvement of design features against station blackout:  a cross-tie design for emergency power supply among units; installation of mobile diesel generator connections; extension of the fuel capacity of the storage tank for AAC diesel generator fuel; battery duty extension;
•   safety improvement design features against severe accidents:  external water injection for the steam generators, the reactor coolant system, and the spent fuel pool; and additional passive auto catalytic recombiners installed in the spent fuel pool building at Barakah;
•   operating procedures and severe accident management guidelines:  the development of improved emergency operating procedures and severe accident management guidelines.

In its assessment ENEC made the following risk judgments with respect to initiating events.

Earthquakes

The assessment presents a comprehensive analysis that fully supports the interim conclusion that while Iran has experienced considerable significant seismic activity, historically there has been little in the Gulf and almost none in the eastern Arabian Peninsula. 
The Board found persuasive ENEC's  argument, based on research, that the earthquake risk is low.

Flood

In the last 1,000 years there has not been a tsunami in the Arabian Gulf and cyclones are infrequent.  There is no history of a tsunami entering the Gulf through the straits of Hormuz.  Nevertheless, the possible effect of a maximum probable tsunami in the Gulf as well as a maximum probable cyclone for the storm surge form the basis of the estimated design threat.  The result of the analysis confirms that the probable maximum tsunami at high-tide would result in an increase in sea level of 5.11 meters and the comparable number for storm surges would be 6.49 meters.  With the reactor power block and the forebay area in front of the reactors at a sufficient  height  above sea level, between the Gulf and the reactors, there is confidence that the Barakah site would remain dry.  An increase in the sea level due to global warming of about 0.48 meters is postulated and even including this estimate, there remains a sufficient  margin against the surge water reaching the reactors.  A number of emergency procedures are available including the use of mobile diesel generators.  Nevertheless, further changes to the site to enhance safety with respect to the threat of high water are planned.  These are included in the list of modifications set forth above.  Most prominent among them are plans to install waterproof doors and gates for safety related buildings.  The dikes or protection barriers protecting outdoor tanks which will contain radioactive or radiotoxic liquid will be heightened and strengthened.

The Board concluded that adequate review and assessment for flooding analysis has been done.

Sandstorms

Sandstorms and dust storms of course are expected to be present periodically at the Barakah site.  It would seem that given the location of the Barakah site these types of events are a significantly greater threat to the site than are earthquakes and high water.  The characterizations of the sand/dust storm events are conservatively selected based on published meteorological literature developed from research at the Abu Dhabi International Airport, as well as other industrial and power operations in Abu Dhabi and other GCC countries.  The design basis for sandstorms would involve particles ranging up in size to 0.5 millimeters, visibility of 0.01 meters (essentially zero) in the worst case with design basis duration of four hours and frequency of four times a year.  Dust storms in this construct could involve large particles from 0.08 mm to 0.55 mm in size, visibility of one meter (also essentially zero) with duration of 24 hours and a frequency of eight times a year.  So called dust events – less than a storm, could produce a condition of visibility of 1,000 meters in the worst case, last for four days and occur up to 20 times a year.  Dust haze reducing visibility to 5000 meters is common and occurs up to 240 days a year.  Such events could occur in conjunction with strong winds and/or fires and protective measures will take this into account.  All plant structures shall be designed to be sealed and configured to minimize the entry of sand or dust particles into plant areas and in case where entry cannot be precluded, suitable design features will be introduced to permit the facilities to withstand the sand/dust storms.  Sealing around openings and special ventilation systems are important.  Offsite power will be available and the ultimate heat sink for component cooling water and essential service water will be protected by filters and other equipment.

The Board concluded that adequate review and assessment has been completed for the effects of sandstorms.

Fire

A design basis fire is postulated for each fire area.  In evaluating the potential fire damage for each fire area the possible effect on safe shutdown and safety-related equipment is analyzed as well as the potential for release of radioactivity in the event of a fire.  The Fire Protection Program will focus on the following issues:  prevent fires from starting, suppressing fires that occur as soon as possible, and designing plant safety systems so that even if a fire burns for a long-time essential plant safety functions can nevertheless be performed.  Sufficient water supply to suppress the fire must be assured.

Explosions

Flammable and combustible liquids and gases are potentially significant fire and explosion hazards.  The Barakah NPP will be built keeping in mind safe distances from railways, highways and movable waterways, where explosions involving materials in transit could occur.  Various strategies will be developed which address the direct and indirect effect of explosions including a fire fighting response strategy, operations to mitigate fire damage including such measures as protection of personnel and communications, and action to minimize the release of flammable material.  The Barakah NPP site is being designed to meet FANR regulations regarding aircraft impact.

Oil spills

Large oil spills resulting from tanker accidents are a potential hazard that could threaten the availability of sea water as an ultimate heat sink. The Board would like to see more assessment of that hazard and also plans to address it in design. 

Additional Issues

 

Additional central issues addressed in detail by the assessment include the possible loss of safety functions such as electrical power systems, the ultimate heat sink, and offsite power.  Severe accident management is also addressed.Thus, in Summary the basic review areas in the assessment are:  earthquake; flooding; sandstorm, fire, explosions, oil spills,  loss of electrical power and loss of ultimate heat sink, along with severe accident management.Furthermore, the IAB took a note that the UAE organizations are now working jointly on the preparation of a national Emergency Preparedness Response Plan.Lastly, ENEC indicated that it plans to add information to its Fukushima assessment on the pros and cons of the co-location of multiple reactors, an issue of interest to the Board for some time.

Other observations on lessons from Fukushima accident

The Board noted what it believed was one of the major lessons of Fukushima:  that in a crisis the experts must make the operational decisions and the politicians must focus in the societal issues: minimizing the overall public harm caused by the accident and the protective measures taken as response.  Other Board members noted that commercial airline crews and those who live in higher altitude cities such as Denver Colorado in the U.S. or in homes containing significant amounts of natural radon gas receive annual doses of radiation that are of the same magnitude as the doses in some areas evacuated after the Fukushima accident.

Interactions of the UAE nuclear program with the global nuclear safety regime

In his briefing by teleconference from Vienna, Ambassador Hamad Al Kaabi also had significant comments on the Fukushima related issues.  He discussed Fukushima and the IAEA Nuclear Safety Action Plan in his presentation.  The IAEA plan was adopted in 2011 in the wake of the Fukushima accident.  The UAE promptly established an internal process to monitor the implementation of the IAEA plan and take it into account in its domestic action.

FANR continues pursuing the strengthening of its regulatory capabilities with assistance from IAEA. The UAE was the first country to be reviewed against a new model in the IRRS which is focused on new nuclear power entrant countries.  The IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS), upon invitation by the UAE conducted a 10-day mission in December, 2011.  The team leader Carl Magnus Larsson of Australia at the time said that "The team was impressed by the speed with which the UAE developed its regulatory framework and established a new regulatory body."  The IRRS team recognized especially human capacity building program in line with the IAEA guidance and praised progress made toward the establishment of an integrated management system.  As its main recommendations, the IRRS team recommended that the government clarify the roles and responsibilities of emergency response organizations as soon as possible and conclude and implement a national policy for radioactive waste management. There will be a follow-up IRRS visit in three years to review the actions taken on the basis of recommendations.

The IAB concluded that the UAE in general and FANR in particular have used international peer review missions effectively in establishing relevant regulations and guidance. It is evident that the UAE is moving ahead with its nuclear power program well in line with international standards and guidance.

Discussion on the Construction License Application status

While Fukushima was the leading issue addressed by the IAB in its Fifth meeting, a close second was the status of the construction license for the Barakah NPP.  ENEC in its briefing noted that FANR is fourteen months into the Construction License Application (CLA) and the preliminary Safety Analysis Report.  At the time of the Board meeting there had been 1,767 Requests for Additional Information (RAIs) with 1,618 responses from ENEC/KEPCO.  Eighteen months review for the CLA by FANR was originally anticipated by ENEC.  There have been more than 20 meetings between FANR and ENEC on various CLA issues, as well as, additional studies submitted by ENEC:  the sand/dust storm study; the Severe Accident Analysis and the Fukushima lesson learned assessment, all of which have provided important supplemental information.

Efforts are underway to close the remaining issues in the CLA process:  meetings to facilitate review of the Fukushima report; agreements for the revision of the preliminary Safety Analysis; commitments for additional information after the CLA is issued; and the resolution of the remaining open items in the RAI process.

Thus the FANR license process for the CLA has moved through the various appropriate steps:  receipt of application; technical review; and the preparation of the preliminary safety evaluations report with findings and conclusions.  It is anticipated that soon FANR will make its licensing recommendation to its Board of Management which will make the final decision on whether to issue the license.  FANR uses the safety evaluation by the Korean regulatory body to support its review of the CLA in the UAE.  However FANR is also conducting an independent review where: (1) it cannot be shown that UAE requirements have been met based on another regulatory body's assessments; (2) the proposed UAE design differs from that approved by the other authority; (3) site characteristics are unique to the UAE; and (4) operating experience since the other body's approval exists.

FANR is aiming its process toward completion in July, 2012 but appropriately expresses no opinion whether this date will actually be met.  ENEC is prepared to act as soon as the license is received.  The decision to move the target date for the pouring of concrete to July from November of 2012 means that the first NPP at Barakah could be completed by May 2017.

The Board concluded that the CLA process is going well.

In the ensuing discussion with ENEC, the IAB emphasized the importance of strict configuration management throughout the construction stage as follows:

ENEC is a new nuclear utility undertaking the Barakah project, a huge plant construction project, for which impeccable safety is an absolute requirement.  Many of the world's operating nuclear power plants were designed, constructed and are being operated without fully incorporating the latest information technologies.  For example, the Fukushima nuclear power plants damaged by the tsunami were based on technologies and technical practices of the 1960s and 1970s. Even though incremental technological innovations were taken into account in the operation and the maintenance of the Fukushima plants, the latest design, construction, operation, and maintenance engineering advances were not fully incorporated.

A nuclear power plant is a large composite system of more than hundreds of sub-systems and modules.  Systems engineering has been making major advances with the recent breakthroughs of digitalization and information management science.  Systems engineering has emerged as the fastest developing engineering field and has been making very important contributions in enhancing safety and security of sensitive engineering applications.

Therefore, the IAB supports the full application of up-to-date configuration management and systems engineering practices in the construction process of the Barakah NPPs.  Configuration management will allow both the management and the regulatory teams to monitor the real progress and as-built status accurately and thoroughly.  By empowering configuration management, the ENEC/KEPCO team would minimize potential mistakes and/or oversight in scheduling and cost management, as well as optimize quality assurance and quality control.

Finally, the IAB noted that ENEC has requested a Limited Construction License for work in advance of the first concrete.  This would authorize first, installation of the mud mat for waterproofing and second, placement of rebar in preparation for pouring concrete of the reactor, auxiliary and turbine buildings base plate. Review of this license is being done in parallel with the CLA.

Security

Security assesment and recommendations

FANR reported on the status of its review of the Physical Protection Plan (PPP) prepared by ENEC.  Last year FANR sent 24 Request for Additional Information (RAIs)to ENEC responding to the first draft of the PPP.  ENEC completed its reply in August 2011 and subsequently submitted revision I to the PPP.  FANR sent two RAIs to ENEC in February 2012 on cyber security and target sets identification.  The PPP is being further reviewed in the context of consideration of the application for the Limited Construction License.

ENEC, as a supplement to the CLA, submitted its Aircraft Impact Assessment Report on December 27, 2010.  Twenty-four RAIs on this report were sent to ENEC by FANR on May 26, 2011 and the ENEC response was received in late July 2011.  The final ENEC Fire and Explosion Report is still pending. 

Sustainability

Sustainability assessment and recommendations

As requested by the Board in its report on the Fourth meeting, ENEC in its briefing addressed the issue of non-electric applications of nuclear energy.  Law No. 21 of 2009 set the ENEC corporate goal to contribute to Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030 by deploying an efficient fleet of nuclear power reactors.  Within the UAE there is a growing demand for potable water and a shortage of power generation capacities.  In this context the diversifying and reducing of water generation capacities based on hydrocarbons is an important objective.

There is a strong case to be made for nuclear desalination.  It is economically competitive compared to desalination with fossil energy sources.  Nuclear reactors provide heat in a large range of temperatures allowing easy adaptation for any desalination process.  Some nuclear reactors furnish heat at ideal temperatures for desalination.  Finally, desalination using hydrocarbons is less compatible with sustainable development over the long-term.

Essentially three types of sea water desalination technologies currently exist.  There are evaporation processes; multistage flash distillation (MSF) and multi effect distillation (MED), these technologies are highly heat consuming.  There is a membrane process technology known as reverse osmosis (RO); this technology is highly power intensive.  Lastly there is a hybrid process which combines either MSF or MED with RO.  Two joint ENEC/KEPCO studies are about to be launched in this area:  a feasibility study to assess and evaluate water desalination for Abu Dhabi specific locations using the APR-1400 or similar reactors. The objective is to find the optimum configuration for nuclear desalination for Abu Dhabi specifications; a techno-economic assessment which examines business opportunities for water generation in Abu Dhabi and the UAE, the objective being to make tangible estimates and forecasts supporting strategic investment in nuclear desalination.

ENEC made a presentation on its workforce and progress in achieving appropriate diversity, as well as on housing needs at the Barakah site.  The ENEC current staff count is 393.  Emiratization is 59%; 27 nationalities are represented.  The workforce at the Barakah site is composed of largely Emiratis, South Asians and Koreans, and the working language is English. Women are approximately 36 percent of the total workforce as they have been from the beginning of the program.  In 2011 this was divided into 12 percent of top management personnel being female, 21 percent of middle-management and 46 percent of the staff.  A strong commitment from top management to emphasize gender diversity exists and a conscious effort is being made to develop a strong presence for women in the nuclear field.  As examples of progress ENEC mentioned in its briefing:  Ms. Hind Al Naqbi, a member of the first class of Senior Reactor Operators, she brings training in the U.S. and seven years of experience in the utilities sector to ENEC; and Ms. Myrna Sabaldan, referred to as "The First Lady of Barakah" a very important document control assistant working at the Barakah NPP site.

There is an approved concept design for the Barakah Operators Village.  There will be six district zones, with parks and recreational space, the community will be pedestrian friendly, the buildings will be contemporary and natural ventilation and shade will be emphasized.  The ENEC Operators Village concept design has been integrated with the overall Al Gharbia Plan 2030 which is in the process of being received and approved by the relevant public bodies.  Mixed use development with up to 2,200 residents is planned.

Accommodation for ENEC construction oversight staff at Barakah is currently being implemented.  There will be 140 units by December, 2012 and 240 by the following June.  Accommodations are planned for approximately 1,500 KEPCO staff during the construction phase.  This would be divided into a mix of - bachelor housing at Barakah of 500 units, and 1,000 units of family housing at the town of Ruwais some 35 kilometers distant.

The family housing for KEPCO would be integrated with the ENEC Operators Village. An international (private) school has already been established locally and there will be an opportunity to share and develop existing community facilities such as, shopping, recreation, and health care.

Lastly, there was a presentation by ENEC on the joint ENEC-KUSTAR program on the development of research capability for safety analysis.  This was supplemented by a briefing to the Board by Khalifa University later in the day.  The objective of the program is to support research to meet stakeholder needs in the UAE.  One project involves reactor analysis system-modeling using RELAPS computer software.  A second project is a reactor analysis employing core physics modeling using industry standard codes.  A third is a dispersion modeling analysis – a study of water plume distribution, and a fourth involves fluid models, using a fluids test facility.  Integral systems test facilities are employed, there will be collaboration with international partners and there will be simulating and model work on passive safety systems.

The objective will be to verify that passive safety systems really do work.  All of these projects are led by Khalifa University faculty working with ENEC.  The Board was pleased to hear this report and noted that the research well supports development of such expert knowledge, which is needed for sustainable long term operation of nuclear power plants.

KUSTAR reported in its briefing to the Board later that it now has eight graduate students in the nuclear engineering MS program and that there are also 12 ENEC scholars pursuing this discipline.  There are 112 students in the undergraduate engineering programs (including all disciplines).  The nuclear part of this program will grow.  The four research groups mentioned above working with ENEC were noted to be up and running.  over time KUSTAR also plans to emphasize environmental waste management research and will offer a MSc in cyber security.  A course supplement for undergraduates to enhance understanding of nuclear engineering is being planned.  It will be a modular program.  There would be three to four one week segments and a one to four week capstone.

 Following the extensive briefings by the UAE entities, the Board held its normal deliberation and wrap-up discussion.   There was an exchange of views on the project management system.   In the view of the Board the critical path of the program and its milestones need to be fully described. Views were also exchanged on configuration management and its importance.  The Board recommends that configuration management techniques and practices be introduced and utilized at the earliest time, if not already employed.  All configuration changes should be documented and care should be taken to be sure that any such changes are made in all units.  Of course, FANR must also approve any such changes.

The Board also recommends the training and appointment of responsible systems engineers in the ENEC organization.  Systems engineers should be thoroughly competent on their own systems and have a good overall understanding of purpose and interaction of all plant systems.
 

The next meeting was set for October 15-16, 2012.  At this meeting, along with other subjects chosen by the UAE entities, the Board would like to be briefed on the following issues:

•  How ENEC is planning to oversee KEPCO's performance in project management, including general management of its subcontractors and management of the quality of the work conducted by subcontractors
•   How ENEC is planning to oversee KEPCO's performance in configuration management and to conduct its own independent configuration management 
•  How ENEC is planning to monitor non conformances and the respective corrective actions
•   How FANR is planning to oversee performance and mutual interaction of KEPCO and ENEC in project management, configuration management and management of non-conformances

The Board would like to learn more about the Tier B issues that FANR will not require be resolved before issuance of the construction license.

The Board would like to get more information on the plans for management of low and intermediate level waste.

Additional subjects that the Board would consider useful to be briefed include:

1. Offsite power and grid stability and reliability
2. Will there be any other power supplies in the close vicinity of the site if needed to supply AC power

The Board has become aware of a recent case of failure of safety culture at the Kori I plant in Korea. It assumes that ENEC fully informs itself of the matter and reports on it to the next meeting of the Board

Finally, the Board continues to seek updates on capacity building in human resources for the plants operators and regulators, and the level of training available for continued education of those involved in the nuclear sectors. 

The Board thanks the UAE and all of the supporting entities for an excellent meeting and congratulates the UAE on the continuing success and progress of the nuclear power program.  The lengthy discussions of Fukushima and lessons learned and the status of the CLA were particularly notable.

 

 

Chairman's Preface

With great satisfaction, I transmit to you the fourth report of the International Advisory Board on the development of the United Arab Emirates' Nuclear Power Program. This report recognizes the continued progress made in the five areas of the IAB's mandate and new challenges that arise. The challenges include: learning from the Fukushima accident, developing a waste disposal policy, and creating and sustaining employment for the nuclear industry. For its part, the Board is committed to provide recommendations to help the responsible entities to improve their performance in meeting all challenges. I would like to thank all the entities for their contributions to the fourth meeting of the Board and supporting this report and for endorsing the Board's recommendations. Thanks are also due to the Board members for their continuous efforts in developing this report.
 

Safety

The fourth meeting of the International Advisory Board (IAB) for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) nuclear power program was held in Abu Dhabi on November 20 and 21, 2011. Eight of the nine members of the Board were in attendance. The Board meeting was opened by the IAB Chairman on the evening of November 20. At this meeting Ambassador Hamad Al Kaabi, the UAE representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency delivered a detailed report for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) via telephone from Vienna. This was followed by a comprehensive presentation by Dr. William Travers, the Director General of the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR), accompanied by his senior colleagues.
The subsequent discussions were held the next day at the Braka Nuclear site - some 300 kilometres west of Abu Dhabi - following a two-hour tour of the site. At this session, the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), led by CEO Mohamed Al Hammadi accompanied by his senior staff, conducted a highly detailed, in-depth briefing covering a number of subjects. The ENEC presentation was followed by briefings by Khalifa University (KU) and the Critical National Infrastructure Authority (CNIA).

The briefings by the various stakeholders focused on the five central areas of the IAB's responsibility: safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency and sustainability. The Board had formulated a number of questions and requests in its Report on the third semi-annual meeting which was held in March 2011. All of these requests were addressed throughout the various briefings during the course of their fourth meeting. Of greatest importance amongst these were requests to visit the nuclear site at Braka; a briefing on an assessment of safety issues associated with the reactors to be deployed at the Braka site in light of the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident; and a briefing on cyber security.

To specifically highlight the response to Fukushima, MOFA presented the general response by the government of the UAE to Fukushima and FANR described the progress of its Fukushima task force. FANR is closely following the reaction of other countries and has requested a report from ENEC on how lessons learned from the accident would be applied to the Braka 1 and Braka 2 nuclear power plants. ENEC presented the interim results of its Fukushima assessment to the Board.
The Board once again found the government of the UAE in its nuclear power program to be fully committed to the principles of safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency and sustainability.

Safety assessment and recommendations

Upon Conclusion of the third meeting of the IAB the Board had some questions on the subject of safety and summarized these in its Report. A set of such questions pertained to the issue of site selection. For example, can locations of reactors within the site boundaries be changed or are they fixed? To what extent did the proximity of international borders versus technical considerations influence the selection of the site, and what specific risks are associated with the selected site? Second, how are radiation emitters to be analysedand what will the procedure be for setting limits for workers? Third, the Board requested more information on the verification and validation procedure to ensure compatibility of the Westinghouse digital instrumentation and control system with the APR-1400.

The Fukushima accident took place a few days after the March 2011 Board meeting and in its Report the Board requested a report on lessons learned from Fukushima and their application to safety considerations related to the reactors to be deployed at the Braka site. The Board also added a number of additional requests for information on the aftermath of the Fukushima accident. In particular the IAB wanted to know the potential vulnerability of the APR-1400 to be deployed at the Braka site to earthquakes and high water levels from the Gulf. To what extent will the elevation of the reactors and other safety critical facilities on the site affect this? How will the lessons learned specifically affect existing plans for construction? Furthermore, the Board inquired about relevance of climatic differences between Korea and the Gulf.

ENEC presented its response to some of these specifics throughout its discussion of site selection. ENEC examined the effect of high water in the Gulf either caused by a storm or a high tsunami. The Braka site is located on the Gulf, as stated above, some 300 kilometres west of Abu Dhabi. The site grade level at the power block area where the safety-related structures are situated is established at elevation (EL) 6.5 m. The forebay area where the storm surge effects are dominant is established at EL 7.5 m to comply with a dry site concept. It is estimated that the wave run-up from cyclones would be a maximum of 3.40 meters and the associated high tide another 3.09 meters for a total of 6.49 meters as the maximum sea water level near the reactor site. This would leave approximately a one meter safety margin against inundation in connection with the storm event that has been used as the design basis.

The analysis relied upon by ENEC concludes that the nearest place where a Fukushima class undersea earthquake could take place would be along the western coast of India. The resulting tsunami would have some distance to travel and then have to enter the Gulf through the narrow entrance of the Straits of Hormuz. This would significantly diminish any tsunami threat with the maximum wave level run-up estimated at 3.12 meters and an associated high tide of 1.99 meters, totalling a 5.11 meter increase, again well within the safety margin.

With respect to a direct earthquake danger, while historically there is considerable seismic activity in Iran, particularly along the Gulf coast, and a Fukushima grade event that occurred around 750 kilometres away at Makran (8.5 magnitude), there is little historical seismicity in the Gulf itself and virtually none on the Arabian shore. Thus, there would appear to be little threat of an earthquake to the Braka site.

Dust and sandstorms however are another matter. For planning protection against them, ample reference data and practical experience has been collected from the oil and gas industry. ENEC is planning for about four major sandstorms and eight to 20 dust storms per year, plus forecasting that most of the year will be affected by dust haze. FANR is awaiting technical submission on relevant environmental data and design measures to mitigate the effect of sandstorms and dust storms. The Board showed interest in hearing more about how this might affect the reactors.

 

ENEC selected the preferred site and has presented the technical justifications of site characteristics in the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report that accompanied its December 2010 application for a construction license. FANR is reviewing this information including its hydrology and general suitability and will make a recommendation in the context of issuing the license.

With respect to the issue of radiation protection, FANR-Reg-04 establishes dose limits and requires optimization of public and occupational exposures from nuclear facilities. The approach is consistent with the ICRP (International Commission on Radiological Protection) recommendations that are generally used as a reference for national and international radiation protection standards. Occupational exposures will be set below a level chosen by the operator and approved by FANR. FANR- Reg- 11 establishes detailed requirements for the radiation protection program for nuclear facilities; for predisposal management of nuclear waste; for the clearance and discharges of radioactive material; and for environmental monitoring.

The Operator is to establish a safety case for discharges to ensure that public exposure is minimized and in any case below dose limits. The Operator is also to establish an environmental monitoring program to demonstrate compliance.

Turning explicitly to the issue of Fukushima and the application of lessons learned to the reactors to be built at the Braka site, three agencies-MOFA, FANR and ENEC-had important contributions to make.

First on the agenda was MOFA. Ambassador Al Kaabi began with general comments focused on the governmental and public response to the Fukushima accident. He noted that after careful consideration the government has decided on no change to its policy on nuclear power for the Emirates and the results of a recent public survey indicated that 85% of the public supported nuclear energy for the UAE. The government will, however, incorporate any lessons learned from Fukushima. ENEC has been asked to conduct a review of the reactor design in light of the accident. Accordingly the government will closely follow related international action, particularly at the IAEA and specifically with respect to additional regulations for operation and for the industry.

FANR in its briefing noted that it has established its own Fukushima task force. Its purpose is to learn and apply appropriate lessons from the Fukushima accident to FANR's regulatory work and to the licensing of the Braka nuclear power site. In addition, FANR has requested ENEC to submit a report "describing its assessment of how recent experience at Fukushima and lessons learned so far have been applied to address any potential safety issues at the Braka facility". This report by ENEC is due on December 31, 2011. Upon request by the Chairman, the Board will be furnished with a copy of this report as soon as it is available so as to permit discussion on the report at the next Board meeting.

FANR will also monitor the actions of regulators in other countries and evaluate their applicability to the UAE. FANR has specifically followed actions of the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group. Also FANR will support the actions of the international community in response to the action plan of the IAEA and at various international meetings. There will be continuous outreach by FANR to national stakeholders within the UAE on the various issues relating to Fukushima.

ENEC presented an interim analysis of its assessments developed so far in preparing the Fukushima report due to be submitted to FANR by the end of 2011. After the Fukushima accident ENEC established a safety review task force. ENEC and KEPCO [1] teams met at the end of September 2011 to discuss the applicability of various action items decided upon by the Korean government in relation to Fukushima to the Braka site. The teams met again in October 2011 to develop a common proposed list of such items for the Braka site. Meanwhile ENEC has forged ahead in its preparation of the report.

The following are some of the interim developments, which have resulted from the ENEC-KEPCO collaboration, and the development of the draft report on Fukushima lessons. It has been concluded that there is no need to increase design parameters for potential earthquakes since a conservative evaluation has always been pursued at the Braka site. The seismic alarm system will be somewhat modified. As indicated earlier in this Report the planned 6.5.meters elevation at the power block area is considered sufficient to protect against tsunamis as well as storm surge. Nevertheless, there is a plan under development for watertight doors for auxiliary buildings to increase the margin beyond design basis events. An important lesson of the Fukushima accident was the importance of a reliable electrical power supply, and strengthening power supply systems has been widely considered, taking into account the Braka site-related safety issues. There is an on-going review of the potential impact of sandstorms, dust storms, other dust events and dust haze on various design features. There is also an intensive and on-going assessment of the risk of complete station blackout (i.e., loss of both all off-site power and on-site power from emergency diesel generators of a plant unit. The existing current provisions for complete station blackout comprise two turbine driven auxiliary feed water pumps per plant unit and a common air cooled emergency diesel generator (AAC) serving the entire NPP. Plans for increasing plant robustness to address possible complete station black-out include: DC battery life extension (8 to 16 hours); emergency diesel generators cross-tie between different plant units via AAC cabling; AAC diesel fuel tank capacity increase (8 to 24 hours); and possible improvements in power supply protection against seismic and flooding events.

Passive fire barriers and active fire protection systems are being analyzed, especially in view of their capability to prevent fire propagation between spaces housing redundant power supply systems.

The severe accident mitigation design features already included in the APR-1400 that is to be deployed at the Braka site include: primary coolant depressurization system using pilot operated steam relief valves (opening by operator control is possible) for preventing core melt down in high-pressure conditions; a large volume reactor cavity; a reactor cavity flooding system; a hydrogen management system (passive recombiners and back-up igniters in small spaces such as steam generator boxes); large dry pre-stressed containment; and a back-up system for emergency containment spray (using fire truck and external hook-up). Possible new systems under evaluation for increasing plant robustness at the Braka site include an external spent fuel pool fill line and a passive hydrogen recombiner in the spent fuel building. At the Board meeting with FANR on November 20, 2011 there was an extensive discussion of whether or not it would be desirable to include in the design of the APR-1400 reactors to be deployed at Braka so-called "core catchers," in order to eliminate the possibility of molten core penetrating the containment boundary. No conclusion was reached at that time.

The Chairman noted after the three briefings on Fukushima: the Board would like to see and discuss the ENEC report to FANR on Fukushima; ENEC has checked and calculated the risks for seismic events, storm surges and tsunamis and found the results reassuring; batteries for emergency electricity are designed to last longer than at Fukushima; the Board is interested in hearing more particularly about dust storms. In addition, during the FANR briefing the Chairman raised the issue of the separation of individual nuclear power plants. He noted that in Florida consideration was being given to require the separation of future nuclear power plants to reduce the risk that more than one will be shut down because of a particular hurricane. There are safety, economic (down time), and security issues involved. Director General Travers responded that FANR knew of nothing that would argue for changing plans to locate several reactors at the Braka site but this issue is still being evaluated. The Board recognized that consideration has already been given to the matter but would like to hear more about this subject at the March 2012 meeting.

FANR indicated that it was about halfway through the 9,000 page application for a construction license at the Braka site. FANR said it uses Contractors to assist in the technical review of the application. Also, FANR utilizes safety evaluations performed by the Korean Institute for Nuclear Safety (KINS) as reference and has contracted external expert organizations to conduct independent safety analysis to verify the analysis submitted by KEPCO. As guidance for its own safety review and assessment FANR is using the Standard Review Plans of the US NRC. Furthermore some advice is received from the IAEA. However, any FANR regulatory judgments will be entirely its own. Thus far, 1,420 requests for additional information (RAI) have been issued to ENEC and there have been 1,170 responses by ENEC. Ninety-one of these FANR RAI's are related to site evaluation leading to the FANR judgments on such things as possible seismic, tsunami and storm surge threats referred to earlier in this Report. The Board would like to have a further report on progress toward the construction license at its next meeting.

Lastly, on safety, in response to the previous questions of the Board as to the compatibility of the Westinghouse digital instrumentation and control system with the APR-1400, FANR Director General Travers and Tim Herrmann from ENEC stated that the general Westinghouse "Common Q" platform has been licensed by the U.S. NRC in 2001 for safety critical nuclear applications. It has been used in the Westinghouse AP600 and AP1000 designs and by application of APR-1400 specific, which makes it compatible with the APR-1400.

Security

Security assesment and recommendations

At the March, 2011 meeting the IAB expressed its desire for a detailed presentation on the issue of cyber security. The Board also asked for more information on the design basis threat (DBT) process and plans for fresh and spent fuel transportation.

Cyber security as the Board requested was a major agenda item for the fourth meeting of the IAB. Cyber attacks have been taken into account to define the DBT. FANR regulations require the applicant/licensee to protect against unauthorized access to communication or computer systems for the purpose of: gaining unauthorized access to sensitive nuclear information; altering system parameters or data; operating, or denying access to equipment or functions; or defeating components of the physical protection system. FANR defines cyber security as "The protection of equipment, systems and networks against attacks by individuals or organizations that would seek to cause harm, damage, or adversely affect the confidentiality, integrity or availability of an information system or that seek to use an information control system for an unauthorized purpose that will affect the functions performed by such equipment systems or networks." ENEC has been required by FANR to develop a cyber-security plan as part of the physical protection plan for the Braka site. FANR will review the plan and inspect its implementation.

At the fourth IAB meeting ENEC presented the essential details of its cyber security plan. The Board concluded that the plan contains essential features of an advanced security system, in line with approaches seen by the Board members elsewhere. Furthermore, there are innovative approaches that provide security against potential malevolent acts by internal actors who conduct maintenance and testing of digital protection and control systems. The plan will include intensive and continuing training for all personnel and active involvement of security at all stages. The CNIA stated in its briefing that the ENEC cyber security plan would have its full support. The Board expressed its satisfaction that so much thought had been devoted to this highly important subject.

The CNIA presented a full briefing on the DBT process. The CNIA is responsible for the development of the DBT and communicating it to FANR. It will review and revise the DBT as threat conditions require and will develop a vulnerability assessment to support appropriate protective measures. On the subject of fuel security, CNIA will ensure the protection of nuclear materials at the Braka site.

On the subject of fuel supply, it should be noted that as part of the Prime Contract KEPCO will provide the fabrication services for initial core, two reloads and two optional reloads for each nuclear power plant. KEPCO and ENEC have agreed to modify the Prime Contract to allow ENEC to procure the enriched uranium product from diverse sources to enhance security of supply and build commercial capability in ENEC for the long term. KEPCO retains responsibility for the fabrication of the initial core and two reloads. Protection of the transportation of spent fuel will be, of course, part of the UAE nuclear waste disposal plan. Further, in the interest of maintaining security of fuel supply ENEC is also studying the feasibility of developing a fuel assembly plant in Abu Dhabi.

 

CNIA is assisted in its development and maintenance of the DBT by the technical support of FANR. The impact of a large commercial aircraft is within the set of requirements that FANR has established by regulation that an applicant/licensee shall address, that is a design specific assessment of the potential effects of the impact of a large commercial aircraft. ENEC has developed an Aircraft Impact Assessment Report which remains classified. Further, FANR provides by regulation that its Physical Protection Plan includes requirements on the transport of nuclear material.

Non-proliferation

Non-proliferation assessment and recommendations

The IAB in its Report on the third meeting of the Board requested as a regular agenda item information on progress of the implementation of relevant international instruments including the Additional Protocol. Ambassador Al Kaabi provided the requested information in his MOFA report.

The UAE ratified the Additional Protocol (AP) in December 2010 and submitted the initial declaration report in accordance with AP in May 2011. All declaration reports related to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the AP have been submitted to the IAEA on time. All clarification questions by the IAEA have been answered and other information exchanges on non-proliferation related issues have been conducted in an exemplary manner. Also, development of UAE legislation and more detailed national regulations have properly taken into account the non-proliferation aspects. Stakeholders with non-proliferation obligations have been trained to ensure the awareness of related expectations.

Most of the remaining part of the non-proliferation section of the third Report was focused on the necessity of developing a waste disposal policy. The UAE participated in the April 2011 review meeting of the contracting parties to the IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety. Considerable positive interest was expressed in the UAE approach at the meeting. Under the leadership of the UAE, the GCC commissioned a joint study in December, 2010, to assess potential areas of cooperation in the field of nuclear energy. The study was completed in June and a comprehensive set of recommendations were made. The subsequent GCC Ministerial meeting adopted the recommendations which define areas of focus for future cooperation; eleven of the 98 recommendations are for cooperation in nuclear waste management. Further, the UAE submitted its first national report in October, 2011, under the IAEA Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management in time to participate in its May, 2012, review meeting.

The UAE Federal Nuclear Law states that the government will issue a national strategy for the long term management of radioactive waste and spent fuel. The study began in February of 2011. Considerable progress has been achieved. The relevant study will be completed in May, 2012. All members were of the view that the development of a policy for management by the UAE of its high level waste is important. Ambassador Al Kaabi stated that he plans to brief the Board on the outcome of the UAE study after May, 2012.

ENEC gave a presentation on the development of the UAE national policy on radiological waste and spent fuel. All options are being maintained pending a UAE decision on this subject. Pursuant to the prime contract, storage capacity at each unit sufficient for spent fuel from 20 years of operation must be provided. Also ENEC is working to segregate sufficient space at the Braka site to permit future construction of a dry cask storage facility. The first phase of the storage plan will involve interim storage for spent fuel for 10-100 years; phase 2 will be ultimate disposition. The three options for long-term spent fuel disposal are: reprocess the fuel outside of the UAE; a commercial fuel lease agreement which includes sending spent fuel back to the country of origin; and, a deep geological repository in the UAE. ENEC is currently conducting a table top study to identify possible sites for such a geological repository in the UAE. ENEC is working jointly with FANR and the MOFA in developing the UAE waste disposition policy.

In the view of the Chairman, the UAE must clearly distinguish between low, intermediate and high-level waste; and the UAE must look for a storage site, or sites within its own territory, as there may be no other place where the waste can be sent.

Transparency

Transparency assessment and recommendations

In its Report on the third meeting the Board mentioned ENEC and CNIA plans for reporting news about nuclear related accidents around the world to the general public.

The Board emphasized the critical importance of careful decision making and warned against any premature statements by people in responsible positions in connection with the nuclear safety. Also, the Board would like to be briefed on how the Fukushima accident was reported to the public in the UAE.

The UAE nuclear power program continues to receive high marks in the news media with respect to its commitment to transparency. For example, about a month after the meeting, on December 27, 2011, a very positive article on this subject was published in The National.
In addition, as mentioned above, the First National Report submitted by the UAE in August 2010, with respect to measures taken to implement the Convention on Nuclear Safety was very well received by the other states' parties to the Convention at the April 2011 meeting. The early submission by the UAE enabled it to participate in the highly constructive Convention peer review process - which takes place at three year intervals - at this April, 2011 meeting. The UAE Program was described as being an "outstanding approach."

Lastly, the Board noted in Ambassador Al Kaabi's briefing the statement that according to a recent survey, 85% of the public in the UAE continue to believe that peaceful nuclear power program is important for the nation even after Fukushima. The board believes that it is important to monitor long term trends of the opinion polls as well as the difference between the opinion of local people near the site and the opinion of the general public. At its March, 2012 meeting the Board would like to have an update on the UAE's efforts to maintain such good public support ratings including the view of local people near the site. The views of the international community and people in neighboring countries is also important. The Board urges the UAE to keep up its outstanding work in this area.   

Sustainability

Sustainability assessment and recommendations

In its report from the third meeting the Board requested that a visit should be arranged to the Braka site, that the Board should be further informed about the housing developments around the site, about inducements to retain qualified personnel, and about the supply chain to support the program being developed by KEPCO. The ENEC view of the effectiveness of this effort would also be valuable.

The visit to the Braka site was carried out on November 21, 2011 and the Board was very impressed by what it saw. The security already being provided by CNIA is efficient, the cement manufacturing plant has already been built, and the site appeared quite sizable and well situated with considerable on-going activity. The Board was informed during the tour of the site that 3,000 workers were already located at the site and that there would soon be in the range of 10,000 as construction of the power plants begins. ENEC presented a briefing on plans for the Operators Village. It is to be located at Ruwais, on the coast some 240 kilometres west of Abu Dhabi City and approximately 55 kilometres east of the Braka site. The master plan for the Operators Village was approved in September, 2011. Mixed-use development is envisioned with up to 2,200 residences. There will be three phases to be completed in 2015, 2020 and 2030 respectively. The buildings will be contemporary with community facilities which will include religious, educational, healthcare, community/cultural and governmental services. There will also be small parks and recreational spaces. ENEC staff will begin mobilization to the Braka site in mid-2013, numbers will increase steadily through 2014, and there will be a major increase in 2015 with the commissioning of Unit 1. By early 2017,it is expected that there will be over 5,000 residents within the Village.

ENEC briefed the IAB on its staff retention program including corporate training, engineer training, and Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) training along with feeder programs to find highly qualified individuals. A pilot program exists for Emiratis who wish to be SRO trainees. This program, to consist of 12 trainees, is conducted by ENEC in cooperation with KEPCO. A contract has been signed with Westinghouse to conduct a SRO equivalency course. Abu Dhabi Polytechnic began its higher diploma in nuclear technology course in September, 2011 with 39 students. There are also scholarships to study abroad for BS and MS degrees involving some 131 students, fifteen of whom are females. SRO bonuses are planned with additional compensation and a shorter work schedule for those who work at the Braka site. ENEC understands that long-term staff retention is an important issue. There will continue to be considerable emphasis on as high a percentage of Emiratis as possible (recognizing that some international personnel will need to be retained long term) and a significant percentage of female employees. The UAE nuclear power program will require a maximum commitment by the UAE to its human capital needs.

FANR also is committed to long-term human resource goals. The current core team of experienced international personnel in nuclear regulation has a strong training and mentoring background. In the mid-term the objective is to develop a skilled cadre of UAE nationals in key areas of responsibility moving long-term to establish nuclear expertise and skills of nuclear expertise within the country while ensuring appropriate support by international experts. The FANR staff is expected to rise to over 200 in 2012. FANR will continue to work with Khalifa University and ENEC to develop the necessary educational infrastructure and a strong UAE nuclear personnel capacity.

Khalifa University (KU) presented a progress report to the Board on November 21 at the Braka site. KU has many academic partnerships including major relevant institutions in the Republic of Korea (KAIST), the United States (Texas A&M) and the IAEA (NKM Unit). The Nuclear Engineering faculty presently comprise of 4 permanent professors and one laboratory engineer, supplemented by 4 KAIST professors on secondment from KAIST. Besides the MSc program in Nuclear Engineering, the BSc program in Mechanical Engineering now includes a minor in Nuclear Engineering directed to all Scholarship students. MSc students comprise 5 now in their 2nd year of study and 7 enrolled in their first year. In addition the Nuclear Engineering Department now has 4 commissioned research laboratories in the areas of Nuclear Instrumentation & Control, Reactor Design & Analysis, Nuclear Materials Science, and Nuclear Environmental and Waste Management. In the Board's judgment Khalifa University is demonstrating a sound commitment to the long-term future of nuclear academics and research in the UAE.

The IAB stressed the importance of competent professionals in order to achieve a successful UAE nuclear power program. The program should emphasize professional competency in connection with planning, design, construction, operation, maintenance and management of nuclear power plants. On the job hands-on experience is essential. General disciplinary education is not enough. Hands-on, on-site training and education should be essential.

ENEC presented an update on the supply chain for the program. A Supplier Conference for ENEC's corporate requirements was organized in 2011 followed by two smaller workshops to assist specific suppliers. Also ENEC has organized and hosted foreign trade missions, including missions from the United States, France, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Australia. Lastly, an update on the development of a nuclear liability regime was provided by Ambassador Al Kaabi. The UAE is committed to join the 1997 Vienna Convention and the 1988 Joint Protocol. There is on-going internal consultation on the proposed UAE federal legislation nuclear liability draft. There also has been consultation on this subject with the IAEA Office of Legal Affairs. The draft legislation has been submitted to the cabinet but as yet no decision has been reached. Also the UAE has accepted the GCC recommendation that the GCC member states join the 1997 Vienna Convention and harmonize implementing regulations. The next steps for the UAE are the following: deposit the Instrument of Accession with the IAEA to become a party to the Vienna Convention; deposit the Instrument of Accession with the IAEA to become a party to the 1988 Joint Protocol; and after the consultation process is complete submit a final draft of the federal law to the cabinet.

The Board commends the UAE and all of the supporting entities for an outstanding and constructive meeting and the continuing success and progress of the nuclear power program. In the view of the board it was an excellent piece of work as all of the Board's questions from the third meeting were answered and as requested there was a visit to the Braka site along with comprehensive presentations on Fukushima and cyber security.

The primary subjects on which the Board would like to be briefed on at the March, 2012 meeting are the following: a progress report on the Construction License-what issues are still open?; other potential uses of nuclear power in the UAE beyond the straightforward use of electricity generation, such as desalinization and industrialization; issues surrounding the co-location of multiple nuclear power reactors; further consideration of the nuclear waste issues, including the search for a possible site for high-level waste disposal; ENEC's report on Fukushima; the potential effects of sand and dust storms on the nuclear power plants to be deployed at the Braka site; more on the development of the Braka site; recruitment—including that of women; more on the development of research compatibility in the UAE such as at Khalifa University; and an update on efforts to maintain the current strong public support of the program, including a description of how the Fukushima accident was reported to the UAE public.

 

 

Chairman's Preface

This is the third report of the International Advisory Board on the development of the United Arab Emirates Nuclear Power Program. We note with satisfaction that our earlier recommendations have been or are being carefully considered and implemented. The members of the Board are also pleased that all nuclear entities reporting to it showing a strong commitment to transparency and to the goals set for the Board. This makes it easier for the Board to be informative and helpful to the Government. Among the items to be taken up at the next meeting of the Board are site selection and cyber security.

  

 

Safety

The third meeting of the International Advisory Board for the United Arab Emirates nuclear power program was held in Abu Dhabi on March 7th and 8th, 2011. All members of the Board were in attendance. The Board meeting began on March 7th at an evening session. At this meeting, representatives of the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR) made an in-depth presentation. The next morning was taken up with a detailed report by the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) which included a segment from Khalifa University. Reports were also delivered by representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and of the Critical National Infrastructure Agency (CNIA). All five areas of responsibility of the Board were addressed in the various reports: Safety; Security; Non-proliferation; Transparency; and Sustainability.

The International Advisory Board found the United Arab Emirates continuing to make progress in its pursuit of safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency, sustainability and cooperation with other governments essential parts of its nuclear power program. The UAE remains committed to the highest standards and its nuclear power program continues to set an excellent example for others in the nuclear industry.
 

Safety assessment and recommendations

In the second report by the Board, following the October 6, 2010 IAB meeting, the Board made the following recommendations and requests concerning safety:

• The Board made a request to hear more on the subject of operational safety. The Board considered the question of FANR and ENEC adopting an iterative procedure for the filing of design documents and safety analyses incomplete at this time given the tentative character of the present filing procedures.
• The Board asked for a presentation from FANR on any "show stoppers" or problems in the UAE nuclear power program that it may have perceived in its regulatory work.
• The Board considered the issue of the development by ENEC of further in-house technical skills still open as no progress report had been presented.
• The Board also requested that the following specific subjects on safety be addressed at the March 2011 IAB meeting:

1. Site selection and risk evaluation of the site;
2. The challenge of building reactors under desert conditions and any lessons learned from the previous ENEC visit to the Palo Verde reactors in Arizona;
3. How best to develop essential services for the maintenance of the reactors;
4. The planned operation of the Nuclear Safety Review Board of ENEC. The IAB strongly supports the establishment of this Board;
5. The lessons that can be learnt by ENEC from the U.S. experience building reactors in Korea and the subsequent adoption and modification of U.S. technology by Korea in its reactor building program.

At its third session in March 2011 responses to these questions were received.

The IAB noted that considerable progress was being made on operational safety. Programs are being developed which benefit from the experience of Korea. However, there was not yet a specific plan for sending ENEC staff to Korea, with the objective of getting hands on experience from future commissioning of the reference plants in Korea. FANR responded on the issue of a possible "show stopper" that it was in the process of reviewing the 9000 pages of material supporting the license application by ENEC but no "show stopper", i.e. an issue that significantly would challenge the plan for the assessment of the licence application had so far been identified. Should such an issue arise, FANR will urgently deal with it and communicate it to ENEC.

In the FANR briefing, the Board inquired whether FANR planned to go to Korea and meet with the Korean Institute for Nuclear Safety (KINS) and conduct inspections of components for the reactor in Korea. FANR replied that they already have excellent contacts and cooperation with KINS based on a formal arrangement between the two agencies. As regards inspection, FANR had conducted inspections at ENEC headquarters in Abu Dhabi, and will conduct follow-up inspection on management system application at KEPCO in Seoul offices in April 2011. For the purpose of training, FANR inspectors are participating as observers in KINS inspections of manufacturing at various factories in Korea and elsewhere. Responding to a question from IAB FANR said that it plans to have resident inspectors on the UAE site by the time of the start of the nuclear construction. When asked about spot changes to the design during the construction phase, FANR replied that if any such change is judged to be important to safety, FANR would have to review it.

When asked by the Board whether the site locations at the Braka site are firmly established, or could still change, FANR replied that the location is the preferred site by ENEC. The results of the on-going safety assessment by FANR of the ENEC licence application will determine the suitability of the site for nuclear construction from the viewpoint of nuclear safety and security. The Board would like to hear more on this subject at the November meeting. A related issue raised by the Board was to what degree did proximity to the UAE's international border and the complexities of cross border cooperation as opposed to technical considerations influence the selection of the site. The site selection process is a subject the Board expressed an interest in keeping on the agenda for November. ENEC did present a thorough briefing on many site issues. However, in the view of the IAB, the site specific risks have not yet been fully analysed.

The threat of commercial aircraft impact was reviewed in detail. The danger of sandstorms was analysed as part of a presentation on issues related to building nuclear power plants under desert conditions which included an exposition on lessons learned from the ENEC visit to the Palo Verde reactors in Arizona. The Board was pleased with the way ENEC is reviewing plant modifications related to conditions such as water, temperature, and sandstorms. Informative presentations were also made on the development of essential services for the maintenance of reactors and the planned operation of the Nuclear Safety Review Board of ENEC.

In the FANR briefing on March 7, the Agency explained its view on risk informed and performance-based regulations. FANR emphasized the importance of well-trained management decision- makers at nuclear power plants as, among other things they must make specific technical decisions on safety issues. It is important for them to learn the uniqueness of nuclear and the way to manage risks at a nuclear power plant. On the other hand, with respect to the Board of Management of FANR, while it is important for this Board to have access to technical reports, it must, above all, be composed of highly respected individuals who can work as a buffering body to ensure that politics will not interfere with safety.

The IAB considered some specific issues in the area of safety and concluded that:

1. ENEC should join the APR1400 owners group at the earliest time and interact with them to exchange data.
2. The IAB would like to hear more at the November meeting on radiation protection. For example, who will analyse radiation sources and how will the limits on workers be set?
3. The Board noted with satisfaction the information given by FANR that the new regulations are written in both Arabic and English languages.
4. The Board was pleased with the UAE decision to adopt the Convention on Nuclear Liability.
5. The Board asked to be briefed at the November meeting on one issue concerning instrumentation and control; to what degree has the Westinghouse digital control system planned for the UAE reactors been adapted to APR1400 technology? Will these two technologies be deployed together for the first time in the Braka site reactors? If so, how is the comprehensive testing planned to be conducted before installation of the control system on site.

In conclusion, many IAB questions from the previous meeting on the subject of safety had been answered in the March 2011 IAB meeting and much important information had been imparted. Several important issues, however, were left open to be addressed at the next meeting. The principal ones are:

• Site selection

1. Can the locations within the Braka site still be adjusted or are they fixed?
2. To what degree did proximity to the UAE's international border and the complexities of cross border cooperation as opposed to technical considerations influence the selection of the site?
3. What site specific risks are deemed to be associated with the selected site?

• Radiation protection

1. How are emitters to be analysed?
2. What will be the procedure for setting limits on workers and other relevant information?

• The verification and validation procedure to ensure compatibility of the Westinghouse digital instrumentation and control system with the APR - 1400.

Not many days after the IAB meeting, an accident took place at the Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan when an enormous earthquake and tsunami struck the northeast coast of the country. The evaluation of and reports on the Fukushima accident have dominated global nuclear energy discussions ever since as discussed in IAEA Ministerial Conference in June 2011. Several IAB members have asked for a briefing at the November meeting on the incident itself and, in particular, its implication for the UAE nuclear program. The Board would like an in depth briefing on how the relevant safety aspects of the reactors to be deployed at the Braka site have been assessed in the light of the lessons learned from Fukushima accident.  The briefing should cover the potential vulnerability of the APR1400s, as to be located in the Braka site, to earthquakes and high water from the Gulf. The briefing should include consideration of the elevation of the reactors and other safety-critical facilities on the site. It should also include the lessons learned and how they will specifically affect the existing plans for the construction of the UAE reactors. The question of how to deal with climatic differences between the Gulf and Korea should be specifically delineated.

Security

Security assesment and recommendations

After the October 2010 IAB meeting the Board noted in its report that it had requested further discussion of four issues raised on the first IAB meeting:

1. appropriate boundaries between FANR and CNIA;
2. new security measures in the design of new nuclear power plants, including protection against impact by a large commercial aircraft;
3. the development of rules, regulations and practices for the import/export regime; and
4. security measures against non-conventional threats.

These issues were presented in detail by FANR and discussed with the Board. There were in depth technical exchanges on design changes to protect against aircraft impacts as well as design changes to withstand sandstorms, dust storms and greater salinity in the Gulf which could affect coolant water. The Board was pleased to note the Memorandum of Understanding developed by FANR and CNIA to delineate responsibilities. CNIA provided detailed information as to the development of the Design Basis Threat (DBT) and vulnerability assessment process which provides design considerations related to new security measures and security measures against non-conventional threats.

There was a lengthy discussion with CNIA on cyber security and how this issue might affect the UAE nuclear power program. CNIA noted that cyber security is within the design basis threat. CNIA said it would be primarily ENEC's responsibility to defend against a computer virus, consistent with regulatory requirements and national security interests outlined by CNIA, designed with malicious intent and deployed against the UAE nuclear program. The so-called Stuxnet worm which was found in Iran was mentioned. The IAB expressed its strong desire for a detailed presentation at the November 2011 Board meeting on the subject of cyber security. The Board would like to know the plans that ENEC has to protect computers from viruses and hackers as this responsibility appears to belong to ENEC.

There was a discussion of the Design Basis Threat (DBT). The Board asked who is responsible for developing the process which established the DBT. The Executive Affairs Authority of Abu Dhabi explained that this was a joint process involving FANR and CNIA. CNIA pointed out that the DBT is their responsibility to develop and maintain as it is considered a matter of National security. Based on the DBT, CNIA provides detailed requirements for mitigation of the DBT to ENEC for consideration in the design of the facility and security measures to ensure the plant is protected against the DBT.

FANR evaluates security at the facility based on the ability to demonstrate the capability to defeat the DBT. Board members then asked what entity has the responsibility for deciding that something is beyond the DBT, and further what entity is responsible for keeping the DBT updated and amending it as necessary. It was explained that FANR and CNIA collaborate on the determination of beyond DBT but FANR has the final determination. CNIA confirmed their responsibility to maintain and update the DBT and communicate the current DBT to FANR. In the Board's view, the full process should be the subject of an agenda item for the November 2011 Board meeting.

Lastly, the Board would like to hear more at the November meeting on new and spent fuel transportation, including how it is planned to take place and which entity licenses this and develops the appropriate procedures. This obviously will be significant to security. Finally, on security, at the next meeting the Board would like to request a briefing on crisis management generally and on the National Crisis and Emergency Management Authority.

Non-proliferation

Non-proliferation assessment and recommendations

The Board was pleased by the presentations made at the March meeting on the subject of non-proliferation by MOFA, FANR and ENEC. The Board expressed a desire to have regular updates at each Board meeting on progress on the full implementation of relevant international agreements, including the Additional Protocol and on the legislative framework for nuclear import and export control. Accordingly, these should be agenda items for the November meeting.

In addition, the Board is interested in discussing the following subjects in November:

• The Board recommends that the UAE government issue a statement about the importance of the UAE nuclear program to the global nuclear environment. Until recently the Middle East region has not had a deployed nuclear power plant and the UAE is setting an example for others.
• There was a detailed discussion with ENEC on the subject of high level waste management. ENEC is preparing for interim and long-term storage of spent fuel. Interim storage will initially be in spent fuel pools.  Each pool will have sufficient capacity to hold twenty years of spent fuel. After the requisite period in the pool, the spent fuel will be transferred to dry cask storage.
• ENEC presented three options, long-term disposal will be addressed by one or more of three options: reprocessing outside of the UAE; a commercial fuel lease arrangement; or a deep geological repository in the UAE or perhaps another country.

The first option is to conduct reprocessing of UAE spent fuel in another country. In such case, neither the plutonium nor the residue would return to the UAE even in fuel form. An exception might possibly be made for small quantities of plutonium for research and testing under FANR license and international agreement.

The second option is fuel leasing: the UAE would not own the fuel provided to it by another country or an international entity. The UAE would deploy the fuel in its reactors and then return it to the providing country or entity in the form of spent nuclear fuel.

The third option is deep geological disposal in the UAE or in another country. Initial investigations have been undertaken in the UAE to locate a potential area for deep geological disposal of spent fuel. A preliminary study is underway to identify a possible site for a repository in the UAE.

ENEC gave no clear identification as to its preference among the options or as to which one, if any, is currently being seriously considered. The Board would like to have a further presentation on this subject in November. It should include an evaluation of the three options and identification as to which one or ones are being considered for the UAE nuclear program. Finally the Board noted that studies should be undertaken on the feasibility and possible locations of a high level waste storage facility in the UAE and an assessment of the potential for this solution in the UAE. The Board requested a presentation on this subject in November.

Transparency

Transparency assessment and recommendations

In the report on the October 2010 meeting the IAB, after praising the public awareness program of ENEC, the Board had additional recommendations:

1. ENEC should make every effort to maintain good understanding and support ratings from the general public by keeping high level of transparency.
2. The Board recommended that ENEC and CNIA should conduct discussions on what plans the UAE government entities had with respect to communicating news about nuclear related accidents in the world, in the event that one should occur, as well as on waste management, to the general public. 
   
   The Board requested presentations on these two issues for the March 2011 meeting. ENEC accordingly delivered such presentations.The Board noted the excellent outreach program being developed by ENEC, for example by use of the public forum. For the November meeting the IAB requested further discussion of planned housing developments around the plant site.

Sustainability

Sustainability assessment and recommendations

At all IAB meetings to date sustainability has been subject of much discussion. The March 2011 meeting was no exception. The Board is of the firm view that the national human resource base must be strong in order for the program to be real long-term success. In the Report on the October 2010 meeting the Board noted that there had been no action on some of the recommendations. The Board had recommended that work be accelerated to develop a nuclear liability regime consistent with the Vienna Convention on Nuclear Liability and noted in its Report progress toward this objective. It requested that more information on this subject should be provided in the March meeting.

MOFA provided an in depth briefing on nuclear liability stating that the UAE will accede to the Vienna Convention and the 1988 Joint Protocol and presenting a detailed exposition on the proposed UAE nuclear liability legislation. The Board expressed satisfaction with this presentation noting the differences between the international system that the UAE will now join and the nuclear liability arrangement recently adopted by India.

The recommendations in the report of the October meeting for which there was no action are as follows:

1. The Board recommended that the UAE government consider expanding the scope of its human resource development beyond the narrow requirements of the construction, operation and maintenance of nuclear power plants to broader subjects in technical science. Accordingly, the Board requested a briefing during the March meeting by ENEC, assisted where appropriate by Khalifa University, on plans to expand human resource capabilities in the area of research in the technical sciences related to nuclear safety.
2. The IAB recommended that the UAE accelerate the development of an integrated fuel cycle strategy to include methods for securing long-term fuel supplies, decommissioning of nuclear facilities and the management and storage of spent fuel and radioactive waste. With respect to long-term fuel supplies, members of the IAB also recommended that the program explore potential alternatives that exhibit enhanced proliferation resistance as compared to traditional uranium oxide fuels. The Board requested briefings by ENEC on plans for an integrated fuel cycle strategy and on potential long-term fuel supplies as well as potential alternatives that exhibit enhanced proliferation resistance.

In addition there were specific agenda items requested for the March meeting. The Board asked for a review of required resource development corresponding to the needs, a detailed plan as to how best to source staff requirements, including a reconciliation of the interaction of the need base demand curve with the supply curve. The Board also wished to hear Khalifa University's view on the development of a training centre to give students practical experience as well as plans to develop nuclear research capabilities and how best to mobilize educational training capacity. In its briefing ENEC did a thorough job in responding to the various Board requests. First, on the subject of the fuel cycle. ENEC in its briefing advised the IAB that its prime contract with KEPCO provides for provision of nuclear fuel for the initial core with an option for two reloads for each nuclear power plant. ENEC is in the process of negotiating long-term contracts for uranium beyond this guaranteed period. ENEC will manage its strategic inventory at the fuel fabricator and with finished fuel assemblies at the reactor site. In addition ENEC is considering two options: working with KEPCO under a FANR license to build a fuel assembly plant in Abu Dhabi to address the risk of supply interruption and working with multiple fuel fabricators to create alternative supplies.

 As for staffing and retention issues, ENEC has expended considerable effort in this area as well. KEPCO, following substantial completion of each nuclear power plant, is obligated by the prime contract to deliver 60 % of the operating staff if needed. KEPCO will be providing training for some 500 ENEC personnel. A detailed hiring plan is in process for ENEC involving a mixture of UAE nationals and some experienced expatriates.

KEPCO, at least initially, will be the prime source of personnel for the Braka operating company. ENEC and KEPCO will be joint owners of this operating company and will work together to develop the corporate staff of this operating company. The support staff capability will be transferred to the operating company over the period 2017 to 2020. Eventually ENEC will hire and train the complete staff for each operating nuclear power plant. As mentioned above, at the beginning a significant portion of the staff will come from KEPCO but as the years pass more and more will come from the training and educational capabilities being developed within the UAE.

The Board was impressed with the number of national and international experts being acquired by ENEC as well as the percentage of women involved as staff. Today at ENEC 36 % of the staff are women and 42 % are Emiratis. ENEC forecasts that by 2017 it will have 250 nuclear engineers on site representing nearly 80 % of its requirements.

Much of this training and education effort is being led by Khalifa University. Now fully 10% of UAE college students are pursuing engineering or science degrees. United Arab Emirates national scholarships support study in nuclear, civil, mechanical, electrical, and chemical engineering; approximately 40 of these scholarships are awarded each year. Khalifa University offers a Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering and a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering. The University is creating a Nuclear Engineering Advisory Committee which is developing a research road map to focus on, among other subjects, small reactors with a desalination emphasis, research reactors, waste disposal, proliferation resistant fuel, nuclear medicine and educational simulators. Finally 50 % of engineering students at Khalifa University are Emirati women. The IAB Board members congratulated the UAE on this number as well as ENEC on its commitment to women in the workforce.

For the November IAB meeting the Board requested to hear more on the subjects of inducements to retain qualified personnel, especially of field engineer, quality assurance, education developments in training nuclear engineers and on the civil engineering aspects of the program. Also, the Board would like to learn more on the supply chains and localization program in United Arab Emirates being developed by KEPCO and ENEC's view of their strength and expertise.

The Board hopes that a site visit can be arranged at the time of the November 2011 IAB meeting or when construction of the plants commences at the site. The Board would also be gratified by more rapid publication of its Reports, within the limits of what is practical. It has made in this Report a number of requests for agenda items at the next meeting, the three most prominent being: site issues; cyber security, and lessons from Fukushima. Once again, the IAB wishes to praise the outstanding work being done by the UAE and all of its supporting entities in the nuclear power program.  

 

Chairman's Preface

 

Introduction

This is the second report by the Board under the mandate set forth by the Government of the United Arab Emirates in the white paper entitled "The Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear Energy." Identifying nuclear safety and security as indispensable elements in any nuclear power program, the government determined to establish an independent regulatory body responsible for developing and enforcing legally binding standards and regulations designed to achieve the highest standards of nuclear safety and security – the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR). In addition, in order to make safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency and cooperation with governments and companies of responsible states essential parts of its operations, the Government established the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) to manage its nuclear power program. 

Early in its development of a policy for the nuclear sector, the  government concluded that for nuclear power to play its essential role in the future development of the regional and global economy, it must be definitively and unequivocally separated from its non-peaceful uses. Accordingly, the government decided to embrace the highest level of commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, and, among other undertakings, the UAE renounced uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing within the country. These commitments were subsequently made legally binding. Transparency was recognized as an important aspect of the commitment to non-proliferation and partly for this reason the concept of an International Advisory Board was set forth in the white paper.

It was also well understood that for a nuclear power program to be successful, it must be sustainable. As such, when the International Advisory Board was established in late 2009 it was charged with advising on, and reviewing, the UAE program not only in the areas of safety, security, non-proliferation, and transparency, but also sustainability.

The Board is mandated to meet twice a year, report its findings to the UAE government, and subsequently make its reports public. The first report of the Board was published in October 2010. It contained assessments and recommendations on each of the five areas: safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency and sustainability.

On October 6, 2010, FANR, ENEC, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the UAE, the Critical National Infrastructure Authority (CNIA)  and Khalifa University of Science, Technology and Research (KUSTAR) reported to the Board on the five areas. All of the reports were carefully prepared and presented. Thorough, authoritative and due account had been taken of the recommendations made by the Board in its first report. Some issues that had been raised were completely resolved, some partially and some remain to be resolved.

The following are the new assessments and recommendations of the Board for the five areas, along with suggestions for additional agenda items for March 8, 2011 when the Board next meets. Overall the Board found the UAE nuclear program to be progressing well, and each of the entities to be highly responsible and cooperative. Finally, the Board very much welcomes Dr. Dale Klein and the members of ENEC's Nuclear Safety Review Board to the program. 

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Safety

Safety assessment and recommendations

The Board in its initial report found, with respect to FANR, strong evidence of commitment to regulatory independence and competence, and in relation to ENEC, a serious commitment to the establishment of a strong safety culture. The Board confirms these judgments.

At its first session the Board made the following recommendations on safety:

1. The Board found strong evidence that the UAE entities had given thorough consideration to safety related issues involved in the procurement and construction of future nuclear facilities. At the same time there was a concern that equal attention had not yet been given to safety related issues involved in commissioning, operation and maintenance of those facilities. Therefore the IAB recommended that more resources should be dedicated to operational safety, including specialized training courses and secondment for future operating staff to learn from existing operating units in other countries. Active participation of the future ENEC operating staff in the commissioning tests of the first APR-1400 type unit being built in Korea, Shin Kori 3 and 4, would be most valuable for gaining hands-on experience.
2. In keeping with the UAE program's openness to international cooperation, the Board recommended that the UAE nuclear regulators and operators establish formal peer review programs with their counterparts in other countries.
3. Given the recent establishment of the UAE nuclear industry, the Board recommended that FANR and ENEC adopt an iterative procedure for filing of design documents and safety analysis that are attached to the license application for the construction of the UAE's first nuclear power plant (e.g. provision of technical documentation as soon as complete sections are available to allow for a more comprehensive, and unhurried review assessment).
4. With regard to FANR, the International Advisory Board noted the important role of the organization's Board of Management, which is invested with ultimate decision making authority from the regulatory perspective. In light of this important function, the IAB recommended that participation on the Board of Management become a full-time position and that, until such time as the UAE industry produces sufficient numbers of experienced personnel, additional training will be provided to strengthen the capabilities and skills of members of the Board.
5. The IAB also recommended that ENEC develop further in-house engineering capabilities specifically aimed at continually improving and enhancing safety levels.

Actions taken toward safety recommendations

ENEC and FANR have made significant efforts on the first and second recommendations. The Board found that the information presented on these recommendations most valuable but would like to learn more about operational safety at the next Board meeting. Regarding recommendation three, concerning filing of design documents and safety analysis, the Board noted the tentative character of the present filing procedures and the quantitative rather than qualitative safety requirements established. The Board considers these agenda items still open and a further presentation at the next Board meeting should be planned. With respect to recommendation four, the Board notes that while full-time participation is desirable for members of the FANR Board of Management there should be some flexibility so as not to lose members who have other valuable and relevant responsibilities. In addition, the IAB believes that FANR should actively be looking for and communicating to relevant agencies of the government, as well as to its Board any "show stoppers" that it may perceive. The IAB considers this agenda point open and would like to hear a presentation on the subject from FANR at its next meeting.On recommendation five regarding further in-house engineering capabilities, no progress has been noted and the issue thus remains open and still before the Board.

Security 

Security assessment and recommendations

The Board found in its first report that the UAE government entities were engaged in serious efforts to establish plans in the various areas of nuclear security. These efforts are continuing. The first session of the Board made the following security recommendations:

1. While acknowledging the benefits of coordination between FANR and CNIA, the IAB found that boundaries and responsibilities between the two organizations were not consistently defined. The IAB recommended that appropriate steps be taken to militate against the risks of gaps or overlaps in responsibility.
2. The IAB recommended that the government integrate new security measures into the design of nuclear power plants to protect against threats including impact by a large commercial aircraft.
3. The IAB noted the importance of enhancing the import/export regime within the UAE and recommended that resources be directed at this effort on a priority basis.
4. Due to the increasing number of non-conventional asymmetric threats raised to society, the issue of security for nuclear power plants calls for more attention. The IAB recommended a due-diligence effort in pursuing enhanced security measures to protect nuclear facilities.

Actions taken toward security recommendations

At its meeting on October 6, 2010, the IAB discussed the appropriate boundaries between the security responsibilities of FANR and CNIA for the maintenance of physical security for the nuclear program. The IAB does not consider this discussion complete and, accordingly, the issue remains on the Board's agenda. The other three recommendations at the first session require considerably more discussion. The Board expects that at the next meeting there will be a presentation which goes into some technical detail on new security measures to protect against threats, such as by a large commercial aircraft.

The development of rules, regulations and practices, as well as hands on experience relating to the important import/export regime must remain on the agenda, even though it did receive some attention at the October 6th meeting. Finally, the general pursuit of enhanced nuclear facility security measures (envelope) merits further Board consideration.

Non-proliferation

Non-proliferation assessment and recommendations

From the beginning the UAE nuclear energy program has been committed to the highest standards of non-proliferation, and the Board finds that remains very much the case. The UAE deserves special praise for this from the international community. In its previous report the Board had the following recommendations:

1. The IAB recommended that the government conduct full implementation of the signed agreements and the Additional Protocol.
2. Monitoring and control of nuclear transfer among countries is an essential element of the global non-proliferation system. The IAB recommended that the government establish an adequate legislative framework for nuclear export and import control to ensure that transfer of nuclear materials, equipment and technology occurs in a proliferation resistant, secure, safe, and environmentally responsible manner with proper inspection when needed.

Actions taken toward non-proliferation recommendations

The Board was pleased with the presentations on this subject by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as by FANR and ENEC. Nevertheless, the Board would like to have regular updates on progress on the full implementation of relevant international agreements as well as the Additional Protocol and on the evaluation of the legislative framework for nuclear export and import control. Accordingly, the Board considers these to be open items.

Transparency

Transparency assessment and recommendations 

As evidenced by the publication of its white paper, and the commitments therein, the UAE government has supported from the beginning and is continuing to emphasize full transparency for its nuclear program. The Board in its previous report had the following recommendation on this subject:

• Noting that, at the time of its first meeting, the proposed location of the UAE's first nuclear power plant had not been announced, the IAB recommended that ENEC develop a comprehensive public awareness program to target the population around the site of the nuclear power plant, including the general public, neighbouring countries and international communities. The IAB suggested that the program should be based on prior research about the attitudes, opinions and level of knowledge of the intended audience and it should describe the need for nuclear energy in terms of its economic feasibility, its contribution to energy independence and how it aligns with the nation's development goals. The public awareness program should provide a clear understanding of the risks to health and safety and means and actions taken to manage those risks.

Actions taken toward transparency recommendations

The Board was very pleased by ENEC's report of the development and evolution of its comprehensive public awareness program. The Board in this regard urges ENEC to keep up the good work. The Board also has the following additional recommendations:

1. ENEC should make every effort to maintain high approval ratings from the public. The Board would like to hear a report from ENEC on this subject at the next meeting.
2. The Board recommends that there would be discussions between FANR, ENEC and CNIA on how to provide to the general public information on two topics that have turned out to be areas of public concern elsewhere: possible means for nuclear waste management and potential consequences of accidents at nuclear power plants, including consequences of severe accidents that are expected to be most improbable but not impossible.

These discussions should examine methods that are available for such communications to the public. The Board would like to have a presentation on these subjects on the agenda for the next meeting.

Sustainability

Sustainability assessment and recommendations 

The Board fully appreciates that the UAE is, and remains, committed to approach its peaceful nuclear energy program in a manner that best ensures long-term sustainability. This approach requires continuous efforts. In its previous report the Board had the following recommendations:

1. The IAB recommended that the UAE government consider expanding the scope of its human resource development plans beyond the narrow requirements of construction, operation and maintenance of nuclear power plants to embrace research in technical sciences relevant for nuclear safety. One aim of this research should be to develop in-depth understanding of key safety fundamentals as well as understanding of operating experience, prior incidents and similar issues. The research should also enhance the capability to independently assess the safety of a nuclear power plant.
2. IAB recommended that the UAE program accelerate the development of an integrated fuel cycle strategy, including methods for securing long term fuel supplies, as well as arrangements for covering the costs of decommissioning of nuclear facilities and the management and storage of spent fuel and nuclear waste. In this regard the Board noted the requirements and standards set in the IAEA joint convention on spent fuel and radioactive waste.
3. With regard to long-term fuel supplies, members of the IAB also recommended that the program explore potential alternatives that exhibit enhanced proliferation resistance as compared to traditional uranium-oxide fuels.
4. The IAB recommended that work also be accelerated to develop and implement a nuclear liability regime consistent with existing standards embodied in multilateral liability arrangements such as the Vienna Convention on Nuclear Liability. 

Actiona taken toward sustainability recommendations

The Board notes progress in the development of a nuclear liability regime consistent with international standards but would like to learn more on this subject at its next meeting. The Board did not however note action on its four other recommendations. Accordingly, the Board would like to have an in depth presentation by ENEC, assisted as appropriate by KUSTAR, on plans to expand its human resource capabilities in the area of research in the technical sciences relevant to nuclear safety; methods for securing long term fuel suppliers, arrangments for decommissioning of nuclear facilities, and the management spent fuel and other nuclear waste (to include the disposition of plutonium as relevant); and a program to consider potential alterative fuel suppliers that exhibit enhanced proliferation resistance over traditional uranium-oxide fuels.

Next proposed topics

There are a considerable number of ongoing and additional agenda items for the next meeting of the Board set forth in the five sets of recommendations presented above. In addition the Board would like to set forth a list of specific subjects that it would like addressed at the next meeting supplementary to the above recommendations:

• Nuclear technology transfer.
• Site selection and risk evaluation of the site.
• The challenge of building reactors under desert conditions and any lessons learned from the previous ENEC visit to the reactors in Arizona.
• Any design changes militated by consideration of possible aircraft impacts.
• Any design changes which are necessary as a result of potential consideration of the effects of sand storms, dust storms as well as possible higher levels of salinity in the waters of the Gulf, and the effect of such a change on coolant water.
• A review of required resource development from the need base.
• A detailed plan as to how to best source staff requirements including a reconciliation of the interaction of a need base demand curve with the supply curve.
• KUSTAR's view on the development of a training centre to give students hands on experience, as well as plans to develop research capabilities in the nuclear field.
• How best to mobilize the educational training capacity in the country with long term research needs in mind.
• How best to develop core services for the maintenance of the reactors.
• Planned development around the nuclear plant area.
• The planned operation of the Nuclear Safety Review Board of ENEC.
• Plans for protection of computers against viruses and hackers (cyber security).
• What can ENEC learn from the United States-Korean experience.
• What are the plans for reducing reliance on technical services organizations.

Chairman's Preface

It is with great satisfaction that I transmit a full report of the first meeting of the International Advisory Board of the United Arab Emirates Nuclear Power Program. The initiative of the government of the UAE has been welcomed by the world as timely and farsighted. The pursuit of the program entails a great responsibility forall involved, notably regarding safety, security and transparency. I and all the other members of the International Advisory Board feel honored to share in some of that responsibility. We expect to be fully and continuously informed and will do our best to offer advice based on our professional experience and contribute to a safe and successful implementation of the program.

Safety

The International Advisory Board endorsed the UAE's effort to make nuclear safety thehighest priority

The International Advisory Board (IAB) views safety as a top priority in the development of the UAE nuclear energy program. Board members were heartened to find that the UAE government has thoroughly reviewed the safety requirements needed for embarking on its peaceful civil nuclear energy program. As a first step, the government issued a white paper entitled "The Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear Energy", which focused on nuclear safety as an indispensible element in the development of the UAE nuclear sector. Subsequently, the UAE government initiated steps to establish a competent, independent regulatory authority to develop and enforce comprehensive safety regulations and standards to govern planning, design, construction, operation & maintenance, management and decommissioning of nuclear facilities, as well as the use, handling and storage of nuclear fissile, fertile and radioactive materials. Under this emerging regulatory environment the UAE government's goal appears to be to hold nuclear operations within its borders to the highest international standards for nuclear safety and security. This presumes that both the regulator and operators understand their responsibilities for nuclear safety, with the regulator providing safety regulation and guidance and the operator implementing the necessary programs to ensure that the plants operate well within that safety guidance. Looking beyond the borders of the UAE, the government has entered into a range of international instruments and agreements related to nuclear safety.

The Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR) was established by Federal Law No.6 of September 2009. Under this legislation, FANR was established as an independent regulatory authority in charge of the task of developing and enforcing binding safety standards and regulations intended to achieve the highest standards of nuclear safety, nuclear security and radiation protection on par with those adopted in the countries with best records in these areas

In briefings by FANR to the IAB, the former outlines its core objectives and responsibilities (see below)

FANR Objectives

1. Reduce any harmful impact of the use of nuclear technology and ionizing radiation on human life, health and living conditions of both present and future generations, the environment and property,
2. Keep worker and public exposure to ionizing radiation to a level which is as low as reasonably achievable and
3. Prevent any diversion of nuclear or radioactive materials and nuclear technology for non-peaceful purposes.

FANR has a responsibility to develop regulations covering all of the following areas:

1. Selection of a site for the construction of a nuclear facility,
2. Preparation of a site for the construction of a nuclear facility,
3. Design of a nuclear facility,
4. Construction of a nuclear facility,
5. Commissioning of a nuclear facility,
6. Operation and maintenance of a nuclear facility,
7. Closure or a change in the closure date of any nuclear facility,
8. Decommissioning of a nuclear facility,
9. Modifications having significance to safety of the management system and organizational arrangements or the systems, structures, and components of any nuclear facility,
10. Possession, use, manufacture and handling of any regulated material or part of any regulated material in the State,
11. Import or export of any regulated material into or from the State, subject to any consents required pursuant to the provisions of Law No. 13 of 2007,
12. Transportation of any regulated material within the State,
13. Introduction or removal of any regulated material to or from any nuclear facility,
14. Storage of any regulated material within the State,
15. Disposal of any regulated material within the State and
16. Emergency preparedness relating to any nuclear facility. Under the UAE nuclear law, each licensee is responsible for taking all steps necessary to reduce the risk of any nuclear related accident to a level that is as low as reasonably achievable.

Subsequent to issuing regulation, FANR will also have the responsibility to assess the capability of applicants and to issue licenses to those seeking to engage in a regulated activity. Finally, FANR will continue to oversee the performance of license holders through a system of ongoing inspections to ensure that they continuously meet the requirements described in their licenses and applicable regulations and laws.

Briefings provided by the senior management of the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) to IAB members also demonstrated that, when establishing the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) in December 20, 2009, the UAE government clearly sought to make the development of a safety culture an essential element of the new organization. The government expects the ENEC management and every employee to understand that the success of the UAE nuclear program, as well as its own success, will hinge upon the establishment of the highest safety conditions on the technical and behavioral sides. Quality assurance programs will be built upon proven engineering practices in the selection, design, construction and operation of future nuclear power plants. The ENEC management is also expected to demonstrate its safety minded attitude in its decisions and actions and seek to promote an appropriate safety culture through the development of a safety conscious work environment and open communications. The promotion of an advanced safety culture starts from the first steps towards planning, design and construction, aiming to create an environment that encourages reporting of safety concerns and a questioning attitude as part of a continually improving high quality corrective action program to address any concerns or shortcomings. The IAB found strong evidence that ENEC's requirements and the criteria utilized in its 2009 bidding process, demonstrated that safety was considered as a key factor in the award of the prime contract for the construction of the UAE's first nuclear power plant. It was important to ENEC's decision to purchase the APR-1400 reactor type given that the design provides safety and seismic robustness. Similarly, and as a result of the operational components of its prime contract, ENEC gave significant consideration to the Korean consortium's consistent high performance with regard to reliability and safety. In an effort to ensure its long term sustainability, ENEC included obligations in its prime contract regarding the establishment of a robust capacity building program.

The UAE government has also signaled its commitment to fulfill its safety obligations through entry into numerous international agreements related to nuclear safety. These include the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (1987), the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (1987), the Convention on Nuclear Safety (2009) and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (2009).

Safety assessment

The International Advisory Board endorsed the UAE's efforts to make nuclear safety the highest priority in the establishment of FANR and ENEC, including a clear division in the roles and responsibilities of these two entities. With regard to FANR, the IAB found strong evidence of commitment to regulatory independence and competence, including legal provisions designed to insulate regulatory decision makers from outside pressure and to provide the regulatory organization with independent source of funding. In relation to ENEC, the IAB found a serious commitment to the establishment of a strong safety culture as well as indications that the ENEC management fully understands both the importance and the complexity of this undertaking. The IAB supports both FANR's and ENEC's efforts to benchmark themselves against the best regulatory and operator regimes in the world, including their plans to establish cooperative arrangements with other international nuclear regulators and operators. FANR cooperation with its Korean counterpart, Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS), and ENEC cooperation with the Korean operating organization, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. Ltd (KHNP) would be of first priority, given the familiarity of the Korean organizations with the design of the APR-1400 and its operation.

The IAB acknowledged and fully supports the UAE program's commitment to work closely with the IAEA as well as the openness of the UAE entities to cooperate with other international nuclear bodies such as Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) and World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO). The IAB appreciated the considerable efforts undertaken by both FANR and ENEC, to appoint leaders and experts with appropriate capability and experience, and to deliver a program that meets international safety standards. The IAB was also encouraged by the development of induction training programs for all new ENEC staff that feature a heavy emphasis on nuclear safety.

Safety Recommendations

• While the IAB found strong evidence that the UAE entities had given deep consideration to safety related issues involved in the procurement and construction of future nuclear facilities, there was a concern that the same level of consideration had not yet been given to safety related issues involved in commissioning, operation and maintenance of those facilities. Therefore, the IAB recommended that greater resources be dedicated to operational safety, including specialized training courses and secondment for future operating staff to learn from operating units in other countries. Active participation of the ENEC operating staff in the commissioning tests of the first APR-1400 type units being built in Korea, Shin Kori 3 and 4, would be most valuable for gaining hands-on experience
• In keeping with the UAE program's openness to international cooperation, the IAB recommended that the UAE nuclear regulators and operators establish formal peer review programs with their counterparts in other countries.
• Given the recent establishment of the UAE nuclear industry, the IAB recommended that FANR and ENEC adopt an iterative procedure for filing of design documents and safety analysis that are attached to the license application for the construction of the UAE's first nuclear power plant. (e.g. provision of technical documentation as soon as mature drafts are available to allow for a more comprehensive, and unhurried review and assessment).
• With regard to FANR, the IAB noted the important role of the organization's Board of Management, which was invested with ultimate decision making authority from the regulatory perspective. In light of that importance, the IAB recommended that participation on the Board of Management become a full-time position and that, until such time as the UAE industry produces sufficient numbers of experienced personnel, additional training be provided to increase the capabilities and skills of members of the FANR Board of Management.
• The IAB also recommended that FANR evaluate the concept of utilizing quantitative versus qualitative safety goals and of introducing safety performance indicators (PI).
• The IAB also recommended that ENEC develop further in-house engineering capabilities specifically aimed at continually improving and enhancing the level of safety.

Security

The UAE government supports and complies with numerous international nuclear security related agreements

 

The UAE has already taken several steps with respect to nuclear security. As previously discussed, the government established FANR to plan and implement a program of nuclear regulation in the area of nuclear security including the physical protection of nuclear facilities and the use, storage and transport of radioactive and nuclear materials. The government also supported the creation of a dedicated group within the already existing Critical National Infrastructure Authority (CNIA) with primary responsibility for the implementation of nuclear security. Together these two entities developed a preliminary Integrated Security Master Plan that reflected the UAE's emerging security related regulatory requirements as well as the IAEA Nuclear Security Guidelines. For example, some components of the preliminary Integrated Security Master Plan included performance background investigations and the issuance of security clearances to individuals working in sensitive roles within the nuclear sector to ensure the reliability of operational personnel. Other components included the establishment of large exclusionary and non-development zones around the proposed sites for future nuclear power plants, as well as the development of internal access controls to protect sensitive areas within any future nuclear facility and the development of a design basis threat following rigorous assessment of potential threats against nuclear facilities established in the UAE. Additionally, the UAE government supports and complies with numerous international nuclear security related agreements including the UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

Security Assessment

The IAB found that government entities were engaged in serious efforts to establish plans in the areas of nuclear security, including the physical protection of nuclear materials and installations and the use, storage and transport of radioactive and nuclear materials. The IAB endorsed the government approach in developing the Integrated Nuclear Security Master Plan, promoted by the IAEA.

Security Recommendations

• While acknowledging the benefits of coordination between FANR and CNIA, the IAB found that boundaries and responsibilities between the two organizations were not consistently defined. As such the IAB recommended that appropriate steps be taken to militate against the risks of gaps or overlaps in responsibility.
• The IAB recommended that the government integrate new security measures into the design of nuclear power plants to protect against threats including impact by a large commercial aircraft.
• The IAB noted the importance of enhancing the import/export regime within the UAE and recommended that resources be directed at this effort on a priority basis.
• The security issue of nuclear power plants is gaining more attention these days due to the increasing security issues by non-conventional asymmetric threats to the society. The IAB recommended a due-diligence effort in pursuing enhanced security measures to protect nuclear facilities.

Non-proliferation

The UAE government has been active beyond its own national nuclear program to support global non-proliferation efforts

The UAE's peaceful nuclear energy program is living up to its international commitment to non-proliferation: inter alia through renouncing any intention to develop domestic enrichment and reprocessing capability and obtaining its fuel from reliable and responsible international suppliers. Furthermore, the UAE government has been active beyond its own national nuclear program to support global non-proliferation efforts and to enhance confidence in the international cooperation in peaceful use of nuclear power. For this purpose, the UAE government has contributed to the establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank, which would help ensure the supply of nuclear fuel and thus eliminate the need for domestic uranium enrichment capabilities.

The UAE government understands that the concept of physical protection is a fundamental national responsibility, and is committed to fully adhering and complying with its obligations under international non-proliferation agreements. In that vein, FANR has been charged with developing a robust State System for Accounting and Control (SSAC) of nuclear material. The UAE government is also working closely with the IAEA to put in place the agreement between the UAE and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons consistent with the UAE obligations under the Additional Protocol to this safeguards agreement.

Based upon extensive briefing to the IAB, it appeared that the UAE understands the important issues associated with establishing domestic radioactive waste disposal capabilities and is looking into developing a comprehensive waste management system that reflects the highest standards of international practice and excludes domestic reprocessing. While a final waste disposal strategy has not yet been completed, the UAE is considering various final waste disposal options, including deep geologic repository for the waste classes that need very long term isolation.

Non-proliferation assessment

The International Advisory Board welcomed the UAE government commitment to refrain from developing uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing capabilities. The IAB endorsed the UAE decision, also set forth in the White Paper, to support, as it explores in the future various technology options, innovative reactors and full cycle technologies that exhibit enhanced proliferation resistance. This commitment strongly demonstrates the peaceful nature of the UAE nuclear program. The IAB also endorsed the government's deep commitment to fulfill its international safeguards obligations.

Non-proliferation recommendations

• The IAB recommended that the government conduct full implementation of the signed agreements and Additional Protocol.
• Applying monitoring and control on nuclear transfer among countries is an essential element of the global non-proliferation system. The IAB recommended that the government establish an adequate legislative framework for nuclear export and import control to ensure that transfer of nuclear materials, equipment and technology occurs in a proliferation resistant, secure, safe and environmentally responsible manner with proper inspection when needed.

Transparency

The IAB endorsed the UAE government's efforts to achieve and maintain operational transparency throughout the development of the nuclear program

As the UAE government began to appreciate the potential contribution that peaceful nuclear energy could make to meeting national energy requirements in a secure and environmentally responsible manner, it committed itself to the highest levels of transparency. Such an action was deemed necessary in order to gain domestic support and to assure the international community and international nuclear oversight bodies of the peaceful intention of the UAE nuclear program. This commitment was embodied in the UAE Nuclear White Paper, which was made available to the public from the very outset of the UAE program and which included a frank and direct discussion of the motivation behind the UAE's exploration of nuclear energy, as well as a description of the manner in which the UAE would implement any peaceful nuclear energy program.

Following the publication of the UAE Nuclear White Paper, the UAE government took several additional and tangible steps to achieve a high degree of transparency in its program. First, the government has directed all entities within the sector to cooperate closely with the IAEA in all aspects of the UAE nuclear program. Second, the government established FANR as a fully independent body, with its own long-term funding sources and significant protections for regulatory staff to ensure that they could face no adverse actions as a result of a regulatory decision. Third, ENEC's procurement process was designed to allow for joint venture arrangements with foreign investors, which would provide them, not only the opportunity to own equity in future UAE nuclear plants, but would also have a strong operator role. Such a structure would be necessary to provide those foreign partners unfettered access to information regarding the manner in which the plants were constructed and operated. Fourth, the government agreed on the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. Finally, the UAE established the International Advisory Board, the entity developing and publishing this report to both review the status of the UAE nuclear energy program and to publish its findings to the public. Together, these steps ensure an unprecedented level of transparency, providing the world with an unobstructed window into the establishment and operation of the UAE's emerging nuclear sector.

Beyond making its White Paper accessible to the general public, the UAE government also undertook other steps to ensure effective public information and engagement on nuclear issues related to health, safety and the environment, including efforts to communicate the basis of its decisions and requirements related to its contemplated nuclear program. Such steps included nuclear awareness commercials designed to raise the public's understanding concerning the UAE nuclear program.

Transparency assessment

The IAB endorsed the UAE government's efforts to achieve and maintain operational transparency throughout the development of the nuclear program. The establishment of the International Advisory Board and the government's commitment to full transparency with the Board, as well as the decision to give the public access to the IABs' reports was recognized as a particularly forward-thinking step to assure transparency. The IAB also strongly supported the government's commitment to working closely with the IAEA. The IAB acknowledged the government's plans to provide educational information to the public regarding the rationale behind the introduction of nuclear power, as well as to inform the public regarding the planned siting of the first nuclear plants and the steps being taken to ensure compliance with national and international standards and conventions.

Transparency recommendations

• Noting that, at the time of its first meeting, the proposed location of the UAE's first nuclear power plants had not been announced, the IAB recommended that ENEC develop a comprehensive public awareness program to target the population around the site of a nuclear power plant, including the general public, neighboring countries and international communities. The IAB suggested that the program should be based on prior research about the attitudes, opinions and level of knowledge of the intended audience and that it should describe the need for nuclear energy in terms of its economic feasibility, its contribution to energy independence and how it aligns with the nation's development goals. The public awareness program should also provide a clear understanding of the risks to health and safety and the means and actions taken to manage those risks.

Sustainability

The UAE government has committed to approach its peaceful nuclear energy program in a manner that best ensures long-term sustainability

The UAE government has committed to approach its peaceful nuclear energy program in a manner that best ensures long-term sustainability. In order to sustain the nuclear energy program, the UAE government recognizes that it must develop essential nuclear capabilities within the national labor force and particularly among the UAE citizens. To this end, the government has put into force several dedicated training and educational programs, including specialized scholarships and advancement opportunities to ensure that national talent will be capable of fully meeting future staffing requirements of the nuclear program. At the time of its first meeting the IAB learned that FANR and ENEC in association with Khalifa University of Science, Technology and Research (KUSTAR) had granted scholarships to 40 students to study nuclear-related disciplines in a number of distinguished universities in the United States, United Kingdom, France and the Republic of Korea.

The UAE government also understands that a comprehensive strategy for the initial sourcing of fresh fuel and ultimate disposition of spent fuel and other nuclear wastes must be developed to ensure the long term sustainability of the UAE's peaceful nuclear energy program. To meet UAE fuel requirements and assure a steady supply of fuel, the government is evaluating a number of options, including traditional market purchases from a diverse portfolio of suppliers, as well as more innovative concepts such as fuel leasing arrangements. The UAE will also be playing an important role in the proposed establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank. Although the nuclear fuel markets function well today and can be expected to do so in the foreseeable future, the nuclear fuel bank would provide a potential fall-back source for nuclear fuel services such as enrichment, processing or management that were temporarily unavailable through regular channels. On the back end of the fuel cycle, the government is still engaged in long term planning for the management of spent fuel and for the ultimate disposal of nuclear waste. As a necessary part of sustainable waste management, the government has called for the establishment of a dedicated decommissioning fund into which nuclear operators would be obligated to contribute and from which the government would draw funds to cover the long-term decommissioning of nuclear sites and the disposition of nuclear waste.

Sustainability assessment

The IAB found the UAE's focus on human resource development and fuel cycle strategy (including long term management of nuclear waste) to be well placed. Efforts in the area of developing national talent were welcomed and seen to be dynamic, if somewhat narrowly focused to reflect the program's intent to become self-sufficient in the operation of peaceful nuclear power plants. However, the IAB found long-term fuel cycle planning underdeveloped, even when acknowledging that no nuclear fuel is scheduled for loading into UAE plants until 2016, at the earliest. Finally, the IAB noted that work remains to be done in developing and implementing a nuclear liability regime that would encourage sustainable investment in the UAE's nuclear energy sector

Sustainability recommendations

• The IAB recommended that the UAE government consider expanding the scope of its human resource development plans beyond the narrow requirements of construction, operation and maintenance of nuclear power plants to embrace research in technical sciences relevant for the nuclear safety. One aim of this research should be to develop in-depth understanding of key safety issues and a capability to independently assess safety of a nuclear power plant.
• IAB recommended that the UAE program accelerate the development of an integrated fuel cycle strategy, including methods for securing long term fuel supplies, as well as arrangements for covering the costs of decommissioning of nuclear facilities and the management of spent fuel and other nuclear waste.
• With regard to long-term fuel supplies, members of the IAB also recommended that the program explore potential alternatives that exhibit enhanced proliferation resistance to traditional uranium-oxide fuels.
• The IAB recommended that work also be accelerated to develop and implement a nuclear liability regime consistent with existing standards embodied in multilateral liability arrangements such as the Vienna Convention on Nuclear Liability.

Next proposed topics

• Organizational Preparations for Licensing and Inspection;
• UAE Preparations to Receive International Transfer of Nuclear Technology;
• Site Selection and Risk Evaluation.